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PART 36.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS OF MOROCCO.

48

January to March 1908.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

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Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Morocco.

Part 36.

[7] **No. 1.**

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 1, 1908.)

(No. 620.)

Sir, *Paris, December* 31, 1907.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 605 of the 21st instant, in which I inclosed copy of a Memorandum left with M. Pichon respecting the rules to govern the preliminary inquiry into British losses at Casa Blanca, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of his Excellency's reply.

In the view of the French Government, it would suffice that the preliminary Commissions should be instructed to apply the principles laid down in the Circular addressed on the 11th October by France and Spain to foreign Governments.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Memorandum from M. Pichon to Sir F. Bertie.

PAR une note en date du 21 de ce mois, son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne a fait connaître au Département que le Gouvernement Britannique désirerait connaître les règles proposées pour le fonctionnement de la Commission Internationale des Indemnités de Casa Blanca, afin de pouvoir en prescrire l'observation à la Commission Anglaise chargée de l'enquête préparatoire.

Le Gouvernement Français estime qu'il suffirait d'inviter les Commissions Nationales préparatoires à appliquer les principes exposés dans la communication que la France et l'Espagne ont faite en Octobre dernier aux Gouvernements étrangers et qui figure au Livre Jaune sous le No. 519.

Le 28 *Décembre*, 1907.

[42628] **No. 2.**

*Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon.**

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, January* 1, 1908.

I BEG leave to acknowledge the receipt of the note communicated by M. Geoffray on the 30th ultimo, bringing to the knowledge of His Majesty's Government the mandate given by the Moorish Government to the Governments of France and Spain

* Also to Marquis de Villalobar, *mutatis mutandis*.

to exercise surveillance over the contraband trade in arms on the coast of Morocco, and the measures which will be adopted to give effect to that mandate, in conformity with Articles 24, 25, 80, and 91 of the General Act of the Algeciras Conference.

I shall have the honour to transmit to your Excellency as soon as possible a list of British ships trading regularly with Moorish ports which will be exempt from the visits of the French and Spanish war-ships charged with the execution of the measures contemplated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[42628] No. 3.

Sir Edward Grey to Baron Gericke.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 1, 1908.

WITH reference to my note of the 23rd October, 1907, I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government have now received from the French and Spanish Governments details of the arrangements proposed for dealing with the contraband trade in arms on the coast of Morocco, and that steps will be taken to communicate them to the British ship-owners concerned.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[41440] No. 4.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 1, 1908.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to state, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, that an International Commission is to sit in Morocco to examine the claims brought against the Moorish Government on account of losses suffered by persons other than Moorish subjects owing to the disturbances which took place at Casa Blanca during the past summer.

In view of the importance of the claims which, it is anticipated, will be submitted to the Commission by British subjects, it will, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, be necessary to appoint, as the Representative of His Majesty's Government on the Commission, an English Barrister of a certain standing. The Barrister selected must have a thorough knowledge of the French language, in which he should be able to converse fluently on technical points, since the proceedings will no doubt be conducted in that language.

In order to assist in selecting the British Representative, I am to request that Sir E. Grey may be furnished with the views of the Treasury Solicitor in regard to the scale of fees by which a Barrister possessing these qualifications should be remunerated.

It is impossible to say when the Commission will meet or what period will be covered by its labours. The French Government, however, who have already selected as their Delegate a Councillor at the Court of Cassation, are anxious that the meeting shall take place as soon as possible, and, as Sir E. Grey desires not be responsible for any delay, I am to request that an early answer may be returned to this letter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. LANGLEY.

[42628] No. 5.

Foreign Office to Board of Trade.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 1, 1908.

WITH reference to your letter of the 30th October, 1907, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, for the information of the Board of Trade, copy of a note communicated by the French Minister on the 30th December, 1907,*

* See Part 35, No. 167.

respecting the measures to be taken by the French and Spanish Governments for the suppression of the contraband trade in arms on the coast of Morocco. A similar communication was made simultaneously by the Spanish Minister.

I am to suggest that, as these measures are to be put into force at once, they should be communicated without further delay to the Associations representing British ship-owners.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. LANGLEY.

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[7] No. 6.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 5.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 2, 1908.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 215 of the 19th ultimo, I transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris,* inclosing a communication from the French Government to the effect that the preliminary Commissions inquiring into the losses of foreign subjects at Casa Blanca should be instructed to apply the principles already laid down for the guidance of the International Commission.

The inquiry which His Majesty's Consul at Casa Blanca was authorized by my despatch No. 209 A of the 9th ultimo to institute is, no doubt, already being conducted on the lines suggested by the French Government. Mr. Madden should, however, in placing the results of his investigations before the International Commission, be careful not to attempt to discriminate between claims on account of direct or indirect losses.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

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[208] No. 7.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 3, 1908.)

(No. 195. Confidential.)

Sir, *Madrid, December* 30, 1907.

THE French Ambassador called at the Embassy to-day, and was led by the prospect of M. Pichon's visit to Madrid, which is now nearly fixed for the 3rd January and following days, to speak of the progress of events in Morocco. These will no doubt form a principal subject of conversation between the French Foreign Minister and the Spanish Ministers, with whom he will come in contact. M. Révoil had no special complaints to make of the recent action of the Spanish authorities at Casa Blanca, and he expects that M. Pichon will do much to remove any signs still remaining of a lack of harmony between the French and Spanish leaders on the spot. The substitution of General d'Amade for General Drude his Excellency believes to be a very salutary measure. M. Clemenceau's well-known determination to be led into no policy of adventure had been too strictly interpreted by General Drude, who habitually shrank from the most necessary warlike undertakings. A change would now be quickly apparent, and no doubt some reinforcements, especially cavalry, would be sent out to enable a more decisive blow to be struck.

M. Révoil read me a telegram he had just received from Paris on the Casa Blanca indemnity question. The German Government had intimated to M. Jules Cambon at Berlin its desire that German sufferers from events at Casa Blanca should not be restricted to receiving the bare amount of indemnification assigned to them by the German Claims Commission at that place. If the International Commission should assign indemnities on a more generous scale, German claimants must reserve their right to put in supplementary demands. The French Government thought this request could not well be refused, and M. Révoil was about to obtain Señor Allende-

* No. 1.

salazar's consent to a reply to that effect. He told me this was only one of many instances he could adduce to show how the indemnity question had been complicated by the German effort to settle it independently of the other Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

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[653] No. 8.

Note communicated by Señor de Villa Urrutia, January 4, 1908.

(Confidential.)

AT the end of December last the two principal Chiefs of the Imperial Mehalla of Mar-Chica presented themselves before the Military Governor of Melilla and begged that their forces might enter that Spanish town in order to avoid any disturbance, for the soldiers composing the mehalla were worn out by hunger and lacked all means of subsistence. They begged that they might not be treated as enemies, and promised, of course, to surrender their arms.

The Spanish Government telegraphed to the above-mentioned authority at Melilla, instructing him to accede to this request, to collect the arms, and to enter into the necessary negotiations with the rebel Chiefs, in order that the loyal troops might not be molested. At the same time they telegraphed to the Spanish Minister in Morocco—at the moment at Rabat—instructing him to inform the Maghzen of the above, pointing out that matters had reached such a pitch through their negligence and disregard of the proposals laid before them by Spain that the Spanish Government were rendering them this fresh service, but that it was urgent to come to a decision as to the method of transporting the troops in question from Melilla to some other place in the Empire, as it was impossible to keep them where they were except for the moment.

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[441] No. 9.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6, 1908.)

(No. 487.)

Sir, *Tangier, December* 23, 1907.

AT the instigation of the Moorish Delegates, a meeting took place to-day, at which these were present, with the foreign Representatives to consider the steps to be taken to complete the work left over from last year in connection with the Act of Algeciras. The Articles which it was proposed to take in hand were 63, 65, and 72, and the system adopted last year with regard to the other Regulations was proposed, the Diplomatic Corps being divided into Committees, with a view to submitting a regulation to the plenary meeting.

I suggested that the Representatives of France, Germany, Spain, and Great Britain should form a Committee to propose a settlement regarding the Habous and Makhzen properties (Article 63), the subjects of those Powers holding the vast majority of those properties, and thus being specially interested in the matter. The Italian Minister objected to the statement that any one Power could be regarded as having a special interest in the matter, and protested with some warmth that every Representative had an equal right to be represented on this Committee. He was eventually added to the Committee, which thus consists of five members of the Diplomatic Corps.

I inquired of the Moorish delegation whether the Special Commissioner provided for by Article 63 had been named by His Shereefian Majesty, but was informed that the whole delegation would act as Special Commissioner, to which the meeting agreed.

A Committee, consisting of the Italian, American, and Belgian Ministers, was appointed to consider Article 64, and the Austrian, Netherland, and Russian Ministers form the Committee to draw up proposals for stamp duties, passport fees, &c. (Article 65), and to determine the maximum of opium to be introduced under Article 72.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[442] No. 10.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6, 1908.)

(No. 488.)

Sir, *Tangier, December* 23, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to report that a Sultan's letter was read here yesterday, with the usual salutes from the town battery. Very little interest seems to have been taken in it by the Moors, but few of whom, I am informed, were present at its reading.

The letter related that a victory had been gained by the loyal tribe of Seraghna over Mulai Hafid and his forces, which were compelled to retreat to the sanctuary of Ben Sassi, a short distance from Morocco City, having lost many killed. The letter then went on to say that His Majesty Mulai Abdul Aziz has the intention of leaving Rabat very shortly for Daralbaida, as the discussions which have taken place with the French have resulted in the latter agreeing to withdraw their forces from that port on the arrival of Abdul Aziz.

The latter part of the Shereefian message appears to have caused a certain amount of amusement among the more educated natives, who ask themselves whether His Majesty intends to go by sea, as there is not sufficient force at his command to make it advisable to attempt to travel there by land.

I may remark that the report of the defeat of Mulai Hafid has not been confirmed; on the contrary, it would appear from the latest reports from the south that the Seraghna tribe has declared itself in favour of Mulai Hafid's cause after the latter had inflicted some small losses on this tribe.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[444] No. 11.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6, 1908.)

(No. 490.)

Sir, *Tangier, December* 27, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to you copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida on the subject of recent desertions to the enemy which have occurred among the Moslem soldiers of the French Expeditionary Force.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 11.

Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 339.)

Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, December* 24, 1907.

I THINK it right to bring to your Excellency's notice that a certain feeling of distrust prevails in some quarters here regarding the trustworthiness of the French Mahommedan soldiery of occupation. As I have already mentioned to you, two Spahis recently deserted to the Arabs, causing a sensation among the French army, as it is said that such a thing has never happened before in this corps. I learn now, on the best authority, that a few nights ago six men of the Tirailleurs (General Drude's old regiment), including a corporal, went over to the Arabs. They took only a few rifles, but a large quantity of ammunition, and fired on the French camp. Presumably the ammunition was intended for sale to the Arabs, though the deserters seem to have lost sight of the fact that the French cartridges do not fit the Arab rifles. The French authorities, I understand, not unnaturally, desire as little publicity as possible to be given to this affair, so that it may be kept out of the German local press; but I am told the Germans here allege that there are now eleven French Moslem soldiers in Mulai Raschid's camp.

Quite a possible explanation for these desertions has been given to me by a native, who tells me that a lot of the French soldiers are natives of Morocco who went to Algeria, and, having married there, took service in the French army. This man states that the deserters receive a welcome from Mulai Raschid, who provided them

with Moorish clothes, and dispatched them, at their request, to Morocco City to their homes in those parts. It appears, in fact, that there is a native from the Oolad Hariz tribe in the French army here.

It has been observed, also, that Arabs who have never before been seen in town, and fanatical saintly personages, get acquainted with and talk to the French Moslem soldiers. Indeed, from a few words I had in Arabic with a Zouave sergeant some time back, these men appear to be ignorant of the exact reasons of their having been brought to Casa Blanca. This man inquired of me if the Arabs of this country were bad people, and asked me whether the Basha had been unable to manage them.

Recently, too, the first detachment of Goumiers sent here were sent back to Algeria, and a new squadron, recruited to take their place, was landed. These men seem to be a wild lot, and do not, at any rate, inspire confidence. The natives allege that some of the first company of Goumiers deserted also.

In my opinion, there is no need to apprehend any collective disloyalty on the part of the French Mahommedan soldiery. The desertions above referred to, which may have been brought about, not improbably, by a desire to evade some disciplinary punishment, are, no doubt, relatively unimportant amongst so large a body of men as are now here. Nevertheless, the employment of a mass of Mahommedans in a Moslem country against their own coreligionists, with a small proportion of European Legionary soldiers only, might give rise to trouble and cause anxiety as to their behaviour. It must be added that the French officers seem a most capable body of men, and have no doubt been specially selected.

The French troops make occasional reconnaissances in the direction of Sidi Mumen. They appear to have orders to avoid taking the offensive or firing on the natives unless provoked to do so by hostile acts on their part. The country, therefore, immediately outside the lines is extremely insecure and unsafe; armed Arabs can be seen, so officers say, from the camps, and small parties of them hold positions at no great distance away. In fact, the French Vice-Consul told me only a few days ago that it is dangerous to be out of range of the pickets even between the pickets and the town, as armed Arabs might be in hiding and fire on one. At present it is imprudent to go further than 2 or 3 kilom. from town, and, indeed, on some sides, less than that.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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[445] No. 12.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 6, 1908.)

(No. 491.)

Sir, *Tangier, December* 30, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of news based on reports received during the past week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 12.

Summary of News respecting Morocco during the past week.

THE reports received during the week have been less contradictory than usual, and the situation is clearer than it has been for some time. The Marquis de Segonzac, whose proceedings have been previously reported on, returned to Mogador, and Mr. Wilkinson obtained some information with regard to his journey. He had spent six days in Mulai Hafid's camp at Ben Sassi, and had had two interviews with him in the presence of Kaïd Glawi and an interpreter. It is said that Segonzac reproached Mulai Hafid with the injury that he was doing his country. He told him that the Powers would never recognize him; that Abd-el-Aziz was supported by France, and that in fighting him he was also fighting France. Mulai Hafid replied that he had no hostility to France, but that she had no right to interfere. His brother had ruined the country, and he meant to fight him. Segonzac urged him to give up the contest, and said that France would secure his pardon for him. Mulai Hafid did not reply to this suggestion, and the interview terminated. The Marquis' interpreter states that at that time Mulai Hafid's force consisted of about 15,000 paid troops; the tribesmen

were then still collecting, and it was impossible to estimate their numbers. Mulai Hafid himself was reported to be all energy and watchfulness, and well informed as to what was passing. Whilst Segonzac was in the camp 110 prisoners were brought in from the Shawia district. They were, at their own request, at once incorporated in the army. Segonzac's visit is of not less than three weeks ago. Another account, also from a French source, dated the 20th December, gives a less hopeful view of Mulai Hafid's position. The writer believes that he can count on no one but his immediate followers, whom he estimates at 4,800 men. Of these not more than 1,400 are effectively armed. There is said to be no enthusiasm for the cause, and desertions may be expected. This account is borne out by the last news received on the 25th instant by French wireless telegraph from Mazagan, to the effect that Mulai Hafid's attempt to coerce the Sheragna has resulted in his defeat, and that he has retired into Marakesh.

Mr. Neroutsos reported that he had received a letter from Aissa Ben Omar, Mulai Hafid's Vizier, in which he asked that the Makhzen might be informed that he occupied his present position under compulsion. Aissa has previously privately affirmed his loyalty to the Sultan. He is an influential man in the south.

If Mulai Hafid's cause shows signs of decline, there has been no corresponding advance in that of Mulai Abd-el-Aziz. Complete inaction reigns at Rabat. In view of this, and of what now appears to be the enforced inactivity of Mulai Hafid, it is difficult to foresee an end to the situation.

The tribes of the Gharb have refused to accept the Kaïds named by the Sultan, and have chosen their own.

The Ulema are reported to have returned a decided negative to the Sultan's inquiry as to the legality of accepting foreign armed assistance to suppress disorders.

Kaïd Anfluz continues to maintain the Sultan's cause at Mogador. Mr. Wilkinson reports that he was again attacked on the 14th instant, and that fighting continued for several days, the object of the attack being to get between Anfluz' force and the town, so that it appears that this had not already been accomplished as was stated last week. After making allowance for the gross exaggerations inseparable from accounts of Moorish fighting, Mr. Wilkinson believes that Anfluz, without winning any great success, has maintained his position. Dissensions have arisen between him and the Algerian Lieutenant attached to his force, and the latter has returned to Rabat. Anfluz complained to the Governor of Mogador that the French Consul was in correspondence with the Algerian, and was giving him advice as to what to do. Rumours that Anfluz contemplates deserting the Sultan's cause are still current at Mogador.

The disorders at Fez referred to last week were due to the rise in the price of food consequent on the anarchy in the surrounding country. The poorer population were joined by tribesmen from outside the town and pillaged some of the Jewish quarter and burnt the Government stores. The octroi posts at the gates were destroyed, and for some days no taxes were paid.

The situation round Casa Blanca has not improved. Mr. Madden says that the state of insecurity has obliged him to issue a warning to British subjects not to proceed beyond the French lines. A belief is current that the French intend to make a forward movement shortly, and that they will attack Ben Rashid at Mediuna. Ben Rashid appears to have created an independent position for himself, and is no longer acting as a lieutenant of Mulai Hafid.

C. R.

December 30, 1907.

[42324] No. 13.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 10.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 6, 1908.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 485 of the 17th ultimo, and I approve the instructions which you have given to His Majesty's Consul at Casa Blanca as regards the reception of claims presented to him by Mokhalats on account of their losses during the disturbances at that place.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[41752] No. 14.

Foreign Office to Messrs. Forwood Brothers and Co.

Foreign Office, January 9, 1908.

Gentlemen,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 20th ultimo, drawing attention to M. Pichon's Circular of the 11th October last, in which he proposed to exclude all indirect claims for damage due to the bombardment at Casa Blanca, and expressing the hope that British interests in this matter may be safeguarded.

I am to observe that the French and Spanish Governments, in making this proposal, followed the precedent established by the Alexandria Claims Commission of 1883, which was instituted in almost precisely analogous circumstances. Inasmuch as the Khedivial Decree, constituting the latter Commission and excluding from consideration indirect claims, was accepted by this country, which also took the initiative in recommending it to the other Powers concerned, His Majesty's Government considered themselves precluded from raising objections to the exclusion of indirect claims on the present occasion.

You will, however, observe that the Circular to which you refer does not profess to indicate what claims are to be regarded as direct and what as indirect. Where, therefore, there is any doubt as to whether a particular claim comes under the one or the other category, it would be well to bring it to the knowledge of His Majesty's Consul at Casa Blanca. The latter will not attempt to discriminate between the two classes of claims, but will submit all alike to the International Commission, who alone will decide whether they are admissible or not.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. LANGLEY.

[1032] No. 15.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11.)

(No. 6.)

Sir,

Madrid, January 6, 1908.

ACCORDING to an official announcement in to-day's newspapers, the establishment of a police force in Tetuan under Spanish instructors is likely to encounter some opposition.

A group of Moors, headed by a fanatical Kaïd, induced the Pasha of Tetuan to forward to the Sultan's Representative at Tangier their Petition that the inauguration of the new force might be postponed for the present.

Hearing of this, the Spanish Government instructed the Secretary in charge of their Legation at Tangier to inquire of Mohammed Torres and El Guebbas what steps they proposed to take to secure the due accomplishment of the measures prescribed in the General Act of Algeciras, and recently confirmed once more by the Sultan at Rabat.

The Spanish Legation was informed in reply that the Tetuan authorities would receive directions making it clear that the Sultan wished the police force to be set on foot as agreed.

A special messenger was to leave Tangier to-day for Tetuan, with instructions to assist in bringing about the desired result.

The Spanish Legation was further instructed to impress on the Maghzen the necessity of providing the local authorities at Tetuan with funds for the above purpose.

The Spanish instructor of police, who is already at Tetuan, has reported that the population on the whole is peacefully disposed, and that he anticipates no further difficulties.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[1013] No. 16.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11.)

(No. 1.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tangier, January 10, 1908.

ACCORDING to reliable news which has just reached me from Fez, Mulai Hafid was unanimously proclaimed there as Sultan on the 5th instant.

[1262] No. 17.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 2.)

Sir,

Tangier, January 2, 1908.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 445 of the 13th November, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Casa Blanca, respecting the payment of compensation to German sufferers from the recent disturbances.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 17.

Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 350. Confidential.)

Sir,

Dar-al-Baida, December 31, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to report that the money advanced by the German Government to assist German subjects residing in Casa Blanca who suffered direct loss from the bombardment, to allot which sum a German Claims Commission recently sat, has been paid over to the persons interested.

I am informed privately and confidentially that the amounts paid are as follows: to Messrs. Tonnies 850*l.*, C. Ficke 3,570*l.*, Brandt 3,570*l.*, H. Ficke 550*l.*, Dr. Dobbert 300*l.*, Opitz 1,250*l.*, Bazlen 1,000*l.*, Krake 640*l.*

I learn from the same source that the sums paid represent one quarter of the direct losses claimed for. They include country as well as town debts, but I understand that the German Government has so far refused to agree to the principle of indemnification for country debts. As, however, the quarter claims paid include debts in the country, German subjects have hopes that their Government will eventually consent to support this part of their claims.

The above-stated sums, representing as they do only one quarter of the direct losses, are thought to be inexplicably large.

The German Consul tells me that debts due by foreign subjects and foreign protégés were rejected by his Commission on the supposition that these debtors will receive indemnity in due course by the help of their own authorities, and eventually be able to pay their debts. As a general rule, books and drafts were accepted as proofs of claims presented, but in cases where no proofs could be shown through loss of account books, invoices, &c., in the pillage, claimants had to bind themselves to take an oath, if required to do so, later on.

Claims made for loss and profits were eliminated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

[1265] No. 18.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 5.)

Sir,

Tangier, January 5, 1908.

MR. BEWICKE, British Consular Agent at Tetuan, reports that there is considerable alarm in that town owing to the institution of the police provided for by the Act of Algeciras, who were about to enter on their duties on the 1st instant. A meeting took place on that day of a large number of townspeople, who waited on the

Governor and requested the withdrawal and the postponement of the installation of the police. The persons who took part were inclined to be excited, but were restrained by the Cadi, and eventually a letter was sent here to Hadj Mohammed Torres explaining the situation, and saying that, as Tetuan was generally a peaceable town, there was no reason to institute the police there. The tribes are reported to be inclined to threaten an attack on the town unless the police are withdrawn, and there are now no troops at Tetuan. The townspeople, moreover, state that perfect quiet prevails, and that the police are not required.

There can be little doubt that the Moors have but a very vague idea as to what the police are to be; they do not understand that the men will be their own countrymen, but imagine that they are to be French and Spanish. They also believe that the police will carry out perquisitions in their homes, and this idea is naturally antipathetic to them. But it is doubtful whether the opposition in this part of Morocco is very genuine or deep-rooted, and in the case of Tetuan it has probably been stirred up by some of the authorities who are opposed to all reform, as was the case recently at Rabat.

It is unfortunate that the opposition to the police should have first declared itself in Rabat and Tetuan, for in both these places the foreign communities would be at the mercy of a fanatical mob. At Rabat, all communication with vessels of war is precarious, owing to the bar, and at Tetuan the distance of 7 miles from the sea presents some difficulty in furnishing speedy assistance. It is to be feared, however, that if the French and Spanish Governments give way to these popular objections in these two cases, the police will never be established anywhere.

As regards Tangier, steps are being taken towards establishing the police, but in spite of good pay being offered to the men, there is little enthusiasm for joining this force.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[1266] No. 19.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 6.)
Tangier, January 5, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of news based on reports received during the past week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 19.

Summary of News respecting Morocco during the past week.

THE situation in the south and the prospects of Mulai Hafid have formed the subject of a separate despatch. His cause will have received an indirect blow this week in the capture of the Kasbah of Mediuna by the French, which took place on the 1st January. Mediuna is in the hills about 15 miles east of Casa Blanca. It is described as a walled inclosure of the usual Moorish type. Its situation is important as commanding several highways, including that from Marakesh to Rabat. It has been for some time past the head-quarters of Mulai Rashid and of the robber bands which have lately made communication between Casa Blanca and the interior impossible. It is hoped that the capture may restore the condition of things as regards the town to their normal state, give protection to the tribes who have already made submission, and induce those of the immediate neighbourhood who are still hostile to make terms. Its effect on the more distant tribes can only be moral, and it remains to be seen what the result will be. The news of the action was received by wireless telegraph, and no details are known beyond the French loss, which is given as one spahi killed and three tirailleurs wounded* (all native Algerians); General Drude was in command. There is some doubt as to the circumstances of his resignation; he

* The French Consul at Casa Blanca says that only three Frenchmen have been killed in action since the beginning of the operations.

appears to have been ill for some time past, and to have asked for leave. The order to occupy Mediuna is stated to have crossed his application. The French Government, who are said to think that the General has acted with too great circumspection lately, were not sorry to supersede him, and appointed General d'Amade in his place. General Drude, however, has carried out his orders before his successor could arrive, and when only a small proportion of the reinforcement of 4,000 men can have been disembarked.

A beginning has been made at Rabat with the organization of the new police, and Mr. Neroutsos wrote in some alarm at the state of public opinion on the subject, which seems to be, as at Tetuan, in a state of ferment. A meeting of the principal inhabitants had been held at the Governor's house to protest against the inauguration of the new force at a moment when the Government was already sufficiently unstable. The neighbouring tribes were said to have threatened to attack the town if the scheme were put in force. A deputation visited the Sultan on the subject, and are said to have received an assurance that the inauguration would be postponed pending less anxious times. Mr. Neroutsos describes the officer charged with the organization of the new police as being particularly tactful and soldierly, and as being personally liked by the Moors, but the feeling against his mission is too strong for him to overcome. Mr. Neroutsos takes a grave view of the situation produced at Rabat by this agitation, which is confirmed by some of the members of the French Mission who had remained there, and have now returned to Tangier.

No fresh disorders are reported from Fez, but the town appears to be in a state of anarchy, and no taxes are being paid.

In the course of the 1st January the French ships off Casa Blanca were obliged by bad weather to put to sea. The "Nive," a transport, was driven on to the rocks about 5 miles south of the town. The crew were saved. The ship is likely to become a total loss.

January 5, 1908.

[1296] No. 20.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 17.)
Paris, January 11, 1908.

Sir,

THE "Journal des Débats" of to-day's date publishes the following information, supplied by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, with regard to the progress of events in Morocco.

The organization of the Moroccan police at Rabat is completed. No difficulty was found in recruiting men among the native population, many offers of employment being received. The French instructors have been actively engaged on their duties. With regard to the question of the contraband trade in arms, considerable activity has been observed on the northern coast. Arms and cartridges are believed to have been passed into the country in barrels; a fact which shows the necessity for the steps recently taken by France and Spain with a view of stopping this trade. Negotiations are continuing relative to the indemnities for losses sustained at Casa Blanca, and it is hoped, as Germany is showing a conciliatory disposition on the question of principle, that a solution will shortly be found for the questions at issue.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[1396] No. 21.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, January 13, 1908.*

MY telegram No. 1 of the 10th instant.

I understand that Sultan, on hearing of the Proclamation, invited French to occupy Rabat and other ports. Invitation was declined, but a French force has reached Buzuiker, 25 miles from Rabat, to serve as a protection in the event of disturbances. There is some anxiety as to how feast on 15th will pass off.

[1402] No. 22.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 22.)

Sir, *Paris, January 13, 1908.*

THE "Matin" of this morning gives an account of the deliberations carried on yesterday by M. Clemenceau with the Ministers for Marine, War, and Finance, the French Ambassador at Berlin, and the French Minister at Tangier relative to the situation created in Morocco by the Proclamation of Mulai Hafid as Sultan.

The Minister of Marine stated that the naval forces off the coast of Morocco were sufficient for any eventuality; eleven ships of war in an effective state were at the disposal of Admiral Philibert.

The question of proper protection for the Europeans at Rabat was also discussed, as a certain effervescence had been reported in that town.

It was agreed that the events reported from Morocco were not of a kind to modify French policy, which is a perfectly clear and decided one. France is obliged, on the one hand, to provide for the security of the Algerian frontier; the operations of General Lyautey have been very efficacious in this direction, and it has been possible to relax the severity of the measures taken in that quarter. On the other hand, France is bound to maintain order in the ports. The instructions sent by the French Government have this end in view and nothing else. The French Government cannot and will not do more than this.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[1441] No. 23.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received January 14.)

Sir, *Treasury Chambers, January 13, 1908.*

WITH reference to Mr. Langley's letter of the 1st instant, inquiring as to the remuneration which should be paid to a barrister whom it is proposed to appoint in connection with an International Commission to examine claims against the Moorish Government arising out of the disturbances at Casa Blanca, I am directed by the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury to request that you will move Secretary Sir Edward Grey to cause them to be furnished with some information as to the number and proportion of British claims which may be expected to come before the Commission, and as to the probable duration of the inquiry. My Lords would also be glad to know what course it is proposed to take as regards abating, in accordance with precedent, a percentage from the awards, or from payments settled out of Court, to defray the expenses of the Commission.

I am, &c.
(Signed) G. H. MURRAY.

[1496] No. 24.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 9. Confidential.)

Sir, *Madrid, January 11, 1908.*

M. PICHON, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, arrived in Madrid on the 6th instant and left again for a short tour in the south of Spain the day before yesterday. The visit was arranged in Paris when King Alfonso was there on his way to England in October last, accompanied by Señor Allendesalazar, Foreign Minister of Spain. His Majesty's desire to bring about a more cordial understanding between France and Spain, in respect of the action of the two countries in Morocco, is now well known, and both the King's visit to Paris and M. Pichon's visit to Madrid may be regarded as

having a close connection with that object. The result has not been unsatisfactory. I have already remarked in my despatch No. 191, Confidential, of the 21st December, 1907, on the improvement in the attitude of this Government towards France which had set in within the last few months. I believe that M. Pichon's conversations with King Alfonso and the Spanish Ministers have confirmed and strengthened this tendency, and that, in so far as an Agreement between the two Governments can secure a better understanding between Frenchmen and Spaniards in Morocco itself, some good may have been done by the interviews which have taken place.

M. and Mme. Pichon were received in audience by the King and also dined with His Majesty on the 7th instant; they came to an informal luncheon at this Embassy and dined with Señor Allendesalazar on the 8th; and there was an official luncheon followed by a reception in their honour at the French Embassy on the 9th. The Spanish Foreign Minister and the French Ambassador were good enough to invite me, and also the Russian Chargé d'Affaires to their entertainments, but no other foreign Representatives were present at them, except at the afternoon reception at the French Embassy.

It has, of course, been generally remarked that the special relations of France with England and Russia were intended to be indicated by the above arrangements.

M. Pichon's visit was described as unofficial, but in reality it was surrounded by every mark of attention which is usually associated with the formal occasions of this kind, and it was particularly noticed that at the French Embassy and in the house of the Spanish Foreign Minister, as well as at the Palace, M. Pichon was given the seat of honour, before the French Ambassador and all the other guests.

In conversation with M. Pichon I gathered that he had been greatly pleased with the friendly assurances of King Alfonso; that Señor Allendesalazar's declaration had also been quite satisfactory; and that Señor Maura, the Spanish Prime Minister, though disclosing his lack of faith in any enterprise whatever connected with Morocco and emphasizing the desire of Spain to restrict her intervention within the narrowest limits compatible with the observance of her engagements, had left the French Foreign Minister in no doubt as to the intention of the Spanish Government to proceed in concert with France in the work of pacifying and policing the coast line of Morocco.

The Madrid press has been a good deal exercized by M. Pichon's visit, the Opposition papers connecting it with a supposed French desire to secure the co-operation of Spain in a scheme of armed penetration into the interior of Morocco, each country confining its action to its special sphere of influence.

The French Ambassador formally complained of the state of uncertainty in which the Spanish press was allowed to remain, and urged on the Spanish Government the necessity of making some authoritative announcement which should place matters in their true light.

The result was a semi-official communication, as published by the Government organ, the "Epoca," on the evening of the 7th instant, and with which M. Révoil declared himself satisfied. It declares that there will be no change in the avowed intention of France and Spain to carry out, in the most loyal manner, their joint policy, which is founded on the Agreements of October 1904 and on the provisions of the General Act of Algeciras.

Mr. E. Grant Duff has had the goodness to furnish me with the inclosed précis of the principal articles which have appeared in the Madrid newspapers.

I am not aware of any impending military operations on the part of Spain beyond the occupation of a point on the Mar Chica, near Melilla, which is now overrun by the Sultan's mehalla, recently roughly handled by the Roghi's forces. As soon as the mehalla can be got rid of, it is, I believe, the intention of the Melilla authorities to occupy this point and to continue to hold it. Señor Allendesalazar tells me their object is to check the illicit traffic which hitherto has passed through it to the Roghi's camp, escaping all payment of duty. I hear, however, from the French Ambassador, that a further supposed object of the Spanish Government is to prevent a French railway being made to connect certain mines in the neighbourhood, which are claimed by conflicting French and Spanish Companies, with the sea-coast. Spain holding both Melilla and the port of the Mar Chica, she could object to any but a Spanish line being constructed, thus favouring the Spanish as against the French claimants.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Inclosure in No. 24.

The Madrid Press and M. Pichon's Visit to Madrid.

THE reason for the visit of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to Madrid has given rise to much speculation and comment in the Spanish press. With the exception of one in the "Imparcial" (Liberal) of the 7th instant, the articles which have appeared have not been unfriendly, but there is evidently a general idea that French policy in Morocco has recently become more aggressive, and a note of fear lest Señor Maura should involve his country in wild and disastrous schemes of conquest. Ominous references have been made in "A.B.C." to the death of King Sebastian of Portugal in battle with the Moors in 1578 and to the unsatisfactory Spanish campaign in Morocco in the early sixties. This fear of possible complications is particularly visible in the "Liberal" and "Correo," while the "Imparcial," in an article published on the 7th January, goes further. While personally welcoming M. Pichon to Madrid, it goes on to say that he must not imagine that a mere visit of courtesy can modify the course of Spanish policy in Morocco. The carrying out of the Algeciras Act is a point of honour for Spain, who cannot deviate a hair's breadth from the duties she has undertaken. France and Spain have but one common interest in Morocco—that of civilization. Their other interests are either distinct or antagonistic. French expansion, for instance, on her Algerian frontier is incompatible with the prosperity of Melilla, while the repeated loans made by France to the Sultan adversely affects the circulation of Spanish money in Morocco. If M. Pichon's visit serves to draw closer the bonds of friendship uniting the two nations, well and good; but nothing further is desired by public opinion in Spain.

The "Época" of the 7th instant contains an inspired article with regard to M. Pichon's presence in Madrid. The visit, it says, of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs returns the visit paid by Señor Allendesalazar to Paris, and will not lead, as a part of the Madrid press suppose, to any change in the understanding between France and Spain in regard to their joint action in Morocco or modify the perfect agreement already existing. Both Governments are resolved as hitherto to carry out the policy laid down by the terms of the Algeciras Act and to guard their respective interests with that moderation to which both parties have been faithful. The Governments of the two countries are convinced that their respective rights in the Shereefian Empire are in harmony, and, the territorial limits within which these rights may be exercised having been the subject of agreement in 1904, are confident as to their reciprocal intentions. The objects of the action of the French Government in the neighbourhood of Casa Blanca and on the Algerian frontier has further been officially limited and regulated. The vacillation of the Maghzen in regard to the organization of the police at Tetuan caused by the attitude of certain local bodies, has also been apparent at Rabat, where the natives have shown some opposition, but it is to be hoped that, aided by the prudent counsels of Spain and France, the Sultan will take measures which will enable the terms of the Algeciras Act to be normally carried out.

The excitement to which the visit has given rise has not been lessened by the fact that the Prime Minister yesterday on leaving the Palace, whither he was accompanied by M. Pichon, informed a reporter that the visit was purely one of courtesy and that nothing as regards Morocco remained to be discussed between the two Governments. Further, that all negotiations between France and Spain were carried on by the respective Ambassadors. M. Pichon himself added that, before leaving Madrid for the south of Spain, he had wished to pay his respects to King Alfonso. As regards the Morocco question, there was nothing special to be said. There was some native opposition to the establishment of the police under the Algeciras Act, but it was to be hoped that this was not serious and that the Sultan would be able to control it.

The Government communiqué in the "Época," of the 7th January, excited the suspicion of the "Imparcial," which on the 8th contained a leading article to the effect that recent events at Ujda, Casa Blanca, and on the Algerian frontier by no means coincided with the statement that "the object of the French in those districts has been officially limited and defined." It points out that the strength of Spain in Morocco consists in the special affinity which the natives feel towards Spaniards. The events above referred to tend to excite the feelings of the Moors against Spain, and thus adversely affect Spanish commerce at Larache, Mogador, Casa Blanca, and Rabat. Señor Maura may say what he likes, but France has other aspirations in Morocco and is trying to realize them by paths on which Spain cannot follow her. Public opinion is

suspicious, because it is not clearly aware of the precise nature of the agreement with France.

The "Correspondencia de España," of the 9th June, contains a lengthy article criticizing Señor Maura's statement that M. Pichon's visit is purely one of courtesy. It attaches the greatest importance to the presence of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and reminds Señor Maura of his own idea, viz., that Spain should leave the Atlantic side of Morocco alone and develop her influence from the "Mulaya to Tangier." M. Pichon had really come to say to the Spanish Government "the moment to act has arrived." Our hands are free. There is nothing to prevent France from carrying out her policy on the Atlantic coast, or Spain from developing her interest on the Mediterranean; but no time should be lost.

The article goes on to say that Germany, in return for a free hand in Turkey, has agreed to leave Morocco to France. So that for Spanish interests in Morocco it is a case of "now or never."

[1581] No. 25.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, January 14, 1908.*

MUCH apprehension is felt by the Spanish Government owing to the new situation in Morocco and the approaching occupation of Rabat, which, the Minister of Foreign Affairs informs me, a French force from Casa Blanca is about to undertake. The Spanish Government maintain that they are not called upon to take part in this movement, since Rabat is outside the Spanish sphere, and the policing of that place is assigned exclusively to France. The Spanish Minister is returning from Rabat as soon as possible, having completed his business there.

It is the action of France in Tangier itself to which the Spanish Government most strongly object, and which is causing them special anxiety. It is reported that Commandant Fournié is organizing a Moorish force in that neighbourhood. In the opinion of Señor Allendesalazar this force forms a little native army, with which France is preparing to dominate the entire region in the event of Morocco falling to pieces, and cannot be regarded as a police force for employment, as arranged, outside Tangier in co-operation with the Spanish police force to be formed inside that town. Spain cannot consent to such a force being under French command. She must take charge in the Tangier region as France did at Casa Blanca.

The French Government have informed the Spanish Ambassador at Paris that Commandant Fournié is merely taking over the work which was formerly done by Kaïd Maclean. This explanation does not satisfy the Spanish Government, who cannot give their consent to a Moorish army being formed under French officers at Tangier.

Señor Allendesalazar, at the request of the President of the Council of Ministers, called on me to-day to beg that I would bring the present question to your notice. He urges that England would surely not wish the Spanish sphere to fall under the control of France.

I stated that no report had reached me of such action on the part of France.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs will see M. Pichon to-day, when the latter passes through Madrid on his return to Paris.

[1581] No. 26.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, January 15, 1908.*

SPANISH complaint of French action at Tangier.

Of what does the French proceeding consist, referred to in Sir M. de Bunsen's telegram No. 3 of the 14th instant?

[1598] No. 27.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 15.)

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, January* 15, 1908.

FRENCH proceedings at Tangier.

Your telegram No. 1 of the 15th instant.

Major Fournié came here at the beginning of 1905. He was previously a member of the French Military Mission at Fez. Since his arrival he has continuously been engaged in drilling, with the help of non-commissioned officers from Algeria, part of the Moorish regular troops, of which the Tangier garrison is composed.

Until recently he was only able to do this superficially, as not much power was given him. Latterly, however, the troops have received advances of pay through this officer, so as to make certain that the money reaches its destination. This has enabled him to show somewhat increased activity, but I do not think that his actual position here has undergone any change.

[1707] No. 28.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 16.)

(No. 4.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, January* 16, 1908.

RESHID'S army was yesterday driven out of Settat by General d'Amade, who took possession of the town after some resistance.

The object of this operation was, to some extent, to make it clear to Mulai Hafid that his advance on Fez, if attempted, would not be unattended by difficulties.

General d'Amade subsequently returned to Bershid.

[1806] No. 29.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 18.)

(No. 8.)
Sir, *Tangier, January* 7, 1908.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 333 of the 30th August, and my telegram No. 138 of the 26th ultimo, I have the honour to inclose a translation of a note addressed by Abdel-Krim Ben Sliman to Count Martens Ferrão, doyen of the Corps Diplomatique, and circulated by him, regarding the measures which the Makhzen has decided to adopt for the repression of the illicit introduction of arms and other contraband into this country, and the arrangements made with the French and Spanish Ministers for the assistance of their Governments in the matter.

You will observe that the note contemplates the employment as coast-guards of two Moorish vessels yet to be purchased. I need hardly observe that these are not likely to serve any useful purpose. The note also asks that a list be furnished by each Legation of the vessels carrying on a regular service with Moorish ports. This arrangement is, in the first instance, to hold good for one year.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 29.

Sid Ben Sliman to Count Martens Ferrão.

(Traduction.)

(Louange au Dieu Unique.)

Son Excellence M. le Comte de Martens Ferrão, Ministre de Portugal, doyen du Corps Diplomatique.

(Compliments.)

VOTRE Excellence n'ignore pas l'intérêt que porte notre auguste Maître à la question de la répression de la contrebande des armes et des tromperies qui s'en suivent sur les côtes de cet heureux Empire. Il a commencé à prendre les mesures pour

aboutir à cela, et il a donné l'autorisation de faire venir deux bateaux qui serviront de garde-côtes pour surveiller les eaux proches des côtes de cet Empire, afin de faire la garde de ce qui a été mentionné et d'empêcher l'introduction de la contrebande des armes et toutes autres sortes de contrebande. Il a donné également son ordre Chérifien d'établir une Administration Marocaine qui sera chargée de ce qui précède. Il a chargé aussi, dans un but d'économie, les contrôleurs employés dans les douanes, de la part de l'Emprunt 1904, de surveiller les travaux de l'administration des deux bateaux et de tout ce qui s'y rapporte. Ensuite, il a jugé à propos d'entamer des pourparlers avec les deux sages amis, le Ministre de France et le Ministre d'Espagne, au sujet de ce qui rendrait efficace la dite surveillance et l'obtention du résultat voulu, en faisant renforcer les deux dits bateaux Marocains par des bateaux de guerre de la part de leurs Gouvernements honorables, qui aideront au fonctionnement régulier de cette surveillance, conformément à la teneur des Articles 24, 25, 80, et 91 de l'Acte d'Algésiras, à condition que l'assistance des dits bateaux de guerre soit limitée à une période d'une seule année, et plus tard au fur et à mesure que le besoin s'en fera sentir, et que les membres du Makhzen puissent monter à bord de ces bateaux de guerre en cas de nécessité; et que le Makhzen demande à chacune des Légations respectables à Tanger qu'elle remette une liste par votre entremise contenant les noms des bateaux de sa nationalité connus comme faisant un service commercial régulier dans les ports Marocains, et qu'elle remette aussi une pareille liste à chacun des deux Ministres susmentionnés; et que les deux Ministres remettent au Makhzen les noms de leurs bateaux de guerre qui seraient chargés de cette surveillance, pourvu que les mesures qui seraient prises par les dits bateaux de guerre dans cette surveillance des bateaux marchands qui font un service régulier dans les ports Marocains ne soient effectuées qu'en cas de flagrant délit.

J'ai écrit à ce propos aux deux Ministres, en leur communiquant l'autorisation du Makhzen que leurs bateaux de guerre puissent prêter cette assistance, ainsi que de la délégation donnée à leurs Gouvernements respectables, de pourvoir à ce service de la part du Makhzen, et je vous prie, au nom de Sa Majesté Chérifienne, de porter ce qui précède à la connaissance du Corps Diplomatique et de demander la liste contenant les noms des bateaux connus comme faisant un service régulier dans les ports Marocains, et nous les remettre ensuite, en transmettant aussi une pareille liste aux deux Ministres susindiqués conformément à ce qui précède.

Compliments.

(Signé) ABDEL-KRIM BEN SLIMAN.

25 *Schoual*, 1325 (2 *Décembre*, 1908).

[1808] No. 30.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 18.)

(No. 10.)
Sir, *Tangier, January* 11, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of despatches from His Majesty's Consul at Casa Blanca respecting the situation in the Showia, and future French policy with regard to that district.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 30.

Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 6.)
Sir, *Dar-el-Baida, January* 6, 1908.

THE French authorities inform me that the force occupying Mediuna has already administered a severe lesson on the Oolad Zian and Hel Deroua tribes, who are responsible for the massacres. A raid has been made on them, and 2,000 sheep, with cattle, goats, horses, camels, &c., were seized, amounting in all to a value of about 60,000 fr.

The tribes are desirous of surrendering, but the French, before considering proposals for submission, will insist on the parties responsible for recent events being delivered up to them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

P.S.—I have omitted to report that on the occasion of the French occupation of Kasbah Mediuna, the Moors carried off all their artillery with which they had fired on the French, both from the Kasbah and the intervening hills, saving their guns from the French.

A. M. M.

Inclosure 2 in No. 30.

Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 9.)
Sir, *Dar-el-Baida, January* 8, 1908.

I AM informed at the French Consulate that the tribes of Showia, almost without exception, are offering their submission to the French, sacrificing cattle to them at the Kasbah of Mediuna, and at the Consulate in town. It is, nevertheless, considered most necessary to inflict further punishment on the natives, and the French Consul tells me it is intended to push very far into the interior of Showia with this object, although the tribes are really now at the mercy of the French. Three or four thousand troops will be sent to Mediuna in due course, but at present there is no accommodation for them at the Kasbah, which is in a filthy state after the Arab occupation.

Kaid Bil Arby, Governor of Casa Blanca, who returned yesterday from Rabat, has been sent out this morning to Kasbah Mediuna and has been made also Kaid of Oolad Zian. The French are determined to keep the Kaids well in hand in order to prevent their returning to their old habits of squeezing the natives, so that the Showia may become a model province for other parts of Morocco.

The policy at Mediuna will be to re-establish the natives, who have fled, on their lands, so that the district may return to its former state of prosperity, and ploughing may at once be started again.

As regards the Sultan Mulai Abd-el-Aziz, M. Malpertuy described His Majesty as being much pleased at the turn events had taken in Showia. The French will advise His Majesty to send a Shereefian mehalla to Mediuna to re-establish his authority or to come there himself, and they would advise His Majesty to go on to Marrakesh, accompanying him with French troops, if necessary to the furthest confines of Showia. The only thing to fear is that the southern tribes all believe that Mulai Abd-el-Aziz has no power whatever.

Mulai Reschid, with a few followers, had fled from Settatt in the direction of Marrakesh, and the Hafidian movement is considered now to be of but small importance, as it depended largely on the success attained by Mulai Reschid in Showia. This Reschid, again, kept up his prestige principally by possessing six cannons, and with these weapons he opposed the French advance on Mediuna.

It is known that very good practice was made with the Arab guns, their shells falling in the midst of the French, but the natives were evidently short of ammunition, as but few shots were fired. As I have already reported, the French did not succeed in capturing any of the Arab artillery at Mediuna.

The Consul said that the situation during the last two months had given the French authorities much anxiety. They had assisted the Sultan with money, but his mehalla had been caught in a trap in Ziaida and practically wiped out. Two courses only remained open to the French, either to themselves pacify the country, or help the Sultan to re-establish his authority, the course they are now following and which they hope may be successful.

An influential British semsar of Oolad Zian came to see me yesterday, and explained that the tribesmen are being told by the French that Kasbah Mediuna is to be returned to the Sultan Abd-el-Aziz, and that he is Sultan, and that they are to obey him, but all the natives know that Abd-el-Aziz has not a single soldier left. Then, Mulai Hafid says he is the Sultan, and they know he has soldiers but no money, and that he is not recognized by the Powers. The natives therefore seem very puzzled at the situation.

General Drude's action at Mediuna has dealt a blow at the brigandage which had

become almost intolerable in this district, and already crowds of native traders are appearing again in town.

General d'Amade, the new General, informed me he is not immediately, himself, going to the interior.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

[1809] No. 31.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 18.)

(No. 11.)
Sir, *Tangier, January* 11, 1908.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 209 A of the 9th ultimo, respecting the institution of a preliminary inquiry into British claims arising out of the recent troubles at Casa Blanca, I have the honour to transmit herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at that port informing me of the steps taken by him to that end.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 31.

Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 7.)
Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, January* 6, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's despatch No. 1 of the 3rd instant, instructing me to organize a preliminary inquiry into the claims of British subjects arising out of the recent events at Casa Blanca.

In accordance with your instructions, I have appointed Mr. Vice-Consul Broome and three merchant assessors, viz., Messrs. C. Lamb, H. F. Butler, and J. Lapeen, to assist me in this inquiry.

Messrs. Lamb and Butler are two of the principal British business men in Morocco, and Mr. Lapeen is the doyen of the British colony here, and has a unique knowledge of local affairs and people. He was also, at one time, British Vice-Consul.

Mr. W. Worthington, clerk to a British firm here, has promised his services as examiner of accounts whenever required.

Mr. Vice-Consul Lomas will act as Secretary.

It has been arranged that an assessor shall temporarily retire during consideration of his own claims or of claims he has an interest in.

I have informed the above-named assessors that it is to be clearly understood that the International Commission is entitled to revise any decision arrived at.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

[1810] No. 32.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 18.)

(No. 12.)
Sir, *Tangier, January* 12, 1908.

YESTERDAY afternoon a wireless message from Rabat gave the first news of the Fez people and Oulema having deposed Sultan Abdul Aziz and declared Mulai Hafid Sultan in his stead, and late in the evening letters arrived from reliable sources in Fez confirming that news, as reported in my telegram No. 1 of yesterday.

From further letters received this morning from private sources in Fez, it would appear that the movement was started on Thursday evening, the 2nd instant, when a meeting of the Fez people was called to judge the conduct of the Oulema in upholding the Sultan and his Government, and an appointment was made to meet at the Kairoween Mosque at midnight to tax the Oulema with this, and with receiving bribes for their support of Abdul Aziz. These charges were denied by them, and after threats of death were made they were compelled to take oath that they had not received anything beyond the customary presents, and that they were not in

correspondence with the Makhzen. Thereupon the meeting declared that it deposed Abdul Aziz.

A further meeting to be held at Moulai Dris (the patron Saint of Morocco) at 8 A.M. on Friday was then arranged. Thousands are said to have been present, and in an address to the Oulema they were asked whether, in their opinion, the deposition of Abdul Aziz was lawful or not, and after some prevarication and threats they answered that he was no longer the Ruler, that he had corrupted the Mohammedan faith and the country, and his deposition was obligatory. They were then compelled to draw up their decision in writing, and to declare it in all the streets of the town. At prayers on Friday, the 3rd instant, no Sultan was mentioned, and on the 5th instant Mulai Hafid was proclaimed with all the usual ceremony. So far as is at present known, certain of the Government officials were in sympathy with the cause of Mulai Hafid, and have espoused it.

The incident passed off without disorder of any sort, and the townspeople have appointed headmen over the different quarters of the city, and I am informed that the Shereef Mulai Abdselam-el-Merani, who was recently compelled by the tribes to fall back on Alcazar in connection with the operations against Raisuli, has been appointed Viceroy to Mulai Hafid at Fez.

It is, as yet, early to form an opinion on the effect this incident will have on the general situation in this country; but it can be said, without exceeding the truth, that Abdul Aziz only rules now where he is under the protection of French guns, and were they withdrawn there is little doubt that those places would also declare against him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[2011] No. 33.

Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 16.)

Sir, *Berlin, January 11, 1908.*

A NUMEROUSLY attended meeting of the German Moroccan Society was held here on the 9th instant, to discuss the position of Germany in Morocco as affected by the action of France in that country. The former Ambassador in Washington, Dr. von Holleben, took the chair, and, after a lecture had been delivered by Count Joachim von Pfeil on Germany's economic and political aims, a unanimous resolution was adopted to the effect that German trade and Germany's good relations with the Moors had been greatly injured by France's action at Casa Blanca, and by her deliberate violation of several points of the Act of Algeciras. Any further neglect of German interests might lead to their total destruction, and it was therefore necessary to demand the evacuation of Casa Blanca by the French, and obtain an assurance from France that she would not occupy any other harbours on the Morocco coast. The Imperial Government should instruct the German Representative in Morocco to oppose on the spot, with vigour, all proceedings of the French military or civil authorities in any way calculated to impair German prestige or Germany's material interests. The Society also expressed their desire to have a stop put to the unlimited supply of alcohol to the inhabitants of Casa Blanca, and demanded that the compensation sum of 250,000 marks for German losses in Morocco, and any other further compensation claims, might fall upon France alone, and neither be imposed upon the German nor upon the Moroccan tax-payers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANK C. LASCELLES.

[2241] No. 34.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 14.)

Sir, *Tangier, January 14, 1908.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 12 of the 11th instant, I have the honour to report further with regard to the Proclamation of Mulai Hafid at Fez. According to later information the proceedings leading up to this event were not of such a peaceable character as was at first believed. Popular excitement appears to have been first stirred by the arrival from Rabat of a messenger bearing letters from the Sultan,

among which was reported to be an urgent request to the Ulema to give a favourable reply to his inquiry as to the legality of accepting the armed assistance of a foreign Power. The public reading of a message from His Majesty, in which he merely thanked the people of Fez for the manner in which order had been restored after the recent troubles, took place amid a scene of great excitement, at the conclusion of which the assembly left the Mosque and proceeded to a public place, where some inflammatory speeches were delivered. It was decided to summon the Ulema, and obtain from them some explanation of the situation. The attendance of some of the latter was accordingly compelled, as reported in my previous despatch, at the Kairoween Mosque, where they were requested to disclose the contents of the Sultan's letters. They at first maintained that no other had been received than that publicly read, but after scenes of some violence, and under threat of death, they admitted the receipt of a message respecting a loan of money to the Sultan by France. Thereupon the Ulema were ordered to be present at a public assembly on the morning of the next day. This took place in the mosque, when a large crowd and the entire body of the Ulema were assembled. The popular leaders had prepared an indictment of the Sultan, in which he was charged with entertaining friendly relations with the enemy of his country, with instituting a State Bank contrary to the faith, with organizing the new police force, and with the alienation of the Sûs, of Tuat, of Ujda, and of Casa Blanca. The Ulema endeavoured to postpone giving the reply demanded of them, but the crowd would admit no delay, and threats of death being again applied, the required decision was obtained. The Sultan's conduct was pronounced to entail his immediate deposition. The Proclamation of Mulai Hafid was not proceeded with for three days, the intervening period being one of anarchy, though possibly not greater than that which has prevailed in Fez for the past four weeks. On the 4th instant, at an assembly at which the Notables of Fez and some representatives of the neighbouring tribes were present, Mulai Hafid was elected Sultan on the following conditions: That certain objectionable taxes shall be abolished; that the Act of Algeciras shall be regarded as void; that there shall be no reforms and no European control of the customs; that no European shall in future reside in the interior, they must inhabit special quarters in the ports, as do the Jews. The principal officials of the Makhzen who had been compelled to attend put their signatures to this document, which was then dispatched with a deputation to Mulai Hafid at Marakesh. Some time must elapse before news can reach here of the receipt by Mulai Hafid of the news, and it is not possible to conjecture what action he will take on hearing it. His conduct hitherto does not suggest any capacity for sudden decision such as the present juncture seems to necessitate. The tradition of Moorish policy would require him to leave for Fez, but his previous departure from Marakesh was not encouraging in its results, and prudent councils may prevail. The news of the French occupation of Mediuna, which was probably not known at Fez at the time of the occurrences there, may also weigh with him. The conditions attached by the people of Fez to his election may prove a further obstacle to action on his part. Recognition by the Powers has been, from the first, an object to him, and he is probably sufficiently acquainted with the situation to understand the impossibility of the acceptance by Europe of the conditions named by the people of Fez. On the other hand, to accept his Proclamation and repudiate the conditions after arrival in Fez would hardly, in the present temper of its inhabitants, seem a prudent proceeding, although, had he sufficient military force to support him, it would not be inconsistent with some precedents in Moorish history.

It is probable that many of the tribes will follow the example of Fez and proclaim Mulai Hafid, and this may be the case also in some of the ports. It is thought by some that to-morrow's festival may be made the occasion of a demonstration at Tangier, as the example of Fez in such matters carries much weight in Northern Morocco.

The situation at Rabat, and the presence of the Spanish Mission there, gives rise to some anxiety. The town has always had a reputation for fanaticism. As I reported in my telegram of yesterday, there is a French force 25 miles from the town; the distance is great in the event of disturbances of any magnitude, but it is hoped that their presence will be sufficient to avert them, and in any case the cavalry should be able to reach Rabat in a few hours in case of urgent necessity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[2262] No. 35.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 12.) *Madrid, January 17, 1908.*

Sir,

THE Spanish Foreign Minister called at the Embassy on the 14th instant, by desire of Señor Maura, President of the Council of Ministers, to communicate the views of the Spanish Government on the present state of affairs in Morocco. I have already given an outline of them in my telegram No. 3 of that date.

As regards the Atlantic coast, Señor Allendesalazar set forth once more the considerations which from the first have carried weight with this Government. The French policy of landing an armed force for the purpose of punishing the tribes for the murder of Frenchmen and others employed on the harbour works was from the first doomed to failure. Señor Maura never believed in the efficacy of this course of action. Spain could only consent to co-operate with France in so far as she was bound by the engagements contracted at Algeciras. The force she landed was, therefore, nothing but a police force, and from the first it took no part whatever in the French military operations. The latter could only result in alienating the tribes, without even securing the punishment of the guilty persons. They had also produced the ruin of Casa Blanca, and the interruption of its flourishing trade. Now the French Government were making matters worse by directing an advance on Rabat. This, the Spanish Government considered, could not fail to increase the unpopularity of Abdul Aziz. It would be better to leave the rival Sultans to fight out their quarrel, without taking sides with one or the other. From the moment that France accepted the task of forcibly supporting the cause of Abdul Aziz she would find herself launched on a course which could have but one issue, namely, an armed expedition to Fez for the purpose of imposing the authority of the legitimate Sultan on an unwilling people. Señor Allendesalazar feared that the first step down this inclined plane was now being taken. He wished it to be understood that Spain entirely dissociated herself from such a movement.

I begged his Excellency to remember that France had undertaken the policing of Rabat, and that she would incur serious responsibility if she allowed the lives and property of the inhabitants to be endangered without making any effort to stand by them. I thought Spain should avoid irritating the French by hostile comments on their action in the midst of such difficult circumstances, and that she should rely on the declarations which the French Government had so often made, to the effect that they had no intention of sending an expedition into the interior. Even if they did so, the region affected lay outside the sphere in which Spain took a special interest.

The Foreign Minister said he quite agreed, but that he wished it to be understood that Spain, for her part, had no belief in the measures which France had adopted.

His Excellency then went on to speak of an article which had lately appeared in the "Petit Parisien" on the subject of a force of some 3,000 Moorish soldiers said to be undergoing instruction at the hands of Commandant Fournier and other French officers within the very walls of Tangier. This was in the heart of the Spanish sphere of influence, where Spain had always contended that, if any military action became necessary, she must take a similar lead to that which France had taken at Casa Blanca. The Spanish Government could not help suspecting that France was manœuvring to secure for herself a commanding military position at Tangier. They much resented these proceedings, and felt unable to accept the explanations which had been offered to the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, to the effect that Fournier was only continuing the work of Kaïd Maclean by organizing a force destined exclusively for the service of the Sultan, who was in desperate straits, and ought not to be deprived of all military assistance during the present crisis.

I repeated to Señor Allendesalazar what I have always said with reference to the eventual claim of Spain to exercise a commanding influence along the northern coast of Morocco, namely, that her position in this respect is defined in international Conventions, and will be best secured by maintaining a good understanding with France, on whose good-will much must evidently depend when the hour of effecting a final settlement arrives.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs through this interview showed considerable agitation, and I cannot doubt that the Morocco question, as affected by the Proclamation of Muley Hafid at Fez, is causing this Government a good deal of anxiety.

Since Señor Allendesalazar's visit I have had an opportunity of hearing the personal views of King Alfonso and Señor Maura, with both of whom I was shooting on the

15th instant. As they closely resembled those expressed by the Foreign Minister, I need not report them in detail. The King is desirous of keeping up the appearance of a good understanding with France, but he has no confidence in the stability of the French Government, or in the financial position of France, which is threatened, in His Majesty's opinion, by hasty legislation under Socialist influences.

By a happy chance, M. Pichon passed through Madrid on the afternoon of the 14th January, on his way back to Paris, and was able, in the course of an interview with the Spanish Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Ministry of State, to reassure them in some measure by explaining that the declared intentions of the French Government had undergone no change; that the movement of troops towards Rabat was designed primarily as a means of protecting the population, including the Sultan, against a possible attack by neighbouring tribes; and that the troops would remain outside the walls of Rabat unless their presence should become indispensable within the town. As regards Tangier, M. Pichon and the French Ambassador, who was also present, explained that Commandant Fournier was merely the instructor of a force intended for the use of the Sultan, but added that, in view of Spanish susceptibilities, the force should, if possible, be removed outside the town. They further reminded the Spanish Ministers that by Article IX of the Secret Convention of the 3rd October, 1904, Tangier is to preserve the special character which it derives from the presence of the Diplomatic Body and from its municipal and sanitary institutions. Tangier is therefore not quite in the same position as the remainder of the northern coast, and other countries are as much interested as Spain in the maintenance of its present status.

M. Révoil thinks the atmosphere has been a good deal cleared by the interview at the Ministry of State. There was also some conversation about the possibility of a Franco-Spanish force having to be landed at Tangier in certain eventualities, and it was virtually agreed, as M. Révoil informs me, that in that case the question of the chief command, which was so much discussed at San Sebastian last September, would not be raised by Spain, each detachment operating independently under its separate Commander.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[2263] No. 36.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 13.) *Madrid, January 17, 1908.*

Sir,

THE French Ambassador mentioned to me in conversation yesterday that he was having some trouble with the Spanish Government in connection with a Mining Concession obtained some time ago by a Frenchman named Massenet, from the Roghi.

The mine was only a short distance from Melilla, and the concessionnaire wished to connect it by a Decauville railway with that town as the easiest means of exporting the mineral. The Spanish Government, as well as the local authorities, were placing every possible obstacle in the way of this enterprise.

I gather from other sources that Spanish opposition to the French Company arises out of the fact that important Concessions of mines have also been made by the Roghi to a Spanish Syndicate. The mines are said to be rich in iron ore of fine quality, superior to that now produced in the neighbourhood of Bilbao. They are situated in the Benibu-Fruor district behind Melilla, some of them within an hour's ride of Zelouan, the present head-quarters of the Roghi.

Mr. Macpherson, a well-known Cadiz merchant, who, I believe, preserves his British nationality, has lately visited the Roghi on behalf of the Spanish interests concerned. He found that Señor Romanones, ex-Minister in several Spanish Governments, had been before him, and had secured the favour of the Roghi by a present of 12,000*l.* Mr. Macpherson and his friends have now formed a Spanish Syndicate which is willing to give the Roghi 1,000,000 pesetas (37,000*l.*), of which half has been already paid over to him.

It has been thought prudent to associate Señor Romanones with the Syndicate, which at present includes all the Spanish financiers interested in mines.

Mr. Macpherson himself has supplied me with some of these particulars. He informed me a few days ago that he had been spending some time at Zelouan in constant communication with the Roghi, and was a witness of the battle in which

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the Sultan's Mehalla was defeated and driven to the point on the sea coast which it now occupies. The victory seems to have been complete, and Mr. Macpherson believes that the Roghi's power is now well established over the entire neighbourhood, and that he is strong enough to put a veto on the Spanish project of taking possession of the encampment of the Imperial Mehalla as soon as the Mehalla has been defeated, or otherwise got rid of.

I understand that the point occupied by the defeated Mehalla and covered by the Spaniards is called Mohamedia, and lies on the tongue of land which divides the Mar Chica from the Mediterranean.

However this may be, Mr. Macpherson is confident that he will secure from the Governor of Melilla a Concession enabling the Spanish Syndicate to make the proposed railway, to the exclusion of the French concessionnaire, whose interest, Mr. Macpherson states, is limited to a single lead mine.

There is some idea of enlisting the aid of British capital for the construction of the railway, but technically the whole concern will be a Spanish one.

There is also iron ore in the promontory lying to the north of Melilla, as well as in the Kebdana Mountains extending to near the mouth of the River Muluya. All of this the Syndicate hopes to secure in the course of time.

I cannot vouch for the accuracy of the foregoing account, but there is no doubt some competition is going on for the mines in question, and it seems not unlikely that the conflict between French and Spanish interests will become more acute as the plans of the Spanish Syndicate mature.

The King of Spain told me a few days ago that he was anxious to encourage the development of Spanish commercial interests around Ceuta as well as Melilla.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[2357] No. 37.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 6.)
Munich, January 20, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that the "Süddeutsche Reichskorrespondenz," which reached me this morning, contains a short communiqué with regard to Moroccan affairs which it may be worth while to draw your attention to.

It states that from Moorish information which has reached Berlin the dethroning of the Sultan Abdul Aziz was the result of an actual step taken by him. It is not true that he has been the victim of the too intimate negotiations carried on with France at Rabat; on the contrary, he himself engaged in an act which brought about his fall. It is said that he laid before the Ulemas the question whether he would be justified in seeking for the assistance of the French in order to overcome his rebellious brother. The reply of the Ulemas was the deposition of the Sultan and the proclamation of his brother as his successor. If it is true that Moorish advisers of Abdul Aziz really urged him to take the step he did, they must deliberately have ignored the Act of Algeciras. In short the Sultan and his Ministers were playing for a French military protectorate which is not provided for in the above Act. As the protégé of a French General Abdul Aziz would soon have been reduced to the position of the Bey of Tunis. It would have been more correct and the Sultan certainly would have acted more in his own interests had he not himself given rise to the suspicion that he was meditating an appeal to French assistance against his brother. It is evident that such assistance could not have been given without infringing the Regulations which have been drawn up for the protection of the sea-board. It is therefore satisfactory to note that the Agence Havas announces that in face of the new situation which has arisen in Morocco France will scrupulously adhere to the Act of Algeciras. That means the renunciation of any idea of military interference in the struggle for the throne in Morocco, as such interference would be equivalent to the creation of an open state of war between France and the Moors.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. L. CARTWRIGHT.

[2775] No. 38.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 13.)
Foreign Office, January 22, 1908.

Sir,

THE Spanish Ambassador spoke to me to-day at great length about Morocco.

He said that France was supporting the present Sultan in various ways, and Spain did not wish to be brought into the quarrel between the Sultan and his rival, but she had no objection to France continuing to give support to the Sultan, as at present, by ways that did not appear.

I said I was sure France did not wish to be drawn into an expedition into the interior of Morocco—that would be entirely contrary to M. Clemenceau's policy—but she was taking steps to protect life and property in the sea ports.

The Ambassador then spoke of the Spanish apprehensions with regard to the action of Captain Fournier at Tangier. For a long time he had done nothing there, but now he was drilling 2,000 or 3,000 troops. The Spaniards considered that after their Secret Agreement with France, Captain Fournier ought not to have remained at Tangier. They considered it very undesirable that the interests of France should be strengthened in this way in parts of Morocco which would fall to Spain under the Secret Agreement. They would have no objection if Captain Fournier drilled troops in other places. They considered that his doing so at Tangier would be contrary to the Algeciras Act, and his action would certainly throw into the shade the 250 police which were to be established there under Spanish auspices. Spain had consented to the joint policing force at Tangier in order not to reveal anything about the Secret Agreement, and it would be unfair that alongside the 250 police there should be 2,000 or 3,000 troops under French officers. His Government were very anxious to have my advice.

I said I understood that the French Government had given explanations to the Spanish Government about the matter. I could not see that the Secret Agreement would be impaired by anything which might happen before it came into force. It would come into force only if Morocco was partitioned, and the fact that a French officer who was in the employ of the Sultan was drilling troops in the Tangier district now could not prejudice the rights of Spain if the Sultan's authority disappeared and that part of Morocco was handed over to Spanish occupation.

Under our Agreement with France about Morocco, nothing had been reserved to us similar to what had been reserved to Spain under her Agreement with France, and yet France had never raised any objection to the position of Kaïd Maclean, or claimed that it was inconsistent with the Agreement.

The Spanish Ambassador still maintained that a strong French party would be created in Tangier, and that would be injurious to Spain should that part of Morocco fall to her. He urged as an illustration that, even if the British occupation was withdrawn from Egypt to-morrow, the fact of our having been in occupation would give us great influence in Egypt.

I said I did not think there was an analogy between the two cases. As a matter of fact, if the British occupation were to be withdrawn to-morrow, and not only that, but succeeded by the occupation of another Power in the same way as Spain would occupy the Tangier district, the British influence in Egypt would not be worth much. I further reminded the Ambassador that I heard it was an understanding that, as long as Morocco remained independent, the special diplomatic position of Tangier should continue to be recognized.

The Ambassador said this was the case, but Spain considered that France should not have a superior force in the district.

I told him I could only say at present that I understood what the Spanish susceptibilities in the matter were.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

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[2462] No. 39.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 37.)

Sir, *Paris, January 22, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a statement of the views held by the French Government with regard to the present situation in Morocco,* which is published in the "Matin" of to-day's date in the form of a résumé of M. Clemenceau's declarations to various politicians.

The statement is to the following effect:—

General d'Amade has received instructions to take such measures as he may consider necessary for the suppression of the Chaouia tribe, in order to put an end to the state of anarchy existing in the neighbourhood of Casa Blanca.

Ships will continue to be stationed at the ports, and the forces already landed will remain in their encampments, ready to suppress any disorders that may arise.

As regards the internal dissensions and the various pretenders to the throne, it is the policy of the French Government to avoid all intervention, and to let matters take their course. General d'Amade has consequently been instructed that he is, under no circumstances, to place his troops at the service of the cause of Abdul Aziz. The Government cannot, however, forget that Abdul Aziz is the Sovereign recognized by Europe, whereas Mulai Hafid has declared a Holy War against France, and has proclaimed his intention to drive all foreigners out of Morocco, in direct contravention of the provisions of the Act of Algeciras.

The "Matin" states that complete unanimity prevails among the members of the Cabinet, and that contrary reports which have been circulated are without foundation. The paper adds that, so far as the Government are aware, no concessions have been granted by Abdul Aziz, and that the rumours current in regard to representations on this subject made to the Government by concessionnaires are false.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[2184] No. 40.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 10. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 23, 1908.*

THE Spanish Ambassador called at this Office on the 16th instant and informed Sir C. Hardinge, by whom his Excellency was received, that his Government were concerned about the situation at Rabat. They recognized that the French Government were at liberty to take such action as they thought desirable at that place, which was within the French sphere of influence, but they feared that if the French troops actually entered the town France would identify herself with the cause of the Sultan Abd-ul-Aziz, who would thus come under French protection.

Sir C. Hardinge expressed the opinion (subsequently confirmed by M. Cambon, who said that General Lyautey had received definite orders not to move from his present position) that there was no intention that the French troops should occupy Rabat, or, in fact, that they should leave their position 38 kilom. from that place, except in the event of imminent danger to the lives and property of Europeans in the town.

M. Villa Urrutia then referred to the report (published, according to his Excellency, in a French newspaper) that the French Government are organizing a force of 3,000 Moorish troops, with artillery and cavalry, to maintain order in Tangier. On receipt of your Excellency's telegram No. 3 of the 14th instant, I had instructed His Majesty's Minister at Tangier to report the nature of the action complained of, and Sir C. Hardinge was able to read to M. Villa Urrutia extracts from Sir G. Lowther's reply, of which a copy is inclosed for your Excellency's information.†

His Excellency explained that the Spanish Government would greatly object to the formation of such a force at Tangier, since the police there was intended to be composed of an equal number of men under French and Spanish officers, and if there were an additional force of 3,000 men under French officers, France would enjoy a

* Not printed.

† No. 37.

position of preponderance in a portion of the Spanish sphere of influence. His Excellency, therefore, asked whether His Majesty's Government would, in the event of the report proving correct, support the Spanish Government at Paris.

Sir C. Hardinge replied that the report in question, emanating from a newspaper and uncorroborated by Sir G. Lowther, appeared so improbable that it was scarcely worth while to consider an eventuality which had not arisen and would probably never arise.

As it appears from your Excellency's despatch No. 12 of the 17th instant, since received, that the Spanish Government are reassured by the explanations given by M. Pichon at Madrid on the 14th instant, I do not think it necessary that you should make any further communication to them on this subject.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. GREY.

[2691] No. 41.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 15. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, January 16, 1908.*

I HAD an opportunity to-day of having a long conversation with Si Mehedi-el-Menebhi on the subject of the proclamation of Mulai Hafid as Sultan at Fez, and on his chances of carrying the country with him. Menebhi was, as you are aware, in the service of Sultan Abdul Aziz as Minister of War, but was dismissed by him. He belongs to Southern Morocco, and is consequently inclined to be a partizan of Mulai Hafid, and in considering the views expressed by him the fact must not be lost sight of that the wish may be father to the thought. His account of what had occurred at Fez on the proclamation coincided with what I have heard and reported. He added, however, that Sid Abdelkrim-el-Shirgui and Sid Abderrahman-ben-Abdessadek, the Governors of New and Old Fez under the Makhzen, had been detected by the ringleaders of the revolutionary movement as being still in correspondence with the Makhzen, and had been obliged to take an oath upon the Koran that they would have no more to do with Abdul Aziz.

On my observing that this was an indication that the movement was not unanimously supported, Menebhi replied that no doubt some of the principal men thought it more prudent, while awaiting events, to sit upon the fence. He was convinced that Mulai Hafid would accept the proclamation in his favour, and on my asking him how he would get over the difficulties of the conditions attached, which practically amount to driving foreigners out of the country, he declared that Mulai Hafid would have nothing to do with them. Moreover, Mulai Hafid had from the first declared, and had so written to him, that he would respect all the conditions of the Algeciras Act. Menebhi thought that Mulai Hafid would proceed at once to Fez, and that on his arrival he would be accepted as Sultan throughout the country. He had a higher opinion of him than he had of his brother, and was convinced that he was a man who would listen to reason. Menebhi felt sure that, should he succeed in securing the throne, he would be prepared to work in harmony with the French. Moreover, he was unlike his brother, who was obstinate, and who had surrounded himself with men who were not, properly speaking, Makhzen people—that is, they represented nothing; they were merely learned men. Whereas, what was necessary in Morocco was the support of the Sultan by representatives of all the powerful tribes. The men who were now acting as advisers to Mulai Hafid, although perhaps not highly educated, were powerful men who carried weight in the country. They themselves would not remain in their present positions, but their influence would be exerted on behalf of Mulai Hafid, and their representatives would form his Government. He explained the defeat of Mulai Rechid in the Shawia by stating that Mulai Hafid thought it more prudent to conciliate important interests by the appointment of Mulai Rechid to this command than to send a more capable man on that expedition, which he considered of minor importance. El Menebhi, who knows most of Mulai Hafid's officials personally, assures me he has good leaders with his main force, which is now in Seraghna. I asked Menebhi what attitude Mulai Hafid would be likely to assume as regards the liabilities of the Makhzen in the event of his eventually becoming Sultan of this country. He replied that, once proclaimed, he would have

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no difficulty in raising very large sums of money, and although it might take him thirty years of reign to pay off the indebtedness of Morocco, he would certainly be successful.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[2692] No. 42.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 16.)
Sir, *Tangier, January* 16, 1908.

AN incident, perfectly trivial in itself, recently occurred between Major Fournié, of the French Military Mission, and Captain Patxot, of the Spanish police.

It would not have occurred to me to notice it were it not that it might, in some small measure, account for the complaint made to Sir Maurice de Bunsen by M. Allendesalazar that Major Fournié was forming a native army at Tangier.

Captain Patxot had, after much trouble, succeeded in obtaining from the Makhzen authorities a building in which he could lodge his police, but on attempting to occupy it he found some 150 native troops installed there. Impatient at the dilatoriness of the authorities, he demanded that it should be evacuated within twenty-four hours.

Major Fournié, hearing of this, and the troops being under his orders, he asked whether there was any other place available which might serve as a temporary barrack, or if tents could be supplied. Receiving a reply in the negative, and knowing that Captain Patxot had only succeeded in recruiting some fifteen men for the police, he declined to allow his men to be removed. No direct quarrel ever took place between these two officers, and the matter was eventually arranged by a small portion of the building being evacuated by the men of the regular army, but the incident was perhaps sufficient to provoke the Spanish Legation to comment unfavourably on the powers they thought that Major Fournié was arrogating to himself.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to Madrid.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[2694] No. 43.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 18.)
Sir, *Tangier, January* 19, 1908.

DOCTOR VERDON, the Sultan's physician, who with Si Mohammed Tazzi was recently in Paris and London for the purpose of obtaining a loan on the Sultan's jewels, returned to Rabat on the 15th instant, and was immediately summoned to His Majesty.

The Sultan asked Dr. Verdon at once whether he could tell him what the French Government intended to do, and told him to ask me to use my influence in order that the French might support him strongly. He added, "tell the Minister that M. Regnault and all the French have constantly assured me that if I followed their advice and put into force the conditions of the Algeciras Act, I could rely upon their support and assistance. I have followed this advice, though I feared it would lead to trouble in my country, and have done my best, with the result that you see. Surely the French must now support me as they have promised."

On the following day His Majesty again sent for Dr. Verdon, who found His Majesty in a state of some alarm, having heard that Mulai Hafid was about to be proclaimed in Tangier, and he had asked the French Consul to send a telegram to Tangier, urging that all precautions should be taken to avoid a Proclamation here, which must inevitably lead to disturbances. The news of such a Proclamation would have a very bad effect on the townspeople of Rabat, and on the neighbouring tribes. The French Consul begged Dr. Verdon to reassure the Sultan by telling him that in the event of a crisis the French troops were ready to occupy Rabat in a very short time. These troops were protected by a cruiser, and they would also be supported by further troops from Casa Blanca.

On the 11th instant the Sultan had asked the French Consul to request his

Government in the Sultan's name to send M. Regnault at once to Rabat, and also to dispatch an expedition to Fez.

Dr. Verdon adds that there are 4,000 troops at Rabat, and about 2,000 tribesmen, that they are friendly and respectful, and that the town is quiet, and that no one outside the Court circles takes Mulai Hafid's doings very seriously.

As I explained, Dr. Verdon has only just reached Rabat, and his first impressions are perhaps too optimistic. They certainly suggest a state of affairs more favourable to the Sultan than is conveyed by most of the information which has reached me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[2695] No. 44.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 19.)
Sir, *Tangier, January* 19, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of events based on information received during the past week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 44.

Weekly Report.

THE most important event to be recorded during the past week is of course the proclamation as Sultan of Mulai Hafid, which took place at Fez on the 4th instant. This has already been fully reported on, and it is, therefore, unnecessary to recapitulate the occurrences which led up to the deposition of Sultan Abdul Aziz. The movement in favour of Mulai Hafid has met with the unanimous and enthusiastic support of almost the entire interior of Morocco, and the tribes in the vicinity of Fez have vied with each other in being the first to acclaim the new Sultan. In the capital itself order appears to have been well maintained, and guards have been placed over the houses of the foreign Consuls in order to prevent any pillaging. A rumour having been circulated that guns and ammunition were secreted in the house of Kaïd Maclean a search was made by the Oomana, but upon nothing of this nature being found, the house was vacated without disturbance. It is reported that all who in any way enjoy foreign protection are well treated, and that even the employés of the French Post Office and other French protégés are not molested. A cheque for a large sum of money, sent by Hadj Omar Tazzi to his Agent in Fez, has been intercepted, and the latter being forced to indorse it, the money was taken possession of by the Viceroy El Merani.

The situation at Rabat is causing some anxiety. His Majesty's Vice-Consul reported on the 10th instant that Bushta-el-Bagdadi and his troops have returned to the town, and are encamped round the Sultan's residence, a somewhat ominous sign of the uneasiness prevailing in the neighbourhood. Some of the chief Notables of Sallee and Rabat have been summoned to attend at Court, and were informed that the events at Fez were merely the work of irresponsible rioters. They were then exhorted to maintain order and prevent any disturbance. Considerable anxiety is felt as to what would happen in the event of the French force advancing on Rabat overland. It is feared that this might give rise to disturbances such as occurred at Casablanca, and might render critical the position of the Europeans in the town, as well as of the Sultan and his Government. At the same time, Mr. Neroutsos is of opinion that the cause of the Sultan is yet far from being lost, and he considers that with the assistance of the French, and with the forces at his command, Abdul Aziz should have no difficulty in assuring his position in Rabat, and in later taking the offensive against Mulai Hafid.

The events at Fez have led to renewed activity on the part of the French forces, it being hoped that by a timely show of force Mulai Hafid might be deterred from proceeding to Fez and placing himself at the head of the popular movement. It was with this object that, after occupying Kasbah Berschid, the French General advanced with 4,000 men on the 14th instant to Settatt, some 75 kilom. inland from Casablanca, where Mulai Reschid had been assembling a large force with a view to cutting the French communications. After a vigorous defence the tribes at length gave way under

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a heavy bombardment, and retired with considerable loss. It is certain that Mulai Reschid's army was severely handled, and will not have to be reckoned with for some considerable time.

The French troops evacuated Settatt and returned to Berschid the same night, where a garrison will be left. It is hoped by the military authorities that Mulai Hafid may now be forced by the tribes to advance against the French, which would give the latter their long-wished-for opportunity to finally destroy the Pretender's power. There is considerable likelihood of these hopes being realized, as it is reported that Mulai Hafid, goaded into fury by the destruction of his army, has declared a Holy War at Marakesh, and has announced his intention of leading the tribes against the "foreign invader."

Many arrests have been made by the French in connection with the troubles at Casablanca, including those of some of the chief instigators of anti-French feeling, *e.g.*, Ben Gillaly and Hosein Ziany. In some instances these arrests have been followed by execution, which, it is hoped, may teach the tribes a salutary lesson.

Some anxiety was felt as to the likelihood of disturbances being caused in Tangier on the Feast of the 15th instant, when public prayers were to be read. The occasion passed off, however, without disorder.

(Initialled) F. R.

[1441] No. 45.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 39.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 25, 1908.

THE question has been raised in what manner the expenses incurred in connection with the International Commission, which is to examine claims arising out of the disturbances at Casa Blanca, are to be defrayed.

I am considering the advisability of causing a percentage to be deducted from the amounts awarded to British claimants in order to defray the expenses of the British Representative on the Commission, but in the meanwhile I shall be glad if your Excellency will ascertain the views of the French Government as to the manner in which the joint expenses (if any) of the Commission should be met.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. GREY.

[1441] No. 46.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 25, 1908.

I LAID before Secretary Sir E. Grey your letter of the 13th instant, and I am directed to reply as follows to the inquiries contained therein.

His Majesty's Consul at Casa Blanca reports that he has so far received sixty-nine British claims for presentation to the International Commission, and he estimates the total number of such claims at about eighty. All claims received by the Consul will be submitted to the Commission, but it would be impossible to form even a rough estimate of the amounts which will be awarded.

Sir E. Grey is still unable to say how long the examination of the claims by the International Commission is likely to last; this will depend on, among other things, the number of claims presented by persons of other nationalities, as to which he has, in most cases, no information.

With regard to the question of abating a percentage from the Awards to defray the expenses of the Commission, I am to observe that the International Commission which examined claims arising out of disturbances at Alexandria in 1882, and which, in other respects, most closely resembles that which is to sit at Casa Blanca, furnishes no guidance as regards such abatement, as the expenses of the inquiry on that occasion were apparently defrayed by the Egyptian Government, and the Representative of His Majesty's Government was not specially engaged in that capacity.

The precedent which Sir E. Grey proposes to follow to some extent, if the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury concur, is that supplied by the settlement of claims against the Chilean Government arising out of the Civil War of 1891. In

this case it was agreed between the two Governments, by Article VIII of the Convention of the 26th September, 1893, that not more than 6 per cent. should be deducted from the total amount received from the Chilean Treasury to defray, or help to defray, the expenses of the Arbitration Tribunal by whom the claims were examined.

In addition to this, a further deduction of 5 per cent. was made as between the British Government and the successful claimants to meet the expenses of the British Agency.

In the present case the expenses of the kind which the first-mentioned percentage was intended to cover will, the Lords Commissioners will observe, be merely the joint expenses of the Commission. Sir E. Grey does not anticipate that these will be other than insignificant, but he is making inquiry of the French Government as to the manner in which they propose to deal with them.

In any case Sir E. Grey would suggest that the percentage of 5 per cent. should be deducted from the sums awarded to the British claimants at Casa Blanca, in respect of the expenses incurred by His Majesty's Government on the International Commission, and I am to inquire whether the Lords Commissioners agree to the adoption of this course.

In the affirmative event it will be necessary to instruct Consul Madden without delay to inform the British subjects concerned that their claims will be presented to the International Commission by him, and supported by the British Representative on that Commission, only upon the understanding that the abatement in question shall be made.

I am to express the hope that the information supplied in this letter will enable you to return an early answer to the inquiry in my letter of the 1st instant, as it is important that Sir E. Grey should be in a position to select without further delay the barrister who will represent His Majesty's Government on the Commission.

I am, &c.

(Signed) W. LANGLEY.

[2858] No. 47.

Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 27.)

Sir, *Berlin, January* 20, 1908.

I NOTICE that telegrams from Berlin reproduced in the European press quote articles from such papers as the "Deutsche Tageszeitung," the "Tägliche Rundschau," &c., in which Germany is recommended to accord immediate recognition to Mulai Hafid, and thus to embarrass the French and render nugatory their efforts of peaceful penetration. The journals which advocate such a policy on the part of Germany, though noisy, carry but little weight, and are not likely to influence public opinion to any great extent.

In my opinion the Government do not wish to utilize the situation created by the proclamation of Mulai Hafid to embarrass the French, and I am glad to say that the more important newspapers share this view. Thus the "National Zeitung," in an article entitled "Morocco," clearly states that Mulai Abdul Aziz is the only lawful Sovereign of the Shereefian Empire in the eyes of Europe. Mulai Hafid is a pretender like Bu Hamara. His missions were unrecognized at all the capitals they visited, and until he can succeed in driving away his brother, for Europe the latter must remain the Sultan.

France and Spain are the two Powers most affected by these disturbances. They have been intrusted by the General Act of the Algeciras Conference with a mandate to establish the international police. The French are neutral in the conflict between the two brothers but they have been intrusted with the maintenance of order and the protection of foreigners in the coast ports, and it is for them to resist force by force.

The "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" is not so explicit as regards France and Spain, but it denies the rumour that Mulai Hafid has addressed a communication to any of the Signatory Powers, at the time of his proclamation as Sultan, and it also states that the rumour of his intention to open relations with the Powers must be received with great caution. There is no mention of any change in German policy in Morocco.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FRANK C. LASCELLES.

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P.S. *January* 24.—Since writing the above I learn from the Secretary of the French Embassy that similar views are held by M. Cambon as to the intentions of the German Government in Morocco. I am unable at present to see the French Ambassador, as his Excellency is laid up with an attack of influenza.

F. C. L.

[2952] **No. 48.**

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 41.)

Paris, January 25, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that a debate took place yesterday in the Chamber of Deputies on the policy of the French Government in Morocco. It was initiated by M. Jaurès, leader of the Socialist party, who called on the Government to extricate France from the "Moroccan adventure" in which she was becoming day by day further entangled. Her intervention in Morocco had only had the result of arousing against her every fanatical and patriotic passion among the Moors. The Sultan was seeing his authority crumble away. What reason had the French Government to take sides with him? Were they going to endeavour to force him upon his people? There was nothing in the Algeciras Act which necessitated the support by France of the actual Sultan. The Sovereign meant by that Act was an impersonal Sovereign, and France should only intervene in a matter of this kind in conjunction with the other Powers. If France engaged herself to support Abd-el-Aziz, it meant that she would have to go to Marrakesh and Fez, to reconquer Morocco for him. That would not be all; she would have to keep it for him, for a check to Abd-el-Aziz would mean a check to France. A permanent army of occupation would be required, and some 150,000 men, a considerable part of France's military strength, would be immobilized in Morocco. M. Jaurès proceeded to state that he had letters in his possession which proved that Dr. Mauchamp, who was assassinated at Marrakesh in April 1907, had acted as a sort of semi-official intermediary between the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Mulai Hafid. This assertion provoked a denial on the part of M. Pichon, who declared that, as far as he was concerned, he had no knowledge of what M. Jaurès meant. M. Jaurès replied that he would submit the documents in his possession to his Excellency and would publicly retract his statement if he found that it was incorrect.

M. Jaurès then touched upon the various points of the Moroccan problem which have excited anxiety during the past two months, mentioning the rumour of a Secret Treaty between France and Spain, which was equivalent to an arrangement for dividing up Morocco. He devoted some time to pointing out the dangers of discord between the two countries. The attitude of Spain was already one of reserve and passive resistance; when her secret resentment should grow stronger, any Power desirous of creating difficulties with France would find a means of making its influence felt through the medium of Spain, "de l'Espagne meurtrie, de l'Espagne blessée, de l'Espagne dont vous avez imprudemment exaspéré l'amour-propre."

The Moroccan adventure was drawing France away from her proper rôle. M. Jaurès said with regard thereto:—

"Depuis qu'après avoir connu les ivresses et les éblouissements de la force, elle en a connu les déceptions et les meurtrissures, son idéal c'est d'être dans le monde la grande ouvrière de la paix et du droit. Son devoir, son rôle, c'est de veiller à écarter, à prévenir tous les conflits qui peuvent menacer la paix du monde. Si un jour les rivalités économiques risquaient de mettre aux prises l'Angleterre et l'Allemagne, votre devoir est de porter devant l'Europe une parole de paix, de prévenir et d'écarter l'orage."

Such a rôle would be difficult if France were involved in the labyrinthine intrigues of the Moroccan affair, where so many interests and ambitions came into play and conflict. The movement of what was best in the Mussulman world was also to be taken into account. The élite of this movement was not only bent on breaking loose from European administration. They recognized, for instance, the admirable services rendered by England to the oppressed castes and they sought to raise their co-religionists to a point where they might participate with dignity in European civilization.

M. Jaurès finished his speech, which lasted for nearly two hours, by urging the Government to hesitate before engaging France further in the Moroccan imbroglio. As soon as he left the Tribune, the President of the Chamber announced that he had received a request from M. Delcassé to be allowed to interpellate the Government on their Moroccan policy. The announcement created a great impression on the House, as since his retirement the ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs has taken no part in debate.

Before M. Delcassé spoke, however, M. Ribot, leader of the Moderate Republican Opposition, went to the Tribune. He began by twitting M. Jaurès on the change which had come over his views as to Moroccan affairs since 1904. He had then defended the Government for concluding the Anglo-French Agreement, which, he said, gave to France the exclusive right of organizing Morocco as she liked. This the speaker mentioned to show M. Jaurès that he should exercise more caution in his language about France and her policy. He himself advocated now the policy he had advocated in November: "de la prudence, de la clairvoyance, de la sagesse, oui; mais de l'abdication, non; de la fuite, jamais." M. Ribot pointed to the disastrous effect withdrawal from Morocco would have on French prestige not only in Morocco, but also in Algeria; it was impossible to fix a date for the withdrawal of the French troops; France must remain till her task was accomplished.

The speaker then examined the question as to whether the Government were still pursuing exactly the same policy as at the date of the last debate on Moroccan affairs. He insisted on the necessity for France to keep herself free from engagements to support either Abd-el-Aziz or Mulai Hafid against each other. No meddling in internal affairs of Morocco must be allowed, no definite pledge to support any one claimant to the Throne must be given. He insisted all the more on these points as there existed an active party in favour of the opposite policy, who were endeavouring to push the Government into it; to adopt that policy would mean conquering Fez, conquering Marrakesh, and the impossible task of holding down an unorganized country.

In reviewing the events in Morocco of the past two months, he had nothing but approval to give to the manner in which the operations on the Algerian frontier had been carried out against the Beni Snassen. The work in course of execution in that region, namely, the maintenance of order and encouragement of trade, was the best kind of pacific penetration. At Casa Blanca the course of events was less satisfactory, but he attributed to the action taken there the calm which had prevailed in the other Atlantic ports of Morocco. But in the Government's action with regard to General Drude, M. Ribot seemed to detect some indication of a change of policy. Was there a "Rabat policy" as well as the policy publicly stated? It was France who had brought the Sultan to Rabat by furnishing him with money; in M. Ribot's opinion this step had been a mistake; it identified the Sultan with France. Was the Government allowing itself to be drawn on by the advocates of forward action? Was this unexpected advance on Settat part of the "Rabat policy"? Again, there had been a question of making Abd-el-Aziz a loan of 150,000,000 fr. The loan, it is true, had not been made, and the events at Fez now rendered it impossible, but the fact that rumours about it had been allowed to circulate indicated a mixture of two policies which the Government were trying to combine. Mulai Hafid's attitude and his chances of success were obscure; but what inextricable confusion would ensue if events should so happen that part of Europe should recognize him as Sultan and France should be unable to do so! As a matter of fact, M. Ribot thought it likely that neither Abd-el-Aziz nor his brother would succeed in dominating all Morocco. Anarchy might continue a long time, and the fact that the receipts of the Customs had considerably increased lately showed that in such a country as Morocco anarchy did not necessarily mean wide-spread disaster.

In summing up the situation, M. Ribot mentioned the Anglo-French Agreement. It had been said in 1904 that France must immediately seize Morocco or the Agreement would be a fraud ("une leurre"). He was not of that opinion. France had been able to make with honour certain financial concessions in Egypt which had cost her nothing and had been necessary for the government of that country. In exchange, she could depend on England's diplomatic support—no inconsiderable advantage; the Act of Algeciras recognized France's special interests in the country as distinct from, but not in conflict with, those of other Powers. It also, however, recognized Moorish integrity, that is to say, it forbade any other country from establishing itself in Morocco so as to become the rival of France. With such advantages only patience is required. "Le temps travaille pour nous; nous n'avons pas à nous jeter tête baissée dans des difficultés ou des périls; nous pouvons attendre."

M. Delcassé followed M. Ribot in the Tribune. He began by stating that it was

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no longer possible for him to keep silence with respect to the foreign policy of France under his guidance. M. Jaurès wished to see France retire from Morocco. Had he considered whether some other Power might not then come forward and take on itself the task which France had laid down, and whether that was not likely to produce a general conflagration? It was sometimes forgotten that the Moroccan question had its place in the general political situation of France, and it could not be considered separately. He had had the responsibility of taking the initiative in finding a solution for the Moroccan question. France was obviously indicated as the Power which should undertake that solution, in virtue of her preponderating influence in that quarter. After the experience of twenty-five years ago in another part of the Mediterranean, it was allowable to think that any hesitation might have had disastrous consequences for France. Already the eyes of other nations were upon Morocco, and it was not necessary to lay stress on what the establishment of foreign influence at Fez would mean for Algeria and for France herself. He asked whether it was not therefore a wise policy to seek to obtain for France by frank negotiations with the other Mediterranean Powers the recognition of her special position in regard to Morocco. This had been obtained, and M. Delcassé quoted a portion of the second paragraph of Article 2 of the Anglo-French Declaration respecting Egypt and Morocco of the 8th April, 1904. France was then at liberty to act: "Nous étions les maîtres de notre action, les maîtres de l'heure, libres d'accentuer ou de modérer notre effort selon les milieux, selon les circonstances." Advantage of this position had at once been taken, with the result that the Sultan of Morocco addressed himself to France in order to obtain her aid in the military and financial organization foreseen by the Anglo-French Declaration of 1904. A loan of 60,000,000 fr. guaranteed on the Moroccan Customs, and the engagement of French officers to instruct the garrison of Tangier were in consequence arranged.

M. Delcassé went on to demonstrate how the intervention of Germany in 1905 had taken place. In his opinion, the reasons which had dictated this intervention did not lie so much as was generally said in the events in Manchuria, but much nearer home. He explained the steps taken to inform the German Government of negotiations concerning Morocco; but they had something else in view as well as Morocco, namely, German hegemony in Europe, and, in Europe freed from that hegemony, a France round whom were congregating all those who desired to see Europe free and independent. What should have been the reply to the action of Germany? The Sultan should have been told, in answer to his request for a Conference of the Powers, that the questions raised had been regulated by the Franco-Moorish Agreements of 1901 and 1902, and by the Anglo-French Agreement of the 8th April, 1904, of which His Majesty had already availed himself in seeking the aid of France for military and financial reorganization: Germany might have been courteously informed of the reply sent to Fez, and of the reasons which dictated an adherence thereto on the part of France. It had been said that this would have brought about a war, but who would declare war on France because, supported by other Powers almost unanimously, she did not consider that a Conference was opportune, when no veritable grievance could be brought against her, when she was acting within her rights, with universal public opinion on her side and with an alliance and powerful friendships at her back. The fact of accepting the proposal for a Conference opened the door to an interference with France which he, the speaker, had carefully kept at a distance, and, however favourable the decisions of the Conference might turn out to be, France was necessarily put in the position of carrying out duties in Morocco under the surveillance and control of others. It was hoped that the Conference would be the means of breaking up the ring of alliances and friendships which French diplomacy had so happily created. The calculations were wrong, as the event proved.

M. Delcassé referred to a sentence uttered by a speaker in the Reichstag which was allowed to pass there without protest: "It would have been much better for Germany if the Conference had never met." That was his own opinion, but he would add that it would have been much better for every one concerned.

Leaving Morocco on one side, M. Delcassé proceeded to speak of the more general aspect of French policy. He gave an account of the efforts made by him to better the diplomatic situation of France in Europe. French colonial expansion, which perhaps more than anything else since 1870 had served to demonstrate the resources and vitality of France, should have been accompanied by a policy designed to secure guarantees for France in Europe, especially in view of the formation of the Triple Alliance. While France was engaged in colonial enterprises, Italy, already a member of the Triple Alliance, was drawing closer to England, so that France was in a manner

caught between the Continental combination and the maritime *entente* of Italy and Great Britain. French diplomacy succeeded in restoring confidence in France at Rome and at Madrid. The *entente* with England was the culminating point of these European *rapprochements*. This *entente*, M. Delcassé said, he had deemed necessary from the first, and he explained how advantageous for France such an *entente* with the first naval Power of the world must inevitably be. The traditional policy of England was to preserve the balance of power in Europe, a state of things in which France was first and foremost interested. It had often been said to him that an alliance with Russia and an *entente* with England was a paradox; events, however, had shown that this was not the case. Public opinion in France had approved of the mediation of the French Government at the time of the Hull incident, and foreseen that further developments of Anglo-Russian relations might with French assistance be expected. The policy of France was, however, suddenly accused of being aimed against another Power which complained of being treated as "une quantité négligeable." The Triple Alliance was frequently vaunted as securing the peace of Europe. He (the speaker) claimed that there was no reason why the system which was the work of French diplomacy should not be equally efficacious in maintaining peace.

M. Delcassé proceeded to show that the system of *ententes* brought about by him was an essentially pacific one in its conception and in its aims. He pointed out the value of the Anglo-French *rapprochement* in keeping the peace of the world, demonstrating how beneficial had been its effect at the time of the Hull incident and during the Russo-Japanese war.

Turning again to the Moroccan question, he asked the House to realize the gravity of the hour—the future of France as a Great Power was concerned. "Those who realize," he said, "how America is now closed to European settlement, and who foresee the rapid evolution proceeding in the Far East, have not hesitated in recognizing the African Agreements as acts of farsightedness. Africa, with her immense territories and her sparse and varied population, is, in reality, the surest reserve for Europe."

He concluded his speech by an eloquent passage in which he said that the danger to France lay, not in the Act of Algeciras, but rather in her own possible weakness and hesitation. The alliance and the friendships she had contracted must be preserved and fortified, and it was, above all, necessary to maintain the efficiency of the army. In this manner the capital of honour, prestige, and safety would be kept intact and increased, and would serve as a testimony that the Third Republic had not been found wanting during the thirty-seven years of its existence in its task of bringing about the resurrection of France.

The debate was adjourned on the conclusion of M. Delcassé's speech till the 27th instant, and it is thought probable that it may be continued on the 28th instant.

I inclose herein, extracted from the "Journal Officiel" of to-day's date, the full text of M. Delcassé's speech.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

Inclosure in No. 48.

Extract from the "Journal Officiel" of January 25, 1908.

M. Delcassé.—Messieurs, il m'est vraiment impossible de ne pas relever certaines paroles graves appliquées à la politique étrangère que j'ai pratiquée et qui a été la politique étrangère de la France par l'Honorable M. Jaurès, paroles qu'il a répétées à plusieurs reprises comme s'il voulait m'amener à cette tribune.

Expliquons-nous.

Je n'ai pas voulu, c'est vrai, en 1905, conduire la France à la Conférence Marocaine. Puisque la France y a été conduite, sans m'attarder à d'inutiles regrets, considérant avant tout le but à atteindre, je déclare tout de suite qu'à mon sens, il y va de l'honneur et de l'intérêt de la France de poursuivre l'œuvre commencée et qu'elle doit la poursuivre avec l'Acte d'Algésiras pendant les trois ou quatre années qui lui restent à vivre, avec l'instrument, si défectueux soit-il, que l'Acte d'Algésiras nous a mis dans la main.

Tout autre est le sentiment de l'Honorable M. Jaurès. Après avoir, il m'en souvient, il y a trois ans, exalté l'idée de la Conférence Marocaine, après avoir exigé du Gouvernement qu'il consentit à s'y rendre, notre éminent collègue proclame aujourd'hui

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la faillite de la Conférence. Il veut qu'on liquide et que la France se retire du Maroc. Et après? L'Honorable M. Jaurès pense-t-il que tout serait fini? (*Très bien! très bien!*) Et si une autre Puissance nous y remplace? Si, sous des prétextes ou pour des raisons qui ne manqueront pas, une autre Puissance intervient? Si, ayant accompli la tâche à laquelle la France aurait renoncé après l'avoir réclamée, cette Puissance prétend prendre sa récompense? (*Très bien! très bien!*)

C'est une première hypothèse; il y en a d'autres. Si, par exemple—ce qui me paraît très probable, étant donné la connaissance que je puis avoir des divers éléments du problème—si l'intervention d'une Puissance détermine l'entrée en scène d'une autre Puissance, s'il y a conflit, si ce conflit, ce qui me paraît inévitable, tourne en mêlée générale! Ce sont là des points auxquels l'Honorable M. Jaurès ne semble pas avoir songé.

Ce sont en tout cas des points sur lesquels l'Honorable M. Jaurès ne paraît pas s'être arrêté, mais qu'il nous est interdit à nous de négliger. Nous le pouvons d'autant moins que l'examen de ces points amène à reconnaître que c'est encore l'action concordante de la France et de l'Espagne qui, avant tout sans doute, avantageuse à la France et à l'Espagne, est encore la plus favorable à la fois au Moroc, aux étrangers qui font du commerce au Maroc et à la paix entre les Puissances qui, pour des motifs divers, ont pris part à la Conférence.

J'ai entendu émettre bien des jugements au sujet des événements qui s'accomplissent au Maroc, et je vois des esprits, perplexes, se demander: Que faire? Où aller? Je crois que nous le comprendrons mieux en nous rappelant d'où nous venons et pourquoi nous nous sommes mis en route. (*Très bien! très bien!*)

Peut-être, au cours de précédents débats s'est-on attaché au fait particulier qui les avait motivés au point de perdre quelque peu de vue l'ensemble. Or, il m'apparaît que, tant pour l'information exacte et complète de la Chambre et de l'opinion publique que pour la direction de nos efforts, c'est dans son ensemble qu'il convient d'envisager notre politique Marocaine.

Et d'abord il faut la mettre et il faut la considérer à sa vraie place, c'est-à-dire dans le cadre de notre politique générale, à laquelle elle a été liée dès le début et de laquelle on ne saurait la détacher sans trouble pour les deux et sans dommage pour le pays. (*Très bien! très bien!*)

C'est ce que je voudrais faire ici et, puisqu'on a parlé des responsabilités engagées dans cette affaire, je viens sans forfanterie, très simplement, pour la première fois que je parle devant cette Chambre, revendiquer ma responsabilité, la revendiquer toute, mais on me permettra de m'en tenir à la mienne.

Ma responsabilité, la voici. C'est à moi qu'est due, ou sur moi que retombe—comme l'on voudra—l'initiative de la solution Française de la question Marocaine; mais comme vous le disaient, dans une précédente interpellation, l'Honorable M. Delafosse après l'Honorable M. Deschanel, l'Honorable M. Ribot après M. Delafosse, cette question existait depuis très longtemps, et c'est la situation géographique du pays, c'est sa valeur économique, c'est son état intérieur qui l'avaient posée, et qui, dans les dernières années, l'avaient posée d'une façon aiguë. Cette question, il s'agissait de savoir qui devait la résoudre. A mon sens, c'était la Puissance qui y avait un intérêt prépondérant, c'est-à-dire la France; et il ne fallait pas se croiser les bras, si l'on ne voulait pas qu'à la faveur de tel ou tel incident, né du chaos Marocain, sans qu'il fût besoin de le provoquer, d'autres, moins qualifiés peut-être que nous—mon éminent collègue et ami M. Ribot vous les citait au mois de Novembre, et je ne suis pas sûr qu'il les ait cités tous—d'autres se substituassent à la France.

Après l'expérience faite, il y a vingt-cinq ans, sur un autre point de la Méditerranée, une hésitation sur ce point aurait été d'autant moins excusable que les conséquences, absolument désastreuses, en eussent été, cette fois, impossibles à réparer.

Songez, Messieurs, à ce qu'est le Maroc; considérez ses ressources, la fertilité de son sol, le chiffre de sa population au moins égale à celle de l'Algérie et de la Tunisie réunies; remarquez qu'il est aux portes de l'Europe—(*très bien! très bien!*)—et que, de plus en plus, les regards de divers côtés se portaient sur lui. (*Très bien! très bien!*)

Réfléchissez que l'établissement d'une influence étrangère à Fez, ce serait, pour l'Algérie, la menace constante et la paralysie—(*Applaudissements sur divers bancs*)—pour la France, l'obligation d'affecter indéfiniment à la seule défense de l'Algérie, l'argent, les efforts qui seraient employés plus fructueusement à l'exploitation de ses ressources; bref, notre avenir dans la Méditerranée gravement compromis, et vous conclurez, avec vos prédécesseurs, Messieurs, que si, comme a dû le reconnaître la Conférence d'Algésiras, le Maroc ne peut, sans soutien et sans guide, se délivrer de l'anarchie, ni le Gouvernement Marocain rétablir l'ordre et la tranquillité sans lesquels la sécurité des personnes

et la liberté du commerce ne seraient guère qu'un mot, c'est la France que, tout ensemble, sa situation dans l'Afrique du Nord, son intérêt, ses moyens d'action, son expérience des populations Musulmanes, désignent entre toutes les Puissances pour être ce guide et ce soutien. (*Applaudissements à Gauche et au Centre.*)

Voilà, Messieurs, le point de vue Français, l'intérêt capital Français. Il restait à le faire admettre, et à le faire admettre, justement, par ceux-là mêmes qu'on avait pris l'habitude de dénoncer, à cette même place, comme nos rivaux.

Eh bien! Messieurs, ne trouvez-vous pas que c'est une politique avisée que celle qui, par de franches négociations, a obtenu des Puissances Méditerranéennes, des Puissances directement intéressées à l'équilibre des forces dans la Méditerranée, ou ayant, au Maroc même, des droits et des intérêts politiques directs, la reconnaissance formelle—laissez-moi vous citer ici le texte des accords intervenus; ils définissent bien notre tâche—la reconnaissance formelle "qu'il appartient à la France notamment, comme Puissance limitrophe du Maroc, sur une vaste étendue . . . . de veiller à la tranquillité de ce pays et de lui prêter son assistance pour toutes les réformes administratives, économiques, financières, et militaires dont il a besoin."

Notez en passant, Messieurs, que ces arrangements Méditerranéens ne pouvaient aboutir que par une amélioration préalable et profonde de nos relations Européennes et devaient avoir pour résultat, pour résultat voulu, un relèvement de notre situation en Europe.

Mais, pour nous en tenir au Maroc, il semble bien qu'appuyée sur de tels titres et sur les amitiés dont ces titres sont le témoignage, la France pouvait d'autant plus tranquillement entreprendre sa tâche que le succès, c'est-à-dire l'établissement de l'ordre et de la tranquillité devait, comme le faisait très justement observer au Reichstag le 12 Avril, 1904, c'est-à-dire quatre jours après l'Accord Franco-Anglais, le Chancelier de l'Empire Allemand, être profitable à tout le monde.

Ainsi, Messieurs, nous étions seuls, seuls à agir; nous étions les maîtres de notre action, les maîtres de l'heure, libres d'accentuer ou de modérer notre effort d'après les milieux, selon les circonstances. Et tout de suite nous avons agi, et notre action s'est engagée dans les conditions les plus encourageantes. C'est ce que de certains côtés on semble ignorer ou avoir oublié.

On a oublié, en effet, ou l'on ignore, malgré la publicité de ces actes, que le lendemain même du Traité Franco-Anglais nous avons notifié ce Traité au Sultan, en lui expliquant la signification et la portée. On a semblé oublier ou ignorer que, loin de protester, le Sultan a eu recours immédiatement à notre appui militaire et financier prévu par l'Accord Franco-Anglais, et que l'emprunt de 60,000,000, gagé sur les Douanes Marocains et l'instruction de la garnison Marocaine de Tanger par des officiers Français, en ont été aussitôt la conséquence. (*Très bien! très bien!*)

Il n'y avait donc qu'à continuer avec méthode, avec esprit de suite, avec souplesse, et malgré les à-coups inévitables—j'ai été le premier à les annoncer à cette Tribune—avec ténacité, comme il convient à une grande nation, à qui ne suffit pas la gloire d'avoir entrepris une grande tâche, mais qui veut recueillir le bénéfice de l'avoir menée à bonne fin. (*Applaudissements sur divers bancs.*)

Le premier à-coup s'est produit un an après par l'appel du Sultan aux Puissances, ou—ce qui est plus conforme à la réalité—par l'intervention de l'Allemagne.

Ne nous attardons pas, Messieurs, à nos étonner du changement d'attitude de l'Allemagne ni que le Gouvernement Allemand se soit alarmé pour les intérêts Allemands au Maroc, en 1905, juste des mêmes accords diplomatiques—car ils n'ont pas été modifiés—où l'année précédente il avait trouvé la justification éclatante de l'immobilité, de la sérénité que ses agités coloniaux lui reprochaient. Le Chancelier de l'Empire Allemand a pris lui-même la peine d'expliquer à ce propos que son langage varie suivant les circonstances.

Que s'était-il donc passé depuis le mois d'Avril 1904? Ce n'est pas moi qui veux le rechercher ici; mais je pense que ceux qui, ne se tournant que du côté de l'Extrême-Orient, voient uniquement les événements de Mandchourie, exagèrent démesurément leur influence à cet égard, et je soupçonne qu'on trouverait beaucoup plus près la cause déterminante du changement d'attitude du Gouvernement Impérial.

L'Allemagne intervint donc, mettant en avant des prétextes dont le Livre Jaune, publié par mon successeur et qui avait été préalablement, selon l'usage, communiqué au Gouvernement Impérial, fit éclater six mois plus tard, aux yeux de tous, la parfaite inconsistance.

On a vu, en effet, dans ce Livre Jaune, contrairement aux griefs articulés, que jamais notre Représentant au Maroc n'avait, ni devant le Sultan, ni devant les Ministres du Sultan, ni devant personne, invoqué un mandat de l'Europe; on a pu s'y

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assurer que, dans nos rapports avec l'Allemagne, nous avions fait preuve d'une prévenance que la force de notre situation diplomatique m'avait permis de pousser à l'extrême sans risquer de voir notre conduite appréciée d'une façon fâcheuse pour notre dignité. (*Applaudissements.*) On y a pu remarquer, en ce qui concerne notamment l'Accord Franco-Anglais, que nous avons fait à l'Allemagne un traitement de faveur, le traitement même réservé à la Russie notre alliée ; qu'au lieu de placer le Gouvernement Impérial, par la simple remise du texte d'un papier, d'un Traité signé, en présence d'un fait accompli, nous lui avions, au contraire, par un procédé particulièrement confiant et amical—dont seule, avec la Russie, l'Allemagne a été l'objet—donné connaissance, près de trois semaines avant sa conclusion, des dispositions essentielles de l'Accord touchant le Maroc, lui fournissant ainsi l'occasion de nous présenter au besoin, de la même manière amicale, ses observations et ses désirs.

On a relevé enfin dans ce Livre Jaune, relativement à l'Accord Franco-Espagnol que, signé à Paris le 3 Octobre, 1904, il a été, par mes soins, porté avant sa publication à la connaissance du Gouvernement Impérial, qui n'a soulevé d'objections d'aucune sorte.

Si elle n'avait pas de prétexte, nous devons croire que l'Allemagne avait ses raisons.

Quand on a observé avec attention ce qui s'est passé à Algésiras, certaines tentatives qui y ont été faites, certaines propositions qui ont été risquées, on ne voudrait pas jurer que le Maroc lui-même n'a été pour rien dans l'intervention du Gouvernement Impérial. Mais—on ne nous l'a guère dissimulé—il y avait autre chose et plus que le Maroc. Il y avait surtout l'Europe, l'Europe qui échappait à une hégémonie, qu'on avait crue peut-être définitive, et, dans l'Europe libérée, il y avait la France, la France autour de qui, depuis quelques années, se serrait, en Europe, tout ce qui était indépendant et le voulait rester, tout ce qui avait à cœur l'indépendance de l'Europe et la voulait consolider. (*Applaudissements.*)

C'est dans ces conditions que l'Allemagne, après avoir fait, à Paris, les sondages que le Livre Blanc Allemand a révélés, c'est dans ces conditions que l'Allemagne proposa une Conférence ou plutôt—car malgré les assurances qu'elle avait pu retirer de ces sondages, il était prudent de prévoir un échec—c'est alors que le Sultan, dûment inspiré et conseillé, fit prier les Puissances de se réunir pour examiner en commun la question de leurs rapports avec son Empire.

Quelle devait être la réponse de la France? Mon opinion, Messieurs, fut très nette.

Au Sultan il fallait faire observer que, pour nous, la question était déjà réglée par les Accords Franco-Marocains de 1901 et 1902 et par l'Accord Franco-Anglais du 8 Avril, 1904, dont le Sultan lui-même s'était déjà prévalu deux fois pour obtenir notre concours militaire et financier.

A l'Allemagne, si elle nous avait interrogés à ce sujet après notre déclaration au Sultan, après les dispositions connues de la plupart des grandes Puissances, à l'Allemagne il n'y avait qu'à communiquer obligamment notre réponse à Fez en lui indiquant les motifs qui nous commandaient de nous y tenir.

Va-t-on me dire encore aujourd'hui : Mais en ce cas c'était la guerre ! Car c'est le cri qu'on fit retentir alors, sans se laisser arrêter par le précédent redoutable qu'on allait créer par la considération qu'on allait livrer à l'étranger le secret d'une faiblesse dont l'étranger pourrait être tenté d'abuser un jour—(*Applaudissements*)—rendant peut-être un conflit inévitable par l'impossibilité pour nous de tout accepter, pour lui de reculer après s'être avancé uniquement sur la foi d'un nouvel abandon ?

Non, Messieurs, ce n'était pas la guerre ! On ne déclare pas la guerre à la France, uniquement parce que la France avec, d'ailleurs, la presque unanimité des grandes Puissances, ne juge pas à propos de se rendre à une Conférence, quand on n'a aucun grief avouable à faire valoir contre elle, quand la France est manifestement dans son droit, quand elle a pour elle ces impondérables dont se préoccupait toujours M. de Bismarck, l'opinion universelle des peuples, une alliance, des amitiés puissantes, et quand elle montre qu'elle a confiance dans son alliance, dans ses amitiés et tout d'abord en elle-même. (*Vifs applaudissements à Gauche et sur un grand nombre de bancs au Centre et à Droite.*)

M. Jaurès.—Pourquoi l'avez-vous laissé tomber, si vous l'applaudissez maintenant? (*Applaudissements à l'Extrême Gauche et sur divers bancs à Droite.*)

Vous êtes provocateurs après le péril, vous vous faisiez humbles pendant le danger.

M. Delcassé.—M. Jaurès . . . .

M. Jaurès.—Je le dis à vos amis . . . .

M. Delcassé.—Eh bien ! je vais vous répondre pour eux, M. Jaurès. C'est

qu'ils n'ont rien su, et, quand on leur a parlé de guerre, c'est qu'ils ont été trompés ! (*Mouvement.*)

M. Ruau (Ministre de l'Agriculture).—Par qui, M. Delcassé ?

M. Delcassé.—Parler de guerre . . . .

M. Ruau (Ministre de l'Agriculture).—Je vous demande l'autorisation de vous poser une question.

J'ai eu l'honneur de faire partie avec vous du Cabinet Rouvier. Vous venez de prononcer des paroles qui visent le Cabinet Rouvier et l'unanimité des membres de ce Cabinet, hormis vous. Je vous prie de vous expliquer. Cela est d'autant plus nécessaire, permettez-moi de vous le dire, que vous avez procédé par insinuation et qu'en ces matières, quand la discussion s'élève à de tels sommets, on n'a pas le droit d'insinuer. On parle. (*Applaudissements sur divers bancs.*)

M. Delcassé.—Parler de guerre à propos de la Conférence, à propos du Maroc, mais c'est faire injure à ceux à qui on en attribue la pensée, qui n'ont jamais eu cette pensée, qui l'ont déclarée à plusieurs reprises en plein Parlement, et tout récemment encore, mais qui avaient intérêt et à qui il ne pouvait déplaire qu'on le crût à ce moment et que, par là, réussit cette campagne d'intimidation à la fois et de promesses, campagne savante, mais non inédite, et à laquelle il est encore inexplicable qu'on ait pu se laisser prendre. (*Très bien ! très bien ! sur divers bancs.*)

Non, ce n'était pas la guerre . . . . mais ce qui, à un autre point de vue, ne laisse pas d'être grave, c'était une pierre de touche. (*Très bien ! très bien !*) Par l'acceptation de la Conférence, on a ouvert au Maroc la porte à des ingérences que je m'étais soigneusement appliqué à écarter . . . . et peu favorables à la France que fussent les décisions de la Conférence, on contractait, au nom de la France, l'obligation de travailler au Maroc sous la surveillance et sous le contrôle d'autrui. (*Applaudissements sur divers bancs.*)

Et ainsi se trouvait viciée dans son principe, faussée dans son application, notre politique Marocaine telle que je l'avais conçue, telle que le Parlement l'avait approuvée, avec sa soudure nécessaire à notre politique Européenne. Je n'en pouvais plus garder la responsabilité.

Mais, de même que je me suis abstenu—la Chambre entière m'en est témoin—de tout mot, de tout geste qui aurait pu embarrasser le Gouvernement qui, tout en déclarant la Conférence inutile et, parce qu'inutile, dangereuse—ce sont les expressions de mon successeur, telles que vous les lisez dans le Livre Jaune—l'avait néanmoins acceptée, de même quand, deux ans plus tard, le Cabinet actuel a soumis à notre approbation l'Acte d'Algésiras, je l'ai voté résolument, parce que ce qui est fait est fait, parce que c'est chose vaine de bouder contre les faits, qu'il vaut mieux pour le pays essayer d'en tirer le meilleur parti et que dans un vote unanime le Gouvernement pouvait puiser la force et l'autorité dont il a besoin. (*Applaudissements.*)

Messieurs—j'aborde le point qui m'a le plus touché dans le discours de M. Jaurès—des considérations d'un autre ordre, mais non moins importantes, le souci de la conservation de relations normales et courtoises entre toutes les Puissances et, comme conséquence, la consolidation de la paix Européenne, devaient, à mon sens, nous faire envisager avec une appréhension insurmontable la réunion de la Conférence.

Dans l'esprit de qui la réclamait, la Conférence était sans doute une diminution de la France au Maroc, peut-être aussi l'accès à d'autres influences, à d'autres ambitions. Mais—on ne s'y est pas trompé en Europe—c'était avant tout un moyen de briser le faisceau d'alliances et d'amitiés dont la diplomatie Française avait été une heureuse ouvrière.

Eh bien ! le calcul était faux et, dès lors, il était facile de prévoir—je l'avais prévu, et je l'avais dit—que la déception fatale où l'on marchait se mesurait à la grandeur des espérances qu'on avait conçues et que, finalement, on serait moins sensible au triomphe obtenue par la réunion de la Conférence qu'à la manifestation répétée qui devait s'y faire que l'immense majorité des Puissances se trouvaient du côté de la France.

N'est-ce pas, Messieurs, ce qui s'est produit ? Et ne vous souvenez-vous pas de ce cri qu'on a pu pousser en plein Reichstag, sans provoquer de contradiction : " Mieux eût valu pour l'Allemagne que la Conférence ne se fût pas réunie ! "

Mais, Messieurs, plus équitable peut-être, je pense et je dis que cela eût mieux valu pour tout le monde. (*Très bien ! très bien !*) Laissées aux seules mains qui avaient tous les titres, titres diplomatiques, titres naturels, pour y travailler, la pacification au Maroc en eût été facilitée au bénéfice commun de tous les étrangers qui y sont fixés, de toutes les nations qui y font du commerce et qui veulent le développer. (*Très bien ! très bien ! sur divers bancs.*)

Et, d'autre part, les modifications qui sont survenues dans ces dernières années en Europe, modifications si profondément heureuses pour la France—M. Ribot le constatait,

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il y a deux mois, et je l'en remercie—ces modifications seraient restées dans le demi-jour où, pour ménager toutes les susceptibilités, mes efforts avaient tendu et avaient réussi à les maintenir.

Ah ! j'entends bien, ce sont ces modifications qu'au fond on incrimine. De là, les accusations sous lesquelles on a prétendu accabler la politique qui a quelque peu contribué à les produire. Passe pour l'étranger, dont le patriotisme peut ne pas se croire tenu d'être juste ! Mais comment vous, M. Jaurès, comment des Français, en qui le même patriotisme devrait tout dominer, peuvent-ils se rencontrer encore, pour répéter des accusations qu'ils ne peuvent pas ne pas savoir être de pures calomnies ? (*Applaudissements.*)

Ah ! Messieurs, s'il ne s'agissait que d'un homme, le mutisme où cet homme s'est obstiné, en des heures plus dures vous est la garantie de la facilité avec laquelle il continuerait à se taire aujourd'hui. Mais j'ai dû me convaincre que ces accusations, indéfiniment renouvelées—peut-être à cause du bénéfice du silence dont elles se sentaient assurées—cesseraient, à la longue, d'être inoffensives et, entre autres inconvénients, pourraient froisser ceux des pays étrangers qui ont traité avec nous et qui ne s'expliqueraient pas que l'on pût dire ici et répéter impunément que la politique de conciliation entre nos intérêts et les leurs, que la politique d'équilibre Européen à laquelle ils ont collaboré avec nous a été, comme le répétait tout à l'heure M. Jaurès, une politique d'aventures. (*Nouveaux applaudissements.*)

Je dis qu'il est de l'intérêt essentiel de la France qu'on ne laisse pas défigurer d'abord, pour la pouvoir détruire ensuite, une politique étrangère qui a fait ses preuves, qui continue à les faire à l'heure où je parle, qui a, par deux fois, contribué puissamment à conserver la paix au monde, vous le savez, M. Jaurès, qui a eu pendant des années l'appui constant et éclairé de la représentation nationale, qui a eu, ainsi que l'attestent les adresses répétées d'un grand nombre de Conseils Généraux, l'assentiment et la faveur populaires, qui a eu au dehors l'approbation à peu près unanime de l'opinion, qui en suivait les progrès avec une sympathie croissante, née sans doute de la conviction qu'il n'y avait rien dans cette politique qui pût blesser les susceptibilités, alarmer les intérêts ni heurter les aspirations légitimes d'autrui.

Eh bien ! qu'a donc été cette politique et que se proposait donc en la pratiquant la diplomatie Française ? Je vais le dire très franchement.

La diplomatie Française se proposait d'améliorer sans cesse, de fortifier sans cesse, et sans cesse d'étendre la situation internationale de la France. Dessein hautement avouable, car les intérêts généraux de la France—combien de fois ne l'ai-je pas fait remarquer à cette Tribune !—peuvent très bien se concilier avec les intérêts généraux des autres Puissances, dessein que ne pouvaient manquer de favoriser, au dehors, tous les partisans d'un sain équilibre Européen, puisque de l'Europe, dont un mot découragé avait un jour constaté la disparition, il s'agissait de refaire une bienfaisante réalité. (*Très bien ! très bien !*)

Tel était le but. Comment l'atteindre ?

Le premier soin qui s'imposait à nous, c'était de changer l'air amblant, c'était de dissiper l'atmosphère de méfiance et de soupçon qu'on avait laissé se former et s'épaissir entre ce pays et certains de ses amis naturels, et préparer ainsi les voies de franches explications, par où tous les malentendus seraient éclaircis.

Il fallait ensuite s'occuper de régler équitablement les différends existants, de façon que rien ne vînt plus obscurcir d'aucun côté l'intérêt supérieur qui commandait aux pays ainsi rapprochés une entente de plus en plus étroite, dont devait bénéficier également la paix du monde.

Et pour consolider l'œuvre accomplie, il fallait enfin s'attacher, à force de loyauté et d'esprit de suite, à inspirer une confiance inébranlable dans la sincérité, dans la continuité de la politique tirée des accords intervenus. (*Très bien ! très bien !*)

Messieurs, quel chemin plus à ciel ouvert pour conduire au but proclamé !

Il n'était pas besoin de longues réflexions pour voir par où il fallait aborder la tâche ainsi définie.

L'altération de nos rapports avec l'Italie avait eu des conséquences particulièrement graves. La formation de la Triple Alliance fut un événement considérable, qui aurait dû, je ne dis pas nous faire renoncer à la politique d'expansion coloniale—dont, à mes yeux, le premier avantage peut-être, après l'effondrement de 1870, a été de révéler au monde et tout d'abord à notre peuple lui-même les prodigieuses ressources et l'inépuisable vitalité de la France—mais nous porter à nous inquiéter davantage des conditions nécessaires de cette expansion, à prendre au préalable nos sûretés, de façon à ne pas rester isolés en Europe au milieu de Puissances méfiantes ou mal disposées. A quoi bon insister ?

Tandis que nous nous enfoncions dans l'Extrême-Orient, tandis que nous multiplions nos efforts en différents points de l'Afrique, l'Italie, déjà incorporée dans la Triple Alliance, se rapprochait de plus en plus de l'Angleterre ; une entente maritime finit par s'établir, qui correspondait à l'alliance continentale, et vous n'avez pas pu oublier à quel point la France, prise entre les branches de cet étau formidable, avait peine à se mouvoir, sinon même à respirer. (*Applaudissements sur divers bancs à Gauche.*)

C'est à Rome que se rejoignaient les deux branches de l'étau ; mais est-ce que le temps, à Rome même, comme à Paris, est-ce que l'expérience, la comparaison entre les résultats obtenus et le prix dont on les avait achetés, la constatation enfin des dommages éprouvés, est-ce que toutes ces causes étaient demeurées sans effet ? Est-ce qu'il ne devait pas y avoir, à Rome comme à Paris, une disposition—inconsciente encore, peut-être—à faire cesser une situation défavorable à tout le monde ? Est-ce que, sans revenir sur les faits acquis, sans manquer aux arrangements intervenus, il n'était pas possible de trouver les éléments d'un règlement qui, sauvegardant les intérêts essentiels des deux pays, ne laisseraient place, pour inspirer leurs relations futures, qu'à la confiance et à l'amitié ? (*Très bien ! très bien !*)

Pour moi, il était hors de doute que la question serait résolue par le fait même qu'à Rome et à Paris on conviendrait de l'examiner. C'est la Méditerranée qui avait séparé, qui avait brouillé la France et l'Italie, c'est la Méditerranée qui les a réconciliées, sans préjudice pour personne, au bénéfice évident de la paix et de la civilisation. (*Applaudissements.*)

Des considérations de même ordre devaient nous amener à bien définir notre situation vis-à-vis de l'Espagne, notre voisine en Afrique comme en Europe. Mais, tandis qu'en Europe la nature elle-même a pris soin de supprimer toute cause de discorde entre les deux peuples—de sorte que pour se bien apprécier ils n'ont qu'à se mieux connaître et qu'à multiplier les moyens de communication qui facilitent les relations entre les personnes et l'échange des produits—en Afrique l'indétermination même de leur position respective permettait parfois, sur les desseins des uns et des autres, des soupçons qui expliquent les nuages survenus dans le passé et dont il n'était que trop aisé de prévoir qu'en certaines occasions critiques ils seraient exploités dans l'avenir.

C'est ce souci de l'avenir, c'est la préoccupation supérieure d'augmenter, de fortifier les raisons de paix entre l'Espagne et la France qui ont présidé à la négociation des Accords Africains ; et l'achèvement de ces Accords également avantageux à la France et à l'Espagne, mais longtemps, mais la veille encore proclamés chimériques, témoigne assez sur quel pied de confiance et d'amitié les relations des deux pays avaient été établies. (*Applaudissements.*)

L'entente avec l'Angleterre a été le point culminant de cette œuvre de rapprochements Européens. Cette entente, je l'ai jugée nécessaire dès la première heure, et, pour y travailler résolument dès la première heure, en dépit de difficultés de toutes sortes, il m'a suffi de ne pas consentir à prendre le change sur les intérêts vitaux de la France.

Est-ce qu'au point de vue économique, la différence même de la production, soit agricole, soit industrielle, ne nous fait pas les amis naturels de l'Angleterre, intéressés d'autant plus à la prospérité de l'Angleterre que c'est la France, pour une bonne part, qui profite du gain que l'Angleterre réalise sur le reste du monde ?

D'autre part, Puissance coloniale, ne pouvant donner à nos forces navales tout le développement que comporterait la grandeur de notre Empire, comment ne pas être frappés des avantages d'un accord colonial avec la nation qui détient et qui—son Ministre des Affaires Étrangères le rappelait l'autre jour en termes significatifs—ne saurait, sous peine de remettre son existence à la merci d'autrui, abandonner la primauté sur mer ? (*Très bien ! très bien !*)

A quoi bon laisser subsister et, pour ainsi dire, entretenir en vingt endroits des litiges dont le moindre inconvénient était de nous gêner les uns les autres, et d'où pouvait sortir à tous moments un conflit dont il est évident que ce n'est pas le vainqueur lui-même qui eût tiré le bénéfice le plus substantiel. Ne fallait-il pas, au contraire, s'attacher d'autant plus à les aplanir, que, très heureusement, aucun intérêt essentiel, de part et d'autre, ne se trouvait en présence, et que chacun, cédant sur un point, devait obtenir sur un autre une équitable compensation ?

Et si, enfin, l'on considère l'Europe, comment méconnaître que la politique traditionnelle de l'Angleterre y a été généralement déterminée par le souci de maintenir l'équilibre entre les grandes forces qui la composent ? et qui donc, aujourd'hui, plus que la France a intérêt à ce que cet équilibre soit fortement assuré ? (*Applaudissements.*)

Intérêts économiques, intérêts coloniaux, intérêts Européens, tout poussait donc l'Angleterre et la France à une entente qui, pour ne plus parler que de nous, devait

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encore fortifier notre rapprochement avec l'Italie et l'Espagne, sans nuire en aucune sorte —bien au contraire—à notre amitié naturelle avec les États-Unis.

Mais l'entente avec l'Angleterre devait-elle se faire au détriment de notre alliance avec la Russie ?

Ah ! je me rappelle très bien, Messieurs, ce que beaucoup me disaient il y a dix ans : Rester les alliés de la Russie et devenir les amis de l'Angleterre, ce serait l'idéal, mais c'est un paradoxe !

Paradoxe peut-être, pour ceux qui n'avaient pas cherché ou qui ne voyaient pas les raisons générales et profondes d'accord à travers d'apparentes oppositions. En tout cas, l'événement a montré que l'idéal était réalisable. C'est de Pétersbourg—on ne peut l'avoir oublié—qu'est venue à Paris la première et la plus haute approbation publique du rapprochement de Paris et de Londres ; et dès lors, il était évident que l'idéal réalisable pouvait s'élargir encore. Déjà même, en France, l'opinion publique, réjouie du succès de notre médiation dans l'incident de Hull, pressentait une autre entente, qui s'est heureusement réalisée depuis, et dont elle aimait à se flatter que notre pays serait à la fois l'artisan et le bénéficiaire.

Et soudain, comme si l'on se trouvait en présence d'un phénomène nouveau, comme si la politique dont, unanimement jusque-là, on s'était pu partout à reconnaître le caractère pacifique, dont on avait, à la tribune du Reichstag, apprécié, dès le lendemain, la manifestation la plus retentissante—c'est-à-dire les Accords Franco-Anglais—comme un gage de la paix universelle, avait subitement changé de nature, comme si les résultats obtenus ne constituaient pas, par eux-mêmes, une explication suffisante de nos efforts, soudain on s'avise que la diplomatie Française n'a tendu qu'à l'isolement d'une Puissance étrangère, qu'on l'accuse en même temps—conciliez les deux termes, Messieurs —d'avoir traitée en quantité négligeable.

Ce qu'on a vu alors, ce qu'on a entendu, je n'ai pas le goût d'arrêter mes regards ni de retenir votre attention sur ce spectacle auquel assistèrent du dehors, avec un étonnement attristé, nos amis qui ne pouvaient pas, eux, être égarés.

Le rideau est tombé. Depuis longtemps les esprits ont pu se reprendre. Quelle est la réalité ?

Messieurs, rappelez-vous ! Il y a trente-sept ans, une nation gisait à terre, mutilée, saignée à blanc, seule, oh ! bien seule ! Qui la pouvait craindre ? Quelles appréhensions pouvait-elle inspirer ? C'est le vainqueur, pourtant, qui jugea utile et qui crut légitime de s'entourer d'alliés et d'amis. Il fit alliance avec une première Puissance, puis avec une seconde, puis il contracta une contre-assurance avec une troisième, puis il gagna à son système les sympathies d'une quatrième ; si bien que l'Europe entière finit par graviter autour de lui. Qui donc, alors, trouvait enviable la situation de la France ? Qui donc alors n'aurait pas souhaité, autour de la France, des alliés et des amis ? (*Vifs applaudissements.*) Et si une politique prévoyante avait déjà pu les lui procurer, quel Français aurait eu l'idée de lui jeter la pierre ? (*Nouveaux applaudissements.*)

Ah ! je sais bien, ce système était pacifique et son expression formelle—la Triple Alliance—n'avait que la paix pour objectif. On le répète volontiers en Allemagne, et je me souviens que des Français mêmes s'en sont portés garants. (*Sourires.*)

Pour ma part, Messieurs, je le crois. Il reste à savoir si ce système était le seul dont la paix du monde se dût accommoder, et si la paix qu'il procurait était bien rassurante et féconde pour ceux qui n'en faisaient pas partie. (*Applaudissements.*) Il reste à savoir si le système que la diplomatie Française a réussi à constituer n'est pas, lui aussi, essentiellement pacifique. Il reste à savoir comment il aurait pu n'être pas pacifique.

Est-ce à l'Italie, par exemple, qu'ayant des desseins agressifs, nous aurions pu songer pour les favoriser ? Certes, je la savais trop intelligente de tous ses intérêts pour douter qu'elle s'empresserait de répondre aux manifestations sincères de bon vouloir et d'amitié qui lui viendraient de Paris ; et il semblait logique et juste tout ensemble que, la cause de nos désaccords supprimée et nos intérêts respectifs délimités et sauvegardés, l'Italie consentît à mettre sa politique générale en harmonie avec les rapports nouveaux établis avec la France. C'est, en effet, ce qui s'est produit.

Mais, Messieurs—je faisais cette déclaration au mois de Juillet 1902—si nos Accords avec Rome nous ont procuré la garantie précieuse que, par le fait de Rome, la Triple Alliance ne saurait avoir de pointe dirigée contre nous, est-ce que, d'autre part, le renouvellement de la Triple Alliance n'est pas une preuve péremptoire qu'il n'a été rien demandé de plus, qu'il n'y avait rien à demander de plus à la loyauté insoupçonnable de l'Italie. (*Applaudissements.*)

Et l'Espagne ? Il est aisé de concevoir ce que l'Espagne, mise en défiance par une politique sur laquelle nous ne nous serions pas expliqués franchement, ou irritée par un

traitement injuste, pourrait devenir à l'instigation d'ennemis de la France. De là, comme je le rappelais tout à l'heure, les Accords du 3 Octobre, 1904, qui ont fait de l'Espagne notre amie en Afrique comme en Europe.

Mais qui donc, ayant simplement jeté les yeux sur une carte, pourrait songer à faire entrer l'Espagne dans une conspiration semblable à celle dont, comme pour justifier d'avance certaines attitudes et certaines prétentions, on a jugé commode d'accuser la diplomatie Française ? (*Très bien ! très bien !*)

Mais il reste l'Angleterre. Ah ! je sais bien que c'est à propos de l'Angleterre, surtout, que le clairon d'alarme a retenti. Il est vrai que lorsqu'on examine la Puissance militaire de l'Angleterre et de la France, quand on considère où se trouve la force essentielle de l'une, où la force principale de l'autre, on doit convenir que la combinaison possible de leurs forces est de nature à décourager toute velléité d'agression. Mais n'est-ce pas là, justement, le plus bel éloge qu'on puisse faire du rapprochement Franco-Anglais ? Et comment contester, d'autre part, contre le témoignage des faits, que l'idée qui y a présidé ne soit une idée foncièrement pacifique ?

C'est que là, en effet, Messieurs, là est la caractéristique des Accords d'Avril 1904. Jamais, depuis la conclusion de notre alliance avec la Russie, pierre plus solide n'a été apportée à l'édifice de la paix du monde, et jamais pacte de paix n'a eu l'occasion de donner plus vite des témoignages répétés ni plus éclatants de son efficacité.

Cette guerre Russo-Japonaise, qui plaçait en des camps adverses l'Angleterre et la France, avait suscité par cela même une inquiétude universelle. Eh bien ! si avouable qu'était le désir de rapprochement de Paris et de Londres, son objet était si manifestement pacifique que, loin d'y faire obstacle, les hostilités précipitèrent la conclusion des négociations depuis longtemps en cours ; et c'est l'opinion universelle qui a tout de suite proclamé que c'est grâce aux Accords Franco-Anglais que la guerre a pu être circonscrite à l'Extrême-Orient.

Est-il besoin maintenant de revenir sur l'incident de Hull, de rappeler les angoisses immédiates qu'il provoqua de toutes parts ? Est-il besoin de rappeler qu'un conflit aux proportions incalculables paraissait imminent et qu'à l'étranger une certaine presse avait tout de suite déclaré irréductible les exigences de l'Angleterre en prononçant en même temps que l'honneur interdisait à la Russie d'y souscrire ? Et n'est-ce pas la Russie, n'est-ce pas l'Angleterre qui ont tenu à faire savoir publiquement que c'est la France, alliée fidèle de l'une, amie solide de l'autre, inspirant à l'une et à l'autre une confiance égale, qui a rendu possible un arrangement honorable pour les deux parties et profitable au monde entier ? (*Vifs applaudissements.*)

Aussi bien, Messieurs, le monde entier ne s'y est pas trompé. S'il a salué, dès la première minute, avec une faveur aussi marquée, le rapprochement Franco-Anglais, c'est qu'il en avait reconnu tout de suite l'essence pacifique et universellement bienfaisante.

Mais la France, en particulier, a le droit de s'en féliciter, comme d'une nouvelle et forte garantie de sécurité dans le présent, et d'y puiser, en même temps que dans notre alliance—alliance étroite—avec la Russie, la confiance raisonnée que, quelles que puissent être les éventualités de l'avenir, la France se trouverait dans les meilleures conditions pour y faire face. (*Applaudissements.*)

Et maintenant, Messieurs, sincèrement, je vous le demande, est-ce du but visé, est-ce de la politique qui nous y a conduits, que nous aurions à nous excuser ? . . . . Alors ? . . . .

J'ai entendu raconter que le premier Chancelier du grand Empire voisin avait dit un jour : "Si la France s'allie à la Russie, je lui fais la guerre." La France s'est alliée à la Russie, et la paix, manifestement, en a été consolidée.

Il y a trois ans, nous avons lu que le Chancelier actuel du même Empire, faisant allusion devant des Français aux rapports de l'Angleterre et de l'Allemagne, avait dit : "Nul ne saurait se flatter d'être le *tertius gaudens* d'une querelle, quelle qu'elle soit. Le *Suave mari magno* n'est pas de mise en pareille matière" ; Latin qui, en bon Français, signifie : Si une querelle surgit, il faudra d'abord nous prononcer.

Messieurs, sous de multiples changements de langage et de ton, changements auxquels d'ailleurs on nous a prévenus de ne pas accorder une importance inconsidérée, est-il bien sûr que nous ne retrouverions pas aujourd'hui encore la même prétention ?

Eh bien ! disons très haut qu'une pareille prétention ne serait qu'une illusion, une illusion que notre souci des situations nettes et notre attachement à la paix nous font un devoir de dissiper. La France sait, bien mieux, elle sent qu'une nation ne mérite plus guère de vivre quand elle laisse toucher à sa liberté—(*applaudissements*)—et l'usage que la France a fait de sa liberté pour s'entourer d'un réseau d'alliances, d'amitiés

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naturelles et d'intérêts concordants lui a été trop profitable, et à la paix du monde pour que, plus que jamais, elle ne s'y montre pas aujourd'hui passionnément attachée. (*Vifs applaudissements.*)

Ai-je besoin de conclure, Messieurs?

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères avait trop raison quand, au début de la séance de Vendredi dernier, il constatait que notre tâche Marocaine est devenue plus complexe et plus délicate.

La Conférence d'Algésiras, par les conditions mêmes où elle s'est réunie, par le spectacle étalé des divisions de l'Europe, a ajouté à l'anarchie Marocaine et favorisé le développement de troubles, sans créer peut-être des moyens suffisants pour les réprimer.

Mais est-il bien sûr, d'autre part, qu'on ait toujours, qu'on ait, aussitôt que l'occasion s'en est présentée, tiré des Protocoles d'Algésiras, de leur lettre comme de leur esprit, tout le parti qu'ils permettaient?

C'est un point où je ne veux pas m'appesantir. Je ne l'ai effleuré que parce que l'interpellation de M. Jaurès, prétendant tout remettre en question, il s'agit, aujourd'hui, de décider ce qu'on fera demain et comment on le fera.

L'heure est grave, car, ne vous y trompez pas, ce qui est en cause—et de là la responsabilité redoutable qui pèse sur nous—ce n'est rien moins que l'avenir de la France comme Grande Puissance! Ceux qui observent, ceux qui savent comment l'Amérique s'est fermée à l'établissement Européen et qui entrevoient le terme où peut aboutir l'évolution rapide qui s'accomplit en Extrême-Orient, ceux-là n'ont pas attendu jusqu'à ce jour pour reconnaître dans les Accords Africains des dernières années des actes de longue prévoyance.

C'est l'Afrique, Messieurs, avec ses territoires immenses aux populations diverses et peu denses, qui constitue la plus sûre réserve de l'Europe. (*Très bien! très bien!*) L'Empire que la France s'y est taillé et dont la frontière septentrionale regarde la rive métropolitaine de la Méditerranée, déjà magnifique en lui-même, nous est doublement précieux par sa situation. En vous soumettant, il y a neuf ans, les Traités qui nous avaient permis d'en achever l'unité, je vous faisais remarquer que cet Empire est bien assez vaste et qu'il est inutile de l'étendre; mais j'ajoutais tout aussitôt, avec l'approbation unanime de l'Assemblée, que les approches immédiates en veulent être protégées contre des influences, à plus forte raison, contre des dominations rivales! (*Très bien! très bien!*)

C'est ce que nous avons à faire au Maroc, et nous devons le faire aujourd'hui avec l'Acte l'Algésiras et malgré les défauts de cet Acte sur lesquels vous pensez bien que je suis le dernier à fermer les yeux. Mais le plus grand péril aujourd'hui n'est pas l'Acte d'Algésiras. En écoutant M. Jaurès, en entendant la conclusion de son discours, oh! Messieurs, comme j'ai senti que le plus grand péril est encore celui qui nous viendrait de nous-mêmes—(*vifs applaudissements sur un grand nombre de bancs*)—de nos hésitations, qu'on escompte partout, de nos contradictions vite relevées et, j'ai peine à dire le mot, mais le mot doit être dit, de nos défaillances dont on se hâterait de profiter.

Et qu'est-ce qui pourrait, je ne dirai pas justifier—car elle serait en tout cas injustifiable—mais expliquer une défaillance, dans la situation qui a été conquise à la France en Europe?

Je dis "l'Europe" bien qu'il s'agisse du Maroc, car il est manifeste que les obstacles auxquels nous pourrons nous heurter en Afrique, de même que les facilités qui pourront nous y être offertes dépendront pour beaucoup des vicissitudes de notre politique Européenne, et que c'est notre politique Européenne qui doit dominer et diriger toutes nos autres préoccupations. (*Vifs applaudissements à Gauche et au Centre.*)

Ne cessons donc pas de nous fortifier en Europe et, comme je le disais ici même, il y a bientôt dix ans, au début de mon ministère—vous me permettrez ce souvenir et cette citation—" en demeurant prêts à toutes les conversations, en demeurant prêts à tout examiner, à tout discuter," pourvu que la discussion soit sérieuse et qu'on ne prétende pas avoir pour rien, comme cet aigle du "Freischütz," que rappelait un jour M. de Bismarck, la collaboration de la France, ni opposer la France à son alliée et à ses amis, ne cessons pas, Messieurs, de cultiver, de resserrer notre alliance et nos ententes, et de garder en même temps l'armée de nos ententes et de notre alliance—(*très bien! très bien! à Gauche et au Centre*)—une armée qui ait confiance en elle—(*applaudissements sur les mêmes bancs*)—parce qu'elle se sentira la pleine confiance de la nation, composée de soldats en qui l'école aura développé l'amour naturel de la patrie, à qui elle aura inspiré la fierté de lui appartenir, la volonté de la servir devenus hommes, et la

passion de se sacrifier s'il le fallait à sa défense! (*Vifs applaudissements sur un grand nombre de bancs. Interruptions à l'Extrême Gauche.*)

Ne me demandez pas de vous garantir que nous serons ainsi infailliblement à l'abri des orages; mais, à coup sûr, les orages risqueront d'autant moins de se déchaîner que nous serons moralement et matériellement et qu'on nous saura mieux armés pour les affronter; et par là aussi nous avous toutes chances de conserver et d'accroître ce capital d'honneur, de prestige, de sécurité qui atteste que la République n'a pas failli à mission assumée, il y a trente-sept ans, de relever la France! (*Applaudissements vifs et répétés sur un grand nombre de bancs. L'orateur, en retournant à son banc, reçoit des félicitations d'un grand nombre de ses collègues.*)

[2656] No. 49.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 40.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 27, 1908.*

THE French Ambassador called at this Office on the 22nd instant, and stated that the German Chargé d'Affaires at Paris had told M. Pichon that the German Minister at Tangier had received a communication from Sultan Abdul Aziz asking for the intervention of Germany to prevent France from violating the Treaty of Algeciras. Baron Rosen had been instructed to reply that if there had been violations of the Treaty of Algeciras by France the proper course would be for the Sultan to warn all the Signatory Powers and not to address himself to Germany alone. If, however, the Sultan would specify in what the violation consists, the German Government would mention it to the French Government.

The German Chargé d'Affaires further informed M. Pichon that Baron Rosen had received a message from Mulai Hafid asking that the German Government would prevent the French from supporting his brother in the struggle now going on between them.

M. Pichon told the German Chargé d'Affaires, in reply, that the French Government had in no sense violated the Treaty of Algeciras, and that it is their firm intention to act strictly within its limits. They had no idea of making a serious expedition into the interior or of occupying Fez or Marakesh. Their intention was to limit their action to the coast towns and to take steps for the protection of the lives and property of Europeans.

As regards Mulai Hafid, the French Government had, M. Pichon observed, assumed an attitude of complete reserve towards the Sultan Abdul Aziz, and would take no part in the struggle. The German Government should remember that the Sultan Abdul Aziz was still the recognized Sovereign, while Mulai Hafid represented revolutionary fanaticism, and that if in the end Mulai Hafid should succeed in overthrowing his brother, the result could only be complete chaos in Morocco.

The German Chargé d'Affaires was referred to a complete statement which M. Pichon said he intended to make in the Chamber of Deputies on the 24th instant.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. GREY.

[3075] No. 50.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January 28.*)

(No. 20.)

Sir, *Tangier, January 22, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to report that news was received here yesterday that Mulai Hafid had been proclaimed Sultan at Wazan. This town being the head-quarters of the important Shereefian family of that name, the sanctuary of their founder being situated there, the proclamation in it of Mulai Hafid is of considerable importance, as the influence of these Shereefs is great in Northern Morocco.

Some surprise was occasioned by this news, as the leading members of the Shereefian family of Wazan enjoy French protection, and they must have known that the proclamation of Mulai Hafid at Wazan would be ill-received by the French Government.

I took an opportunity this morning of referring to the matter when speaking with the French Chargé d'Affaires, who informed me that the news came as a surprise to

him, but was undoubtedly true. He explained the proclamation by the fact that the Wazan Shereefs have valuable property at Fez, and probably feared that they might lose it if they did not fall in with the popular movement.

Count Saint-Aulaire stated that upon receipt of the news he had written on the subject to Mulai Tayeb, the head of the family from the religious point of view. Mulai Tayeb had, he believed, stood somewhat aloof from the movement, the proclamation having been carried through by his cousin, who holds the temporal power, so to speak, in Wazan.

The news of the proclamation of Mulai Hafid at Wazan will be received with some bitterness by the Sultan, who has recently treated the Shereefs well, and endeavoured to win their good-will. It must also cause some embarrassment to the French Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. WHTE.

[3079] No. 51.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 14.) *Madrid, January 23, 1908.*

Sir,

SEÑOR ALLENDESALAZAR, Minister for Foreign Affairs, has made an official communication to the press, explaining the present attitude of Spain with regard to affairs in Morocco. I inclose a summary herewith.

The Foreign Minister states that the Spanish Government has continued to follow a uniform policy in the face of the conflicts of authority which so often arise in Morocco. This policy has been equally applied to meet the case of the Roghi's assertion of power four years ago, and that of the proclamation of Muley Hafid in Morocco city in August last. It consists in the recognition of Sultan Abdul Aziz as legitimate Sovereign, in the maintenance of such relations as may be necessary, in the Spanish interest, with local Chiefs who have established a *de facto* authority, and in the avoidance of all intervention in the conflict between loyalists and rebels. It is the obvious duty of third parties to insist on the observance by the Sultan of his international obligations, and to protect the lives and properties of their subjects from the effects of the prevailing anarchy. Spain and France are united in pursuing these objects. As far as possible the maintenance of order is left to the local authorities, and there is no truth in the rumours which ascribe to Spain the intention to embark on a policy of adventure.

After enumerating the subjects which have engaged the attention of Señor Llaberia, Spanish Minister to Morocco, in his negotiations with the Sultan at Rabat, Señor Allendesalazar deals with the special situation of Spain in the Riff country. The decision of the Imperial mehalla to surrender its arms to the Governor of Melilla and to take refuge in that city is, of course, engaging the attention of the Spanish Government. The tribal conflicts which have so long prevailed at the very gates of Melilla have seriously affected the commercial prosperity of that town. It has been said that Spain intends to protect herself against a continuance of this state of things by seizing a point on the Mar Chica. Whatever may be the ultimate decision, nothing more can at present be stated than that she will act according to circumstances, observing the same prudence as hitherto, and aiming always at the re-establishment of normal conditions favourable to the development of legitimate commerce. Acting on these principles, she has not withheld her moral support from the Spanish Companies which have entered into engagements with the tribes and received Concessions at their hands, but in so acting she has in no way bound herself to recognize any other ultimate right of sovereignty than that of the legitimate Sultan, nor has there been the slightest infringement of the General Act of Algeciras.

This last paragraph alludes no doubt to the Mining Concessions in the region adjoining Melilla, which form the subject of my despatch No. 13 of the 17th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

P.S.—The French Ambassador attaches great importance to the inclosed announcement of Spanish policy in Morocco, which has been drawn up, he believes, to meet his

own repeated representations on the apparent reluctance of the Spanish official press to explain the true nature of the question, and so to educate public opinion. His Excellency is quite satisfied with Señor Allendesalazar's declaration.

M. DE B.

Inclosure in No. 51.

Précis of Article in the "Época" of January 22, 1908.

IN answer to various questions put by a representative of the "Época," the Minister for Foreign Affairs made the following statement:—

The proclamation in August last in Marrakesh of Muley Hafid as Sultan does not present a fresh problem to the Spanish Government from a juridical point of view. Four years ago there appeared in the neighbourhood of the Spanish Settlements in the north of Morocco another pretender, Muley Mohamed; but this event did not cause the Spanish Government to modify its policy, which is to recognize His Majesty Abdul-Aziz as Sovereign, and to maintain relations with the *de facto* Power which can protect our interests, and to abstain from intervention between the party loyal to the Sultan and the rebels. The Spanish Government maintains the same policy in regard to Muley Hafid, and instructions in that sense were from the first given to Spanish Consuls in Morocco.

At present the cause of Muley Hafid is associated with disorder, and it remains for the future to decide whether he will succeed in making head against the forces of the legitimate Sovereign.

For the moment, and, indeed, at all times, third parties must require the Sultan to comply with his obligations in accordance with International Treaties and to take steps that intestine dissensions do not expose the lives and property of foreigners to danger or unlawfully interfere with the liberty of commerce.

France and Spain, acting in concert, will endeavour to further these objeects, which mark the direction and at the same time the limits of their programme.

The measures to be taken will depend on circumstances. The Legation at Tangier, the Consuls, police instructors, &c., will endeavour to arrange that the local authorities with their own resources shall maintain order and protect the interests committed to our care.

The sincerity with which the above action is being taken is a sufficient answer to the rumours that Spain is about to embark on a policy of adventure.

The mission of Señor Llaberia to Rabat, apart from its being an occasion to present his letters of credence to the Sultan, was in accordance with the policy referred to above. The Diplomatic Representatives of Spain and France, who are acting in concert, took part in negotiations of great importance for the carrying out of the terms of the Algeciras Act, such as the immediate organization of the police, the suppression by the vessels of Spain and France of the contraband trade in arms in the territorial waters of Morocco, the foundation of a special bank to supply funds for the public works in the ports, the issue of orders making the freedom of the coasting trade a reality, the regulation of sales and the opium traffic, &c. Señor Llaberia has also had to discuss the situation in the Riff, at Cabo del Agua, in the neighbourhood of Ceuta, and the punctual carrying out of the stipulation of the Treaty of 1860 regarding Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña.

The Spanish Representative had many interviews with the Sultan and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and further meetings are still necessary before a practical solution of the problems can be reached. The presence of Señor Llaberia is, however, more urgently required at Tangier, and the Spanish Government have arranged for the return of the Mission to that town, whence less direct negotiations will continue with the Shereefian Court.

It has been said that the Government proposed to occupy positions on the Riff coast, and those who, doubtless, forgot, the Anglo-French Declaration of the 8th April, 1904, the conditions at Melilla, and the importance of Chafarinas, have supposed that, at the instigation of the Cabinets of Paris and London, we had made up our minds to take possession of the lagoon of Mar Chica and convert it into a military port.

Undoubtedly the decision of the Commanders of the Imperial mehalla to surrender their arms to the Governor of Melilla causes us anxiety as regards possible consequences. The Spanish Government cannot look with indifference on the fact that the struggle in the neighbourhood of Melilla (a struggle which is rather tribal than dynastic, and is

maintained by the rivalry of some of the Kabyle Chiefs) leads to reprisals by the rebels against those who have hitherto sided with the Imperial troops; that the difficult task of suppressing the arms traffic is complicated by the attempts to establish along the coast bases for the supply of munitions of war to the rebels, and that, in the absence of any strong native Government, each tribe negotiates as it pleases with the Spanish local authorities, and, without proceeding to open hostilities, harasses our subjects and trade each time the Spanish ships prevent the landing of a cargo of arms.

Still, I repeat that the measures to be taken will depend on circumstances, and although we are ready for every eventuality, nobody has the right to say that any particular plan has been selected.

The prudence with which we have hitherto conducted affairs is a guarantee for the future. We desire nothing more than a normal state of things, which will permit Spanish subjects to pursue their legitimate callings in Morocco.

When, having that object in view, Spanish subjects have solicited the moral support of their Government and of the Melilla authorities, they have received it without our having been thereby obliged to abandon our neutrality in the internal dissensions in Morocco, or to take action tending to recognize another authority than that of the Sultan Abdul-Aziz, or to violate the principle of free economic competition. This course is logical, as these are private affairs. It is the business of the possessors of the land—the tribes, &c.—to come to an arrangement among themselves according to the local laws and customs. In such matters Spain has not intervened, as she has never intervened in the legitimate affairs in which our compatriots have long been engaged in other parts of Morocco.

As regards the idea that there have been protests on the part of the Maghzen against pretensions on the part of Spain to trade monopolies contrary to the Algeciras Act, I do not believe that any such an idea has ever been thought of. It is undoubtedly the duty of the Government, by supplying accurate information, to prevent public opinion from taking a false direction; but it is impossible at all times to follow the vagaries of the journalistic imagination.

[3045] No. 52.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 42.) *Paris, January 26, 1908.*

Sir,

The French press of yesterday and to-day has naturally devoted considerable space to the discussion of the debate on Moroccan Affairs, which took place in the Chamber on the 24th instant. It is also natural that M. Delcassé's speech has excited the most interest. The ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs has received from different organs both the highest praise and the deepest reprobation.

The "Figaro," in a leading article, attacks M. Delcassé bitterly for his speech. With the thirst for revenge of a man whom events have rightly reduced to silence, the reckless ex-Minister attempted not only a justification, but even a glorification of his policy. M. Delcassé has involuntarily become the tool of lobby intrigues. The applause which his speech has met with was not for him, but against others, and if the Government were to be defeated over the Morocco question the policy of the new Ministry would be absolutely different from that advocated by M. Delcassé and branded as dangerous by the Parliament. Abroad there may be mistakes as to the nature of his oratorical success, but he alone in France does not see the truth.

The "Siècle," edited by M. de Lanessan, which has always been opposed to M. Delcassé's policy in Morocco considers that before pronouncing his speech the ex-Minister should have thought of the Chauvinistic sentiments which he might reawaken, and that he should have considered whether he was not again involving the question of Morocco with European complications from which it had been freed by the Algeciras Conference. Fortunately M. Pichon and M. Clemenceau, speaking on behalf of a Government responsible for the peace of Europe and the legitimate defence of French interests, will be able, in reply to an irresponsible orator, to put matters straight again.

The "Action," a Radical organ, is hardly less violent in its tone. M. Delcassé is a megalomaniac dwarf. The mania may well affect him personally, but it is a sad day when it also affects Parliament, and the article expresses amazement that Radicals

and Socialists can so far have forgotten how near France was to war with Germany as to have applauded "le fameux petit monsieur qui ne causait pas avec l'Allemagne."

The "Gaulois" and the "Echo de Paris," respectively Royalist and Nationalist organs, are as enthusiastic in their praise of M. Delcassé as the preceding articles are in their blame of him. The "Gaulois" avows that it is the first time that it has been able to approve the ex-Minister, but it pays a tribute to his courage first in keeping silence so long under attack, and, secondly, in now pointing out to France the path to greatness. The "Echo de Paris" considers the speech one of the finest of recent years. M. Delcassé dealt with the most serious problems of international politics and spoke like a statesman.

M. Vuillaume, writing in the Radical-Socialist "Aurore," deals with the debate on general lines, and gives his approval to the moderate tone of policy advocated by M. Ribot. M. Delcassé's speech will excite most interest in Europe, but the writer thinks its delivery in the Chamber was a mistake, and can only serve to awaken sleeping susceptibilities.

The "Journal des Débats" summarises M. Jaurès' speech in a critical tone, stating that he finds in French diplomacy and policy arguments which it is painful to hear in Parliament. Public opinion is equally unfavourable to an adventurous policy in Morocco and to one of hasty withdrawal; but M. Jaurès knows nothing of national dignity. Perhaps, however, the greatest mistake of his speech was committed when he uttered the sentences which brought M. Delcassé to the Tribune. The ex-Minister has for a long time had personal motives for breaking silence which are perfectly comprehensible, the foremost among them being the desire to answer the unfair attacks of which he has been the object. These personal motives should have been kept in the background, and the speech was therefore not judicious. M. Delcassé justified his policy by reviewing it from his personal standpoint, but it can hardly be doubted that some of the difficulties of the present situation are due to his actions. In all his speech, however, he made no attempt to deal with the politics of the day. The review of the past was useless, and perhaps had been arranged with a view to a rearrangement of parliamentary groups rather than to furthering the real objects of the debate. If so, M. Delcassé has been the innocent tool of others, and must himself have been surprised at the applause which he received from the former supporters of M. Combes who allowed him to fall. The article approves of the manner in which M. Ribot dealt with the two extremes of policy into which it was attempted to draw the Government. In spite of errors committed M. Clemenceau has so far avoided both extremes. The Government has already publicly declared itself in favour of the moderate course, and a precise declaration in this sense may be hoped for when the debate is resumed.

The "Temps" of to-day's date also publishes a leading article on the subject of the debate. M. Delcassé had stated that the crisis of 1905 could not bring a war. But at a moment when the efficiency of the army and the navy was suspected, France refused to trust implicitly in his judgment, and he was allowed to fall. Later, at Algeciras, Germany's policy and her claims in Morocco became more clear; if France resisted these claims with success, that success was due to the system of alliances and friendships which M. Delcassé had arranged, and which won the applause of Parliament when M. Delcassé reviewed them in the Chamber. While approving M. Delcassé's speech and the policy expounded in it, the "Temps" is in favour of a bolder line of action than that advocated by M. Ribot. As for preserving impartiality between the two claimants to the throne of Morocco, the article points out that France has long had intercourse with Abd-el-Aziz. He has been given money and military instructors; in the eyes of all Morocco he is identified with France; why abandon him in his distress? M. Ribot is unwilling to choose between the two Sultans; but it is they who do the choosing. Abd-el-Aziz is ready to co-operate with France, Mulai Hafid is frankly anti-foreign. The police in the ports is to be organized in collaboration with the Moorish authorities; what if those authorities are hostile? The Government must do what is necessary, but they should also be allowed sufficient latitude to take advantage of any favourable combination of events.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[2765]

No. 53.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. White.

(No. 17.)

Foreign Office, January 28, 1908.

Sir,

WITH reference to Sir G. Lowther's telegram No. 138 of the 26th December, I transmit to you herewith a list of the British vessels trading in Moroccan waters.* I request you to communicate this list to the Dean of the Diplomatic Body at Tangier.

The ships of the Ellerman and Papayanni Lines, although employed in a regular service in the Mediterranean, are described by the Manager of the Ellerman Lines as paying only "an occasional call at Tangier or other Moroccan ports."

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. GREY.

[3269]

No. 54.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 30.)

(No. 47.)

Paris, January 22, 1908.

Sir,

IN continuation of my despatch No. 41 of the 25th instant, I have the honour to report that the debate in the Chamber of Deputies on Moroccan Affairs was resumed yesterday afternoon. Several speeches were made by the Deputies before the Minister for Foreign Affairs replied on behalf of the Government.

M. Raiberti was the first speaker. He did not criticize the aim of French policy, but he found that its methods were wrong. France had all along had in view her relations with Europe, and had paid no attention to her relations with Morocco. In showing how the reforms urged on the Magbzen conflicted with native opinion and with the narrow construction of Mussulman law prevalent in Morocco, M. Raiberti displayed considerable knowledge of local conditions. He recommended that greater efforts at conciliation with Morocco should be made, and more deference paid to native susceptibilities.

M. Paul Deschanel, ex-President of the Chamber and a Moderate Republican, next made a short but vigorous speech. He made it clear that so far as the past was concerned, while approving in general France's system of friendships and alliances, he had made reserves about the developments of French policy with Morocco. At present the insecurity in the ports made it necessary for France to maintain ready access to them, and it may have been justifiable for her to push her troops to within a few miles of Rabat; but was the advance to Settat necessary? As to the rival Sultans, France, as the mandatory of Europe, could only deal with the one who would respect Europe's wishes. Towards Mulai Hafid an attitude of observation must be taken up. A policy of adventure is as equally impossible as one of abdication, and the Chamber must sanction the line of action indicated by the strict observance of the Act of Algeciras.

M. Tournade, who next came to the tribune, is an ex-officer in the army. His speech was devoted almost exclusively to the military questions raised by the events in Morocco, and he threw no light on their political aspect. He was followed by M. Dubief, who presented himself as the authorized spokesman of the Radical Socialist party. That party, he said, had carefully abstained in the past from embarrassing the Government, but there was a certain uneasiness reflected in his speech as to the signification of recent developments in Morocco. What was wanted was a clear and straightforward policy which would deceive no one; but the attack on Settat, the advance towards Rabat, and the operations against the Beni-Snassen, caused his party some anxiety. It was France who had brought Abd-el-Aziz to Rabat. Could that be characterized as impartiality between the rival claimants to the throne? France had been the Sultan's adviser, almost his auxiliary. Would she become his armed protector? The journey to Rabat was a mistake, and France was partly to blame for its consequences. Without men or money the Sultan was so weak that he might never be able to regain the ascendency. Then came the sudden change in France's attitude and the unexpected advance on Settat. Was this due to what M. Ribot had called the Rabat policy? He concluded his speech by advocating strict adherence to the moderate and prudent policy as expounded by M. Ribot.

* Not printed.

Before M. Pichon spoke, M. Delafosse came to the tribune. He is a Conservative Deputy, a well-known journalist, and one of the leading speakers on foreign affairs of the Opposition. He was in favour of a vigorous line of action in Morocco, and he therefore approved the change of policy which he detected in the resolution to advance on Settat. He enlarged on the dangers of evacuation, not only on account of the loss of prestige in Northern Africa that it would entail, but also because Germany would certainly take France's place. All the difficulties that now exist were due to France's vacillation; she ought from the first to have acted with energy, and she must do so now. The Act of Algeciras alone limited her action, and he interpreted that Act as empowering her to repress disorders anywhere in Morocco. The future of France, he said lay in Africa, and she must watch jealously lest any other Power set foot within Morocco.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs then went into the tribune. Most of his speech was devoted to the question of the policy followed by the Government with regard to Morocco itself, and to the recent events in that country. In the rest of the speech he dealt with the considerations of general policy which the speech of M. Delcassé on the 24th instant had brought into prominence.

His Excellency cleared the ground for his subsequent explanations by laying down the conditions which governed France's action with regard to Morocco. The present Government on accession to office had found the situation of the various Powers already defined by the Act of Algeciras. This Agreement had, however, in view an orderly, peaceful, and prosperous Morocco. The present situation was the contrary of these anticipations. In December 1906, France and Spain had been obliged to send war-ships to Tangier to protect the foreign colony from the dangers threatening it on the part of Raisuli. In March 1907, France was forced to occupy Oudja in order to obtain reparation for a series of outrages culminating in the murder of Dr. Mauchamp at Marrakesh. In August last, the despatch of troops to Casa Blanca became necessary to avenge the assassination of French citizens and to protect the foreigners in the town. Since then the insolence of the Beni-Snassen on the Algerian frontier had rendered operations in that quarter unavoidable.

The next portion of M. Pichon's speech was a detailed answer to the questions put and the criticism made inside as well as outside Parliament with regard to the conduct of the military operations on the Algerian side by General Lyautey, and in the vicinity of Casa Blanca by Generals Drude and d'Amade. He mentioned that the first-named General had taken measures, in concert with the Governor-General of Algeria, as soon as the fighting was over, to endeavour to pacify the tribes and to win them over by a policy of consideration and humanity. Ploughs had been sent from France to aid them in resuming agricultural operations, and the services of the Algerian Army Medical Staff had been offered wherever it could be useful. M. Pichon was interrupted at this point by applause and by the exclamation of one of the Deputies that such action constituted the real system of pacific penetration. His Excellency continued his defence of the policy of the Government with regard to the events at Casa Blanca. This policy, decided on after agreement with Spain, had been favourably viewed by all foreign Governments, for France had nothing to conceal from Europe, and had kept those Governments fully informed of what was being done. He gave a somewhat lengthy explanation respecting the expedition against the Kasbah of Mediouna and Settat, taking the opportunity to eulogize General Drude, whose retirement from his command was solely owing to reasons of health. France had been obliged to take upon herself responsibility for order at Casa Blanca; he believed that it was a temporary task. The French Government had no intention to establish themselves on the coast of Morocco, nor to penetrate into the interior of the country. The measures had been taken under a sense of responsibility towards their own country, as also towards Europe; this responsibility would be transferred to the Moorish Government as soon as practicable. He did not, however, believe that even M. Jaurès would propose an immediate evacuation.

M. Pichon then alluded to the intestine conflicts in Morocco. His remarks on the subject were guarded and probably designed to leave the Government a free hand in the matter of the struggle between two or more possible rivals to the Throne of Morocco. He had said at an earlier date that French destinies in Morocco were not bound up with one Shereef or another; they were connected with French interests and rights, her general situation, her treaties, and her history. If there were no Sultan in Morocco, France would none the less be a great Mussulman Power, with rights and duties towards a country with which she was so intimately associated. At the same time Abd-el-Aziz was the Sovereign who had signed the Algeciras Act, with whom a variety of engagements had been entered into, who had accepted the schemes of reforms and sanctioned the means for carrying them into execution. If appearances were to be

believed, Moulai Hafid represented at present the anti-foreign movement; if this movement were to gain the upper hand, the institution of police as contemplated by the Algeciras Act, already sufficiently difficult, would become an impossibility. Moulai Hafid might conceivably endeavour, once in power, to curb the anti-foreign movement. In any case the greatest prudence was requisite on the part of the French Government. At present their agents were in touch with Abd-el-Aziz, and were doing what was possible and proper to prevent the collapse of all constituted authority. There was complete accord between France and Spain, and by way of proving it M. Pichon read to the Chamber the text of an official declaration made by the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the attitude to be observed towards Moulai Hafid, the line of action to be followed by the two Powers in executing their mandate, and the mission of the Spanish Representative at Rabat.

M. Pichon commenting on this declaration stated that, if there was a port, Safi, for instance, where Moulai Hafid was supreme, the French authorities would officially hold relations with the authorities established there *de facto* with a view to preserve the foreign Colony from danger. But negotiations with respect to the more general questions must be carried on with Abd-el-Aziz. He gave some explanations with regard to the Sultan's journey to Rabat which had originally been His Majesty's own idea.

M. Pichon then gave the views of the Government as to the question of furnishing funds to the Sultan which had been raised by previous speakers. He could give a formal assurance that no loan would be raised by the Makhzen otherwise than under the conditions laid down at Algeciras.

Before leaving the subject of Morocco, his Excellency laid down in unequivocal terms the principles guiding French policy, namely, the defence of the rights of France; respect of the conventions with other Powers; execution of the mandate given to France and Spain in agreement with the latter Power; loyalty towards the Sultan in power; non-interference in the internal disputes of the country; no protectorate and no action which could lead to an expedition into the interior.

The latter portion of M. Pichon's speech which is of great interest was manifestly designed as a reply to that of M. Delcassé. His Excellency denied that the Moroccan question was being treated as a thing apart from the general policy of France. The present Government, on the contrary, had never looked upon it in that light, though while giving it its due importance they had not subordinated their whole foreign policy to it. France's policy depended on her loyalty and on her strength; her loyalty had never been called in question, and he had never been in doubt as to her strength, which was the result of the accumulated efforts of thirty-seven years, efforts which had raised France to the proud position she now occupied among the Powers. No one man and no one Government could claim to have made France's policy; to think so would be to belittle that policy, for it would imply that when a Ministry fell the signed engagements of France were affected, and the confidence of foreign Governments in France's word would diminish.

M. Pichon gave his unreserved assent to all that had been said in praise of the alliance with Russia, of the agreements with England and Spain, and of the friendship with the United States; but he traced the history of all these *rapprochements* back far beyond present-day politics. The Franco-Russian alliance had been mooted from the day of the Duc Decazes up to that of M. Ribot, who signed it; an agreement with England had been always regarded as an aim to be pursued, and M. Pichon made an obvious allusion to M. Clemenceau when he said that there was a man within the Government who had ever been one of the most fervent and steadfast advocates of such an agreement. Italy, Spain, and more recently still with Japan and Siam, Arrangements had been come to, and French influence had made itself felt in the reconciliation of Japan with Russia, and in the *rapprochement* between Russia and Great Britain.

It should be clear that French policy is aimed at no one Power, and it seeks the isolation of nobody, and that its object is to give further pledges for the peace of the world. It was untrue to say that France had shown weakness or lost self-confidence because she refused to endanger peace in pursuit of inadequate and precarious aims, and accepted the principle of an international conference.

In 1904 France had, through her agreements with Spain and Great Britain acquired the right of acting in Morocco within the limits laid down by those agreements, but having obtained the right, it remained to her to secure the means for its use. When the time came for carrying the provisions of the agreements into effect, what happened? International complications of a formidable character arose, whether or not they

constituted a danger of war, he was not now called upon to decide; but at the time it was the duty of French diplomacy to solve them, and the idea of an international conference was accordingly entertained. But in accepting a conference France did not have to make an absolute surrender of all that she had gained by her agreements with England and Spain—on the contrary, in accepting the invitation to the conference her special interests in the Morocco question were expressly recognized. "Non," M. Pichon said, "la France n'a pas faibli; non, ses Représentants ne l'ont pas humiliée; non, vous n'avez pas douté de vous-mêmes; et vous n'avez pas manqué de confiance en elle." France's rights thus acquired a new basis, which in course of time may be broadened, but she is now insured against the dangers of too adventurous action. Her policy, assented to by the nation, must be controlled by the Chamber, who ought to be furnished for that purpose with every information on the views, the plans, and the acts of the Government. The present Ministry would never withhold that information; they desire that their policy should be an open one, they shrink from no responsibility; and they believe that France, strengthened by the universal confidence which she inspires, and by the friendships which she has gathered round her, will have no cause to regret the course which she had pursued.

The debate was resumed on Tuesday afternoon by M. Lucien Hubert. He stated that he had been intrusted by the Radical Left with the task of taking note of the declarations of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He confined himself to this task, expressing general approval of the Government's declarations, but criticized M. Pichon's statements with regard to the rival claimants to the Throne of Morocco, which, he considered, lacked precision.

Count Boni de Castellane (Nationalist) made two main points in his speech: first, that the mistakes of the French Government had been made at the very beginning of the Morocco question, so that they now could not recede and might not advance; secondly, that the attitude of Germany was now as little clear as ever, and that every event in Morocco had concurred to enable her to retain her power of intervening in the affairs of that country when it suited her. He warmly approved the agreements with England and Spain, which, he said, would have given France an excellent position in Europe if it were not for the Morocco question.

M. Denys Cochin, a prominent speaker on foreign affairs of the conservative opposition, took exception to several statements contained in M. Pichon's speech. He blamed the Government for their hesitation in Morocco over the formation of the police and for not taking military action when all Europe was ready to approve such steps, and over the question of supporting either of the two rival Sultans. The Government was only capable of saying what it would not do; it was clear that M. Cochin's opposition was due to reasons diametrically the opposite of those of M. Jaurès and his supporters.

M. Jaurès then rose to reply to the criticisms of his opening speech in the Chamber. He defended himself against the charge of inconsistency which had been made against him as to his attitude over the bearing of the Anglo-French agreement on the Morocco question. If that agreement had been such as to facilitate the policy of pacific penetration, then he had not been inconsistent; but the mistake had been that no attempt had been made to carry out that policy with loyalty. He himself had always protested against military action in Morocco in view of the danger of complications that such action must entail. He had been accused of knowing nothing of the dignity of France, but in his opinion it was an indignity to drag France into an unworthy policy of adventures. He regretted to note from M. Pichon's remarks that the question of the loan to the Makhzen of 150 millions of francs had not been finally disposed of. Abd-el-Aziz might still hope for France's financial assistance, and France must still face the possibility of having to collect bad debts in Morocco.

M. Jaurès had mentioned in his first speech that he had papers proving that France had been in relations with Malai Hafid through the intermediary of the late Dr. Mauchamp. These papers, consisting of letters from that gentleman to a friend in Morocco, he read to the Chamber. I have the honour to inclose the text of this part of M. Jaurès' speech, which also gives the interruptions and remarks with regard thereto made by M. Pichon.

The most important part of the remainder of M. Jaurès' speech was that relating to Anglo-French relations, which I have the honour to report in a separate despatch.

A desultory debate followed after M. Jaurès' speech, and the Chamber finally adopted by 436 votes against 51 the order of the day in the following terms:—

"La Chambre, résolue à appliquer l'Acte d'Algésiras et à assurer la défense des droits et des intérêts de la France au Maroc, sans intervention dans la politique intérieure du Gouvernement Chérifien, approuve les déclarations du Gouvernement, lui exprime sa confiance, adresse les félicitations de la nation aux officiers et soldats des armées de terre et de mer qui combattent en Afrique et, repoussant toute addition, passe à l'ordre du jour."

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith extracted from the "Journal Officiel" the text of the speech delivered by the Minister for Foreign Affairs during the course of the debate.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 54.

Extract from the "Journal Officiel" of January 28, 1908.

M. Stéphen Pichon (Ministre des Affaires Étrangères).—Messieurs, en terminant son beau discours, mon honorable ami M. Ribot faisait allusion à la nécessité de s'expliquer à la tribune et d'éclairer le pays sur notre politique étrangère. Il y voyait, pour les représentants de la nation, le moyen de fixer et de prendre leur responsabilité, et pour le Gouvernement, disait-il, cet avantage inappréciable de s'expliquer publiquement, de rectifier, s'il y a lieu, sa ligne de conduite et de dissiper les malentendus.

Je suis entièrement de l'avis de M. Ribot. J'ai toujours été prêt à m'expliquer sur tout ce qui concerne notre politique étrangère. J'ai souvent parlé de la politique Marocaine, et je m'excuse à ce propos des quelques répétitions ou des quelques redites auxquelles je serai inévitablement condamné. Mais je pense que ce débat était nécessaire.

Vous avez entendu, Messieurs, les diverses thèses qui vous ont été exposées. C'est au Gouvernement maintenant d'apporter la sienne, de dire nettement quelle a été, quelle est, quelle sera sa politique. Je me placerai, dans cette discussion, au point de vue des questions spéciales qui m'ont été posées, et je dirai ensuite, puisque le débat a été porté sur ce terrain, comment cette question Marocaine se rattache à la politique extérieure de notre pays.

Pour que ce débat soit clair, je vous demande la permission de rappeler tout d'abord quel était l'état de la question Marocaine au moment où le Gouvernement actuel a pris le pouvoir.

La situation respective des Puissances dans l'Empire du Maroc avait été réglée comme l'est encore, vous le savez, par l'Acte d'Algésiras. Les principes essentiels de cet Acte sont la consécration de la souveraineté du Sultan, de l'intégrité de l'Empire Chérifien, et de la liberté commerciale dans cet Empire. Il a, en outre, reconnu la situation spéciale de l'Espagne et de la France, qu'il a appelées à venir en aide au Sultan pour l'organisation de la police ; il a donné une place prééminente à France dans une institution internationale—la Banque d'État Marocaine. Il a tenu en dehors de ses stipulations, à la suite d'une entente intervenue entre le Gouvernement de la République et le Gouvernement Allemand, tout ce qui concerne le régime de notre frontière Algérienne. Et que faut-il entendre par la frontière Algérienne ? C'est, aux termes de l'Arrangement conclu entre M. Rosen et M. Revoil le 28 Septembre, 1905, "les territoires où résident, campent, et se meuvent traditionnellement les tribus Marocaines, sédentaires ou nomades, en relation ou en contact habituel avec les tribus Algériennes."

Mais l'Acte d'Algésiras a été fait en vue d'un Maroc tranquille où régneraient et se consolideraient l'ordre, la paix, et la prospérité.

Sans doute il a pris des précautions pour essayer d'assurer ces garanties indispensables : répression de la contrebande des armes, amélioration des douanes et des impôts, création de nouveaux revenus, répression de la fraude, organisation de la police. Mais ce sont des garanties qu'il n'est pas suffisant de stipuler ; il faut encore qu'elles soient effectives, et ce ne sont là malheureusement, ou ce n'étaient là que des palliatifs bien insuffisants en présence des maux dont n'allait pas tarder à souffrir l'Empire.

Et la pratique loyale des décisions prises par les Puissances, décisions auxquelles nous étions et auxquelles nous demeurons absolument résolus à rester fidèles, cette pratique n'a pu empêcher un régime d'anarchie, de brigandages, et d'assassinats de se

généraliser aux dépens des Gouvernements étrangers et de leurs Colonies, comme aux dépens du Gouvernement Marocain lui-même. (*Applaudissements.*)

C'est ainsi qu'au mois de Décembre 1906, nous étions contraints, de même que l'Espagne, d'envoyer des navires de guerre à Tanger pour rassurer et protéger les Colonies étrangères qui étaient victimes des délits et des crimes commis par Raissouli en présence d'un Makhzen incapable ou impuissant.

C'est ainsi qu'au mois de mars 1907 nous étions amenés à occuper Oudjda pour obtenir réparation de toute une série d'attentats qui avaient été commis à notre détriment aussi bien dans l'intérieur du Maroc que sur la frontière de l'Algérie, attentats dont le dernier en date avait été l'assassinat du Dr. Mauchamp, qui succédait à toute une série de provocations, de vexations, d'abus de pouvoirs, d'emprisonnements, de meurtres, dont j'ai apporté la liste trop longue à cette tribune, au risque, comme le rappelait tout à l'heure mon honorable ami M. Dubief, de provoquer vos protestations contre l'excès de notre patience et contre les scrupules extrêmes de notre mansuétude. (*Très bien ! très bien !*) Ce jour-là, M. Ribot disait que j'avais fait un expose douloureux des avanies que nous avions dû subir, et il n'hésitait pas, comme toute la Chambre, à nous donner son approbation pour les mesures que nous vous proposions.

C'est ainsi encore qu'au mois d'Août dernier, nous avons dû envoyer des troupes à Casa Blanca pour venger le meurtre de cinq de nos nationaux et pour assurer la sécurité des colonies étrangères dans la ville, où elles étaient menacées, à la suite de cet assassinat.

C'est ainsi, enfin, que, depuis, nous avons dû châtier l'insolence des Beni-Snassen, qui avaient fait des incursions jusque sur notre territoire, et que nous avons dû recourir à des mesures de précaution et de police pour empêcher le retour de pareils méfaits.

Avez-vous eu des reproches à nous faire au sujet de ces mesures ? Nous avez-vous refusé votre concours ? Auriez-vous agi autrement que nous ?

Vous avez successivement approuvé la démonstration de Tanger, l'occupation d'Oudjda, les mesures prises à Casa Blanca ; je ne crois pas que vous soyez disposés à blâmer la campagne du Général Lyautey contre les Beni-Snassen. Alors, que nous reprochez-vous ?

Les variations de notre politique ? C'est un reproche que j'ai trouvé dans un certain nombre des discours qui ont été prononcés. Or, je prétend que notre politique a toujours été parfaitement logique et cohérente.

Indépendante et libre de ses mouvements sur la frontière de l'Algérie, elle n'y est intervenue militairement que pour repousser les agressions, les punir, en empêcher de nouvelles et organiser une police fortement encadrée par des éléments Algériens.

On nous a critiqués à ce sujet ; on nous a reproché nos atermoiements. Le reproche s'est produit plusieurs fois à la tribune. On a rappelé une lettre de M. le Président du Conseil à M. le Gouverneur-Général de Algérie. M. Clemenceau, répondant à une demande de M. Jonnart, qui avait proposé d'occuper Cheraâ avec un détachement de faible importance et de renoncer à notre attitude expectante dans la région d'Oudjda, disait au Gouverneur-Général de l'Algérie que "la question des rapports entre l'Algérie et le Maroc restait au premier rang de celles qui intéressent notre politique Marocaine et qu'elle ne cessait de préoccuper le Gouvernement" ; mais il ajoutait que "la situation de l'Empire Chérifien nous imposait l'ajournement de toute mesure qui pourrait donner à croire au Sultan, à la population et aux Puissances étrangères que nous cherchions à profiter des troubles antérieurs, des compétitions dynastiques et de la faiblesse du Makhzen pour avancer un établissement dans la région frontière."

Ah ! je sais bien ce qu'on nous aurait dit, si nous avions pris les devants et recouru à la méthode offensive ; on nous aurait accusés de provocation, d'arrière-pensées, d'imprudence ; on nous aurait dit que nous cherchions des prétextes pour envahir le Maroc, et toute l'éloquence de M. Jaurès se serait déchaînée contre nous. (*Très bien ! très bien !*)

Ce n'est pas que je la craigne ou que je la regrette. Je l'admire assez pour aimer l'entendre, alors même qu'elle s'exerce contre moi. D'ailleurs, je suis parfaitement sûr qu'elle ne manquera pas de prétexte, car, quelle que soit l'attitude que je prenne, je suis certaine d'être interpellé par M. Jaurès. (*Applaudissements et rires.*) Je ne me plains d'aucune de ces interpellations.

Mais enfin, nous ne sommes intervenus militairement dans la région d'Oudjda que pour réprimer des attaques qui s'étaient produites et, lorsque la répression énergique, rapide, décisive, conduite par le Général Lyautey avec la plus grande habileté, avec une connaissance profonde du pays et de ses habitants, s'est effectuée, qu'avons-nous fait ? Nous avons agi avec les sentiments d'humanité, de générosité qui sont dans

notre caractère, avec les instincts d'indulgence et de bonté qui sont au fond de toutes nos résolutions. (*Applaudissements.*)

Ainsi que cela résulte des télégrammes de M. Jonnart, le Général Lyautey s'est appliqué à donner aux Beni-Snassen, qu'il venait de châtier, l'impression qu'il n'entendait profiter à leur égard de sa victoire que pour leur assurer d'une façon complète les bénéfices de la paix. Il a voulu que ces tribus se sentissent désormais protégées, il les a appelées à concourir à une œuvre de police et de pacification ; il leur a fait remise des contributions auxquelles elles avaient été condamnées et leur a restitué leurs armes. Vous pouvez-être sûrs que si le Général Lyautey le fait, c'est qu'il a raison de le faire. (*Applaudissements.*)

Il les a conviées à cultiver les riches plaines du massif du nord et du sud qui demeuraient incultes à cause des ravages et de incursions des mehallas du Roghi ; il a préparé l'exploitation économique, méthodique de la région ; il a fait grâce à des réguliers qui avaient été surpris les armes à la main parce qu'il lui a semblé qu'ils n'étaient coupables que d'un égarement momentané. (*Très bien ! très bien !*)

" J'ai la conviction, télégraphie M. Jonnart à la date du 13 Janvier, que les instructions que je renouvelle au Commandant de la Division d'Oran seront de nature à opérer un rapprochement rapide et durable entre les tribus des Beni-Snassem et les autorités de la frontière, grâce aux avantages que les tribus retireront de notre contact tant au point de vue de l'hygiène que de l'amélioration des cultures et du développement du commerce.

" Je vais faire envoyer un certain nombre de charrues Françaises qui seront mises à la disposition des laboureurs de la plaine des Trifas et j'invite le Général Lyautey à étendre l'action des infirmeries indigènes et à organiser de petits services anti-ophtalmiques et antipaludiques semblables à ceux qui fonctionnent avec tant de succès dans le Sud Oranais." (*Applaudissements à Gauche. Mouvements divers.*)

Cela vous étonne, Messieurs ? Cela surprend certains d'entre vous ? Quant à moi, je ne saurais trop me féliciter de cette méthode du Général Lyautey et du Gouverneur-Général de l'Algérie. (*Applaudissements à Gauche.*) Ainsi procèdent nos Généraux et nos Gouverneurs, qui ne font que continuer les traditions des pacificateurs de l'Algérie, en y apportant quelque chose de plus que la bonté ; ce sentiment de justice et de solidarité qui est le propre de notre race et de notre époque, qui survit à tous les antagonismes, à toutes les luttes, à toutes les batailles et qui finit par s'imposer comme une règle, comme un devoir, et comme une loi. (*Applaudissements.*)

J'ajoute, pour répondre à une question de M. Ribot que, dans une télégramme daté du 23 Janvier, le Général Bailloud nous informe que l'organisation de la police se poursuit activement sur la frontière et permet de parer à toute éventualité résultant de la situation du Maroc. Elle prépare la transition du régime actuel au régime définitif. Dès maintenant les effectifs du Général Lyautey peuvent être réduits ; ils le seront davantage à mesure que l'incorporation des éléments Marocains pourra s'accroître et que le calme renaîtra dans la région.

Notre politique a-t-elle été plus critiquable à Casa Blanca ? A-t-elle, comme on l'a dit, varié ? A-t-elle été contradictoire ? Nous a-t-elle entraîné au delà des nécessités ?

Dès le premier jour, le Gouvernement l'avait nettement définie ; il suffirait pour s'en convaincre de se rapporter au Livre Jaune et, vous me permettrez de l'ajouter, au discours que j'ai prononcé dans la séance du 12 Novembre dernier ; respect de l'intégrité du Maroc et de la souveraineté du Sultan, rétablissement de l'ordre, de la sécurité, de la liberté des transactions commerciales assurée par des forces suffisantes, châtiment exemplaire des auteurs des massacres et des attentats, satisfaction complète donnée à nos réclamations antérieures, mise en demeure adressée au Makhzen d'appliquer intégralement et sans délai toutes les réformes stipulées par l'Acte d'Algésiras.

Je rappelle en passant que ce programme, arrêté après entente avec l'Espagne, reçut un accueil favorable de la part de tous les Gouvernements étrangers, car nous n'avons rien à dissimuler à l'Europe et nous la tenons constamment au courant de nos intentions.

Et à ce propos, M. Jaurès, croyez-vous qu'il soit bien adroit de parler toujours de protestations qui peuvent surgir au delà de la frontière ? Croyez-vous que ce soit un rôle utile de se demander toujours, à propos de tout, s'il ne va pas se produire à l'étranger quelque réclamation ? (*Applaudissements sur un grand nombre de bancs.*)

Ne craignez-vous pas que ce soit un moyen de faire naître des protestations qui ne seraient pas fondées ? Ne craignez-vous pas d'apporter ainsi à ceux qui n'auraient

aucune espèce de raison de suspecter notre conduite, des moyens de la discuter et de la critiquer ?

Vous disiez, dans votre dernier discours, que vous n'aviez pas l'esprit d'opposition. Vous avez quelque chose de plus, une sorte de pessimisme d'opposition qui vous donne une tendance invétérée à croire que toujours la France se trompe lorsqu'elle est en face de l'Europe et des autres pays. (*Vifs applaudissements.*)

Soyez donc plus calme et plus rassuré, je vous en prie.

M. Ribot vous a dit à cette tribune que ce n'était pas dans ces termes qu'il fallait parler de la France, qu'il fallait en parler avec plus de fermeté, avec plus de dignité. (*Applaudissements.*) Eh bien ! je m'associe complètement à la remarque de M. Ribot. (*Interruptions à l'Extrême Gauche.*)

Comment avons-nous exécuté notre programme ?

Envisageons d'abord le point de vue militaire.

Je voudrais bien établir que ce n'est pas au Gouvernement qu'il appartient de faire le plan d'exécution des mesures militaires. Il indique les lignes générales ; c'est au chef militaire d'en réserver et d'en assurer l'exécution sur le terrain. (*Très bien ! très bien !*)

Et naturellement cette exécution subit les modifications qui, au point de vue stratégique résultent des circonstances.

Eh bien ! qu'avions-nous dit au Général Drude ? Nous lui avions dit de pacifier Casa Blanca et ses environs, d'assurer le ravitaillement de la ville, de poursuivre jusque dans leurs cantonnements habituels les tribus coupables, d'éviter de nous engager dans une expédition à l'intérieur.

Il s'est tenu strictement dans la limite de ces instructions, mais il avait, cela va de soi, toute latitude pour le choix des mesures qui, au point de vue stratégique aussi bien qu'en raison des résultats à obtenir, pouvaient lui paraître les meilleures. Nous ne lui avons jamais marchandé aucune espèce de concours, ni aucune espèce de moyen d'action.

Les tribus qui nous avaient provoqués, qui avaient assassiné nos nationaux, qui continuaient à nous attaquer, appartenaient à celles qui, au nombre de douze, constituent ce qu'on appelle les Chaouïas.

Il semblait au début—c'était l'avis du Général, comme de nos Agents Diplomatiques et Consulaires—que pour les réduire il suffirait de détruire des camps situés à une certaine distance de Casa Blanca et au plus loin jusqu'à Sidi-Taddert et Sidi-Brahim. Le Général Drude nous le fit savoir, d'accord avec les autorités Françaises au Maroc, et il exécuta cette opération ; mais après qu'elle eut été affectuée, les indigènes des Chaouïas recommencèrent à nous attaquer ; ils se concentrèrent, dans ce but, toujours sur leur territoire—car, je le dis dès maintenant, il n'a jamais été et il n'est pas question de le dépasser—à la kasbah de Mediouna. Nos Agents signalaient unanimement que, réfugiés dans cette kasbah, les coupeurs de routes créaient une zone impraticable autour de Casa Blanca et empêchaient notre contact avec les tribus de l'arrière-pays qui étaient désireuses de vivre en paix avec nous. Ces indigènes empêchaient en même temps le ravitaillement, par l'intérieur, de la ville de Casa Blanca.

Sur la demande pressante qui lui en fut faite, le Gouvernement décida l'occupation de la kasbah. Pour y procéder le Général Drude demanda des renforts, qui lui furent immédiatement accordés. Sur ces entrefaites il tomba malade. (*Interruptions à Droite.*) Mais oui ; cela résulte de ses lettres. Je pourrais les lire.

Le Général Drude nous le fit savoir et nous saisit d'une demande de congé. Satisfaction lui fut immédiatement donnée. Mais avant que le Général d'Amade, qui avait été nommé à sa place, eût rejoint son poste, des dépêches parvinrent au Général Drude, de nos Agents Diplomatiques et Consulaires, lui signalant comme de plus en plus nécessaire et comme tout à fait urgente l'occupation de la kasbah. Une grande partie des renforts qu'il avait demandés lui étaient déjà parvenus, et dans un répit que lui laissait la fièvre intermittente dont il souffrait, ce qui n'a rien d'étonnant dans ce pays où il exécutait des opérations depuis six mois—(*très bien ! très bien !*)—il s'empara de la kasbah.

Faut-il l'en blâmer ? Son action a paru surprenante à quelques personnes. Faut-il la juger extraordinaire ? Je pense, Messieurs, que vous serez d'avis qu'il a eu raison. (*Très bien ! très bien !*)

Je sais qu'aujourd'hui—il faut bien que je m'en fasse l'écho, puisqu'on en a parlé à la tribune—certains sont enclins à jeter la pierre au Général Drude. Permettez-moi de rendre hommage à l'endurance, à la conscience, et à la discipline avec lesquelles pendant six mois il a rempli sa difficile mission. (*Vifs applaudissements.*)

Il a laissé à son successeur Casa Blanca tranquille et fortifiée, à l'abri de toute

espèce de surprise, avec des services d'hygiène et d'assistance rémarquablement installés, avec des troupes aguerries et disciplinées, dans un très bon état sanitaire et militaire. (*Nouveaux applaudissements.*) Et puisque l'occasion s'en présente, permettez-moi aussi, Messieurs, d'adresser en passant l'hommage de notre admiration et de notre reconnaissance aux femmes vaillantes et charitables (*vifs applaudissements*) qui, envoyées là-bas par la Croix-Rouge, prodiguent tous les jours à nos soldats dans les hôpitaux et les ambulances, les trésors—ce n'est pas trop dire—de leur sollicitude et de leur dévouement. (*Vifs applaudissements sur un grand nombre de bancs.*)

Mais je reviens à ma discussion.

En nous emparant de la kasbah de Mediouna, avions-nous pour but de châtier les tribus et de pacifier les Chaouïas? Non, nous avions aussi la préoccupation, qui ne nous a jamais abandonnés, de rendre possible la substitution de mehallas Chérifiennes aux troupes Françaises et de faciliter ainsi l'évacuation de Casa Blanca, car nous n'avons jamais renoncé à cette idée (*très bien! très bien!*) je l'affirmais à la tribune du Sénat à l'heure même où, sans que je le susse, il était procédé à l'occupation de la kasbah.

Cette idée a fait l'objet de nos négociations constantes; nous n'avons assumé à Casa Blanca qu'une responsabilité nécessaire, mais temporaire, et nous n'entendons nullement la conserver indéfiniment. Ce n'est ni pour nous établir sur la côte du Maroc, ni pour pénétrer dans l'intérieur du pays que nous avons pris les mesures militaires qui ont été la conséquence des assassinats du mois de Juillet dernier, c'est uniquement pour y remplir nos devoirs vis-à-vis de nous-mêmes et vis-à-vis de l'Europe, avec la résolution d'en laisser la charge au Gouvernement Marocain aussitôt qu'il sera en mesure de la remplir. Je ne peux pas la lui laisser auparavant, et je crois que personne ici, sauf M. Jaurès, ne nous a proposé d'évacuer Casa Blanca dans l'état actuel. (*Très bien! très bien!*)

Les instructions du Général d'Amade, contrairement à ce qu'on en a dit, sont, comme je l'ai affirmé moi-même à ce tribune, exactement celles que nous avions données à son prédécesseur: il demeure chargé comme lui de veiller à ce que les tribus qui entretiennent l'agitation soient ramenées à des sentiments pacifiques, à ce que les auteurs de crimes commis contre nous soient punis, à ce qu'un état de choses s'établisse qui nous permette de nous retirer progressivement du pays où nous ne sommes allés que provisoirement et avec un mandat limité. (*Très bien! très bien!*)

C'est dans ces conditions que M. le Général d'Amade s'est porté jusqu'à Settat et qu'il s'est efforcé d'assurer nos communications à la fois avec Rabat et avec Mazagan. Il s'est porté jusqu'à Settat, sur le territoire des Chaouïas—car, je vous l'ai dit, il n'est pas question de dépasser ce territoire.

M. Fernand Dubief.—Settat est au delà du territoire des Chaouïas.

M. le Président du Conseil.—Non! regardez une carte et vous serez fixé sur ce point.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—C'est en dehors du rayon pratique de ses opérations, comme l'indique lui-même le Général dans une dépêche que je vais lire, mais c'est sur le territoire des Chaouïas.

Je disais donc que M. le Général d'Amade s'était porté jusqu'à Settat pour en déloger une bande qui s'y était cantonnée, qui rayonnait aux environs et qui mettait une barrière entre nous et les tribus désireuses de faire du commerce pacifiquement avec Casa Blanca.

M. Jaurès a représenté cette opération comme une sorte de défaite militaire. J'avais déjà lu la même nouvelle dans un journal étranger, la "Vossische Zeitung," qui rapportait que les Français avaient été défaits. (*Mouvements divers.*)

Eh bien! Messieurs, permettez-moi de vous dire que, vraiment, c'est une simple plaisanterie.

Voici les télégrammes du Général d'Amade:—

Premier télégramme, dans lequel il indique à quelle opération il va procéder:

"Suivant le programme exposé, je me suis porté aujourd'hui dans la direction de Ber Rechid avec une colonne de quatre bataillons.

"Je bivouaque à Aïn Djemaa, à 18 kilom. au sud de Casa Blanca; aucun incident; je compte demain faire effort sur Ber Rechid par mouvement combiné avec colonne Mediouna.

"Mon but est:

"1. Confirmer action exécutée contre Mediouna;
"2. Réprimer fraction tribus Ouled Harriz impliquées massacres;
"3. Détruire reste mehalla Mouley Rechid."

Dans le télégramme suivant, il rend ainsi compte de son opération:—

"Ai engagé le combat à 8 heures matin aux abords et dans défilé Settat; Mehalla été refoulée, tribus nous ont opposé résistance plus obstinée et combat s'est prolongé jusqu'à midi; avons occupé Settat et y avons détruit camp de la mehalla.

"La situation"—et c'est ainsi que je réponds à l'observation de M. Dubief—"la situation m'ayant paru en dehors du rayon pratique des opérations en cours ai ramené ce soir à minuit même colonne à Ber Rechid."

Ceci prouve qu'il n'y a aucune espèce de défaite et que, dès le début, le Général d'Amade avait décidé de ramener ses troupes à Ber Rechid.

Il indique ensuite quelles sont nos pertes—elles sont de dix-sept blessés—et il ajoute:—

"Résultat obtenu par marche de vingt-cinq heures consécutives, quatre heures combat et un parcours de 75 kilom. pour certaines unités infanterie est dû aux excellentes troupes façonnées par mon prédécesseur. Résultat atteint sera d'inspirer aux tribus impression de notre force et de notre mobilité, c'est aussi une satisfaction très grandoise pour massacre du 30 Juillet dans lesquels sont impliquées les tribus qui toutes ont combattu à Settat."

Enfin, le lendemain il complète ainsi ce télégramme:—

"Complément télégramme.—Pertes de l'ennemi évaluées: 150 morts et 300 blessés."

Voilà en quoi a consisté sa défaite!

Cette opération qui, contrairement à ce que pense M. Jaurès, a été brillamment exécutée, n'a pas eu uniquement pour résultat d'atteindre et de disperser une bande de Marocains, après lui avoir infligé des pertes sérieuses; elle se recommande à mes yeux par des résultats encore plus pratiques et plus significatifs. Elle a frappé d'un châtiment qui, depuis longtemps, était recherché par nous, une des tribus les plus gravement impliquées dans les massacres de Casa Blanca. Elle a donné, comme le dit le Général, de notre force une impression qui sera salutaire pour notre prestige. Elle a eu un retentissement considérable dans le Chaouïa. Tous les télégrammes que nous avons reçus depuis le démontrent. Enfin, elle a permis au Général d'Amade de mettre la main sur les indigènes de marque qui, dès le 30 Juillet, montés sur leurs chevaux, excitaient et guidaient les massacreurs des ouvriers du port de Casa Blanca, qui escortaient ensuite les crieurs publics prêchant la guerre sainte dans les rues de la ville. Le Général, comme vous l'avez vu, a si peu manifesté l'intention de s'enfoncer dans l'intérieur du pays, qu'il est revenu à Ber Rechid, où il a eu la chance de mettre la main sur le Caïd, qui a été le principal initiateur des massacres du 30 Juillet.

Voilà le résultat de l'opération.

Mais le crime du Commandant en chef de nos troupes est, paraît-il, de s'être heurté à des mehallas Hafidiennes. Trahirai-je un secret en disant que nous ne sommes pour rien, ni le Général non plus, dans les sentiments politiques de ces mehallas? (*Sourires.*)

En poursuivant sa marche en avant, le Général a négligé de se poser la question de savoir à quelle fraction politique appartenait l'ennemi qu'il allait combattre, s'il était pour ou contre Moulay Hafid, pour ou contre Abd-el-Aziz. Il n'a pas regardé à la couleur de ses bannières; il ne s'est pas demandé si parmi les auteurs des massacres du 30 Juillet, les coupeurs de routes, les détrousseurs de caravanes, l'ennemi qui sans cesse nous harcèle et nous attaque, il n'y avait pas des indigènes qui mériteraient une certaine indulgence du fait qu'ils se rattacheraient à un parti prêchant la guerre sainte et voulant nous expulser du territoire Marocain.

C'est, paraît-il, une grave erreur, une faute impardonnable de la part du Général d'Amade et, naturellement, du Gouvernement.

J'avoue que je ne puis comprendre ce scrupule singulier de la part de certains de nos contradicteurs. Quelle étrange stratégie ce serait que de prendre en considération, lorsqu'on va attaquer un ennemi, qui se concentre en vue de vous livrer bataille, la couleur de ses bannières et l'origine de ses oriflammes! Quant à moi, je n'ai pas la force d'en vouloir au Général d'avoir adopté une autre tactique et de n'avoir pas distingué, lorsqu'il châtie les fauteurs de troubles et les ennemis qui prennent des dispositions pour la bataille, entre les tribus attachées à une cause ou à une autre; mais d'avoir frappé vite et d'avoir frappé fort afin d'éviter d'être surpris ou d'être entraîné trop loin (*très bien! très bien!*), car sa principale préoccupation, comme la nôtre, est précisément de ne pas être entraînés trop loin.

Voyons maintenant quelle est notre attitude en présence des luttes intestines qui ruinent et qui désolent l'Empire Marocain.

Je me suis déjà expliqué à ce sujet en répondant à M. Ribot, comme l'a rappelé M. Dubief, dans la séance du 12 Novembre dernier. A ce moment Moulay Hafid n'avait pas encore été proclamé à Fez, mais il l'avait déjà été à Marrakech. Définissant notre attitude entre le Sultan légitime, et le prétendant qui lui dispute le trône, je disais que nous étions obligés à beaucoup de prudence, que notre sort au Maroc n'était pas lié à celui de tel ou tel Chérif, qu'il tenait—vous l'avez rappelé, M. Dubief—à nos intérêts, à nos droits, à notre situation générale, à nos Conventions, à nos Traités, à notre histoire.

J'ajoutais, comme vous l'avez dit également, que, même si tous les Sultans venaient à disparaître du Maroc, la France n'en serait pas moins une grande Puissance Musulmane et qu'elle aurait les mêmes droits, les mêmes devoirs, et les mêmes obligations dans un pays auquel sont liées ses destinées Africaines. Je faisais, toutefois, une différence entre le Prétendant et le Sultan reconnu par toute l'Europe, en possession légitime du pouvoir, avec lequel toutes les Puissances ont négocié, qui a ratifié la Convention d'Algésiras, qui nous a confirmé par les accords de 1901 et de 1902 une situation spéciale et qui s'est enfin entendu avec nous pour ce qui concerne la frontière de l'Algérie.

Je rappelais notamment que l'Acte d'Algésiras porte en première ligne la reconnaissance et le maintien de l'intégrité du Maroc et de la souveraineté du Sultan. En fait, disai-je, comme vous l'avez rappelé également, nous ne pouvions que rester de son côté. Je n'ai rien à changer à ces déclarations.

Que s'est-il passé depuis que je les ai faites ? Moulay Hafid a été proclamé à Fez, comme il l'avait été à Marrakech.

Dans quelles conditions ou plutôt à quelles conditions, car, contrairement à la loi et à la tradition Marocaines, il paraît qu'on a posé au Prétendant des conditions qui, même d'après les interprètes Musulmans des règles Coraniques, seraient une cause de nullité ; Mais je ne me charge pas de les départager ; j'ai assez des soucis qui me préoccupent, je ne veux pas y ajouter celui-là. (*Sourires.*) Voici donc dans quelles conditions, d'après le télégramme de M. de Saint-Aulaire, Moulay Hafid aurait été proclamé :—

1. Il n'y aura plus de droits de porte.
2. Il n'y aura plus d'impôt sur les industries.
3. Il n'y aura plus de police. (*Rires au Centre.—Très bien! très bien! à l'Extrême Gauche.*)
4. Il n'y aura pas de réformes.
5. Il n'y aura aucune application de l'Acte d'Algésiras.
6. Il n'y aura pas de contrôleurs dans les Douanes. (*Rires et exclamations.*)
7. —Voilà qui va réjouir M. Jaurès.—Il n'y aura pas d'emprunt. (*Mouvements divers.*)

M. Jaurès.—Suis-je le seul à m'en réjouir ?

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—Nous en parlerons tout à l'heure.

8. Il sera interdit aux étrangers de s'immiscer dans les affaires du Makhzen.
9. Il sera interdit aux étrangers d'habiter l'intérieur du Maroc.
10. Dans les ports ils habiteront au mellah avec les Juifs. (*Mouvements divers.*)

Cette Proclamation se serait faite d'ailleurs à l'instigation d'un certain El Kitani, qui, mécontent de ne plus recevoir de subsides du Makhzen, aurait voulu se faire proclamer Sultan lui-même. Les amis de ce troisième Prétendant deçu auraient même espéré provoquer des désordres et mettre la ville à sac afin de donner libre cours, par le pillage, à leurs instincts de cupidité. Une tentative de contre-révolution se serait produite ; le Khalifat du nouveau Sultan aurait essayé de s'insurger contre lui pour restituer le pouvoir à Abd-el-Aziz. Cette tentative aurait échoué grâce à la trahison de l'un de ceux avec lesquels elle avait été complotée. Le gâchis est à Fez, comme, hélas ! dans une trop grande partie de l'Empire du Maroc.

Voilà donc aussi clairement que possible quelle est la situation. (*Exclamations à l'Extrême Gauche.*) Je l'expose telle qu'elle est, avec tous les regrets que vous pouvez en avoir, mais auxquels je ne peux rien moi-même.

Il y a au Maroc un Sultan légitime reconnu par toute l'Europe, au nom duquel nous sommes investis d'un mandat et au nom duquel, en ce moment même, nous intervenons, auprès duquel sont accrédités des Ministres étrangers, qui a lui-même des Ministres en

relations régulières avec les Représentants des Puissances, qui n'a cessé auprès d'aucune Puissance d'être considéré comme investi du pouvoir et comme l'exerçant.

Son pouvoir est malheureusement très réduit, mais c'est encore le seul obstacle légal au règne complet de l'anarchie et du gâchis dans tout l'Empire Marocain.

En face de lui se dressent à des titres divers plusieurs Prétendants : Bou Amama, le Roghi, Moulay Hafid. Ce dernier a été proclamé dans plusieurs villes et possède une force indéniable puisée dans le sentiment populaire et dans le fanatisme religieux ; mais il n'a été reconnu jusqu'à présent par aucune Puissance étrangère et n'existe officiellement vis-à-vis d'aucune d'elles.

Le Sultan Abd-el-Aziz, Signataire de l'Acte d'Algésiras, représente jusqu'à nouvel ordre et sauf changement nouveau de sa part—car je reconnais qu'il a eu, comme on l'a dit, un certain nombre de métamorphoses—l'association des intérêts étrangers aux intérêts Marocains. Il a accepté le principe des réformes projetées dans l'Empire et s'est déclaré disposé à les pratiquer ; il a prescrit l'établissement de la police, qui s'organise en ce moment à Rabat, à Mazagan, à Casa Blanca, à Tanger ; il a sanctionné le contrôle des Douanes ; il s'est entendu avec nous pour la création d'une police dans la région frontière, ce qui nous donne la solution des difficultés pendantes entre le Maroc et l'Algérie depuis un demi-siècle et ce qui assure à notre Oranie, au point de vue économique, le bénéfice de sa situation limitrophe ; il a reconnu la légitimité des griefs qui ont motivé notre intervention à Oudjda et à Casa Blanca et nous a promis toutes les satisfactions que nous exigions. D'une façon générale, il a pris l'engagement de poursuivre l'application des réformes d'Algésiras.

Nous ne lui avons rien demandé qui ne soit absolument conforme à nos obligations internationales et qui n'ait pour but de les concilier avec nos intérêts spéciaux.

Le Prétendant Moulay Hafid qui a eu, autrefois, c'est indéniable, des dispositions favorables aux Puissances étrangères, qui a manifesté des sentiments qui n'étaient pas hostiles à la France. Moulay Hafid actuellement a déclaré la guerre sainte, dans les documents expédiés par lui de Marrakech. C'est aussi au nom de la guerre sainte qu'il a été proclamé à Fez.

Il apparaît—puisse l'apparence devenir trompeuse !—comme représentant l'hostilité du vieux parti fanatique Musulman aux étrangers. Il semble le prisonnier de ceux qui en le prenant pour chef lui ont demandé l'expulsion des Français d'Oudjda et de Casa Blanca, l'abrogation de l'Acte d'Algésiras, le retrait de tous les droits accordés aux étrangers, la suppression des impôts payés par les Marocains, celle des droits de ports et de marchés.

Il se manifeste comme le dernier des produits de l'anarchie qui se développe depuis sept ou huit ans, depuis la disparition du Grand Vizir Ba Ahmed qui fut le dernier Ministre énergique d'Abd-el-Aziz.

Pendant cette période de sept ou huit années, le Gouvernement Chérifien s'est ruiné, il s'est affaibli, il s'est discrédité ; il a supprimé les anciens impôts sans pouvoir en percevoir de nouveaux. (*Interruptions et rires à Droite.*) Et le peuple voit dans le Prétendant un instrument pour se débarrasser des charges fiscales qui pèsent encore sur lui.

Au total, Moulay Hafid incarnerait, si l'on s'en rapportait aux conditions d'avènement de son autorité populaire telle que je viens de les rappeler, l'action contre l'Europe et contre toute espèce de Gouvernement.

La guerre sainte qu'il a prêchée n'a d'ailleurs pas, contrairement à ce qu'on croit, entraîné toutes les tribus Marocaines. Les tribus de l'Atlas et de la plaine sont restées indifférentes et ont refusé de se réunir au Chaouïas. Les autorités des ports, sauf Sapal, plusieurs grands Caïds du Sud, un Marabout très puissant, le Marabout de Bou-Djad, semblent rester du côté d'Abd-el-Aziz.

Mais, comme M. Ribot, je ne veux pas faire de pronostics. Je veux simplement faire un certain nombre de suppositions.

M. Jaurès—Vous ne pariez pour aucun cheval, mais vous montez sur l'un des deux. (*On rit.*)

M. le Ministre.—Je ne fait pas de pari et je ne prends aucune part à la course.

Supposons le succès de la cause de Moulay Hafid telle qu'elle résulterait de l'ensemble des faits que je viens de signaler—je ferai tout à l'heure la supposition contraire. Il serait à craindre que les villes à colonie Européenne fussent en proie au danger d'une réaction violente. La police d'Algésiras, qui est déjà rendue infiniment difficile, deviendrait plus impossible que jamais.

La suppression du Mahkzen légitime risquerait de livrer le pays entier sans aucun contrepoids à l'anarchie ; nous serions exposés à de nouvelles attaques à Oudjda et dans la région de Casa Blanca. Les Puissances seraient menacées de se trouver devant un

Maroc inorganique et hostile. Et qui sait à quels remèdes on pourrait songer en présence d'une si inquiétante situation ? Qui sait ce qu'un Maroc livré entièrement à l'anarchie pourrait faire craindre de complications sinon de périls pour la paix du monde ?

Mais je vais faire d'autres suppositions : Moulay Hafid porté au pouvoir par les fanatiques évitant de les suivre, essayant de se concilier les Puissances, d'arrêter le mouvement antiétranger qu'il représente et d'entrer dans la voie des réformes. Sera-t-il, alors, mieux en mesure de réussir qu'Abd-el-Aziz ? Pourra-t-il sauver son autorité et son prestige ? Le parti de la résistance abandonné par lui ne lui suscitera-t-il pas des compétiteurs ? N'aura-t-il pas lui aussi à lutter contre son Kettani ?

Toutes ces considérations nous commandent de quelque côté que nous nous tournions, la plus grande prudence.

Nous ne pouvons rester indifférents au spectacle auquel nous assistons, ni comme on nous l'a conseillé, nous réfugier dans une tour d'ivoire pour le contempler à notre aise. Il ne saurait être question davantage de nous engager à fond dans des affaires qui ne sont pas les nôtres, mais qui pourtant nous intéressent, qui ne sont pas non plus celles de l'Europe, mais qui pourtant ne l'intéressent pas beaucoup moins que nous, qui ne sont pas exclusivement celles du Maroc, mais qui sont le résultat de ses fautes, de sa faiblesse, de son impuissance, et qui en ce moment soulèvent, comme sur le passage du sirocco, toute la poussière de ses tribus.

Nous devons être prêts à tout événement et faire ce qui dépend de nous pour que tout pouvoir, toute autorité, toute garantie contre le désordre—et par conséquent contre des causes permanentes d'intervention—ne disparaissent pas dans cette tourmente qui pourrait avoir de si graves conséquences pour tout le monde civilisé.

Actuellement, Abd-el-Aziz est maître des ports, sauf Saffi, et nos Agents y entretiennent avec lui officieusement des rapports, comme tous les Représentants des Puissances sans aucune exception. Ils y veillent à la sécurité de nos colonies et à celle des étrangers ; ils s'efforcent d'y assurer, avec l'aide de l'autorité qui reste, l'exécution des clauses de l'Acte d'Algésiras ; ils y procèdent notamment à l'organisation d'une police pour éviter d'être conduits à de nouveaux débarquements.

Ils ne cherchent à dégager de la crise actuelle que les moyens d'empêcher l'effondrement complet des autorités régulières, et les moyens, aussi, d'exercer au profit de tous leur influence et de remplir, d'accord avec l'Espagne, le mandat Européen qui nous a été confié.

Nous sommes en accord complet avec l'Espagne. M. Jaurès a dit le contraire ; il a prédit que nous irions au-devant de difficultés croissantes et d'un désaccord profond. Qu'il me permette de lui dire qu'il s'est complètement trompé ; et, comme ma déclaration pourrait ne pas lui suffire, je donne lecture à la Chambre des déclarations faites officiellement par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères du Gouvernement Espagnol :—

"La proclamation de Hafid ne soulève pas au point de vue juridique un problème nouveau ; la situation est analogue à celle résultant de l'établissement du Prétendant dans le voisinage de Melilla ; les autorités Espagnoles ont entretenu avec lui les relations strictement nécessaires à la sauvegarde des intérêts Espagnols ; les Consuls d'Espagne ont reçu les mêmes instructions à l'égard de Hafid. Ces principes de droit international sont fortifiés à l'égard du Sultan qui occupe le trône depuis 1895 du fait que la Proclamation de son rival paraît jusqu'ici surtout destinée à servir d'étiquette au désordre. Actuellement et toujours s'impose aux tiers cette double nécessité : obtenir que le Souverain Marocain, conformément au droit de gens qui place les Traités au-dessus des changements intérieurs du Gouvernement, remplisse ses obligations internationales particulièrement en ce qui concerne les vies et les biens des étrangers ainsi que la liberté du commerce.

"Sur ces deux objets se concentrera ou plus exactement se concentre l'action de l'Espagne et de la France, parfaitement d'accord entre elles : ils marquent la direction et en même temps la limite de leur programme. Les moyens dépendront des circonstances. La sincérité avec laquelle nous procédons constitue la meilleure réponse aux bruits qui circulent périodiquement supposant que tantôt pour complaire à des désirs étrangers, tantôt cédant à nos propres impulsions, nous sommes sur le point de nous engager dans des voies tortueuses et aventureuses.

"Quant à la mission de M. Llaveria à Rabat, celui-ci, d'accord avec le Représentant de la France, a poursuivi l'exécution de l'Acte d'Algésiras au bénéfice des intérêts étrangers : organisation immédiate de la police, répression de la contrebande de guerre par des forces navales Françaises et Espagnoles, organisation de la caisse spécial en vue des travaux publics, liberté du cabotage, &c."

Messieurs, il est impossible de mieux définir l'action que nous exerçons aujourd'hui au Maroc, d'un commun accord avec l'Espagne. Voyons quelle est cette action dans la pratique.

Y a-t-il un port, tel que Saffi, où Abd-el-Aziz n'est pas le maître, où Moulay Hafid dispose d'une influence supérieure, où il a été en quoique sorte reconnu ?

Nos Agents traitent officiellement avec les autorités de fait qui s'y sont établies ; ils s'occupent avec elles d'assurer la sécurité de notre colonie et celles des colonies étrangères. Ce n'est pas là chose nouvelle.

Déjà Moulay Hafid a été le maître dans d'autres ports, à Mazagan, à Mogador. Qu'avons-nous fait ? Sommes-nous entrés en lutte avec Moulay Hafid ? Lui avons-nous déclaré la guerre ? Pas du tout. Nous nous sommes bornés à prendre sur place toutes les mesures nécessaires pour ne manquer à aucune de nos obligations locales et à aucune de nos obligations internationales et nous avons eu la chance d'y réussir.

Je disais dans une discussion précédente que l'essentiel, dans cette question Marocaine, était d'avoir une méthode. Notre méthode, la voilà ! Je disais que la question Marocain serait longue à résoudre, qu'elle serait hérissé de complications. Les complications, avouez-le, ne nous ont pas manqué et, pour ma part, depuis que j'ai l'honneur d'occuper le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, je n'ai pas chômé dans le dédale à peu près inextricable des embarras de toute espèce auxquels, au Maroc, la fatalité m'a condamné à me heurter. Je vous demandais, il y a peu de temps, d'avoir de la patience. Ce sera peut-être un bien gros sacrifice, mais je vous demanderai aujourd'hui d'en avoir autant que moi.

La situation ne nous a jamais permis l'indifférence totale, transcendante, qui nous a été conseillée ; ce n'est pas avec Moulay Hafid que nous pouvions et que nous pouvons encore traiter officiellement les questions qui nous intéressent et les questions qui intéressent l'Europe, questions relatives à notre situation spéciale, aux droits que nous ont reconnus les Gouvernements, aux intérêts de l'Europe elle-même : répression de la contrebande, police de notre frontière, police des ports, conditions de l'évacuation de Casa Blanca et règlement des affaires qui s'y rapportent. Eh bien ! voilà ce que nous sommes allés négocier à Rabat.

Et combien ces négociations déjà si délicates, aurait été plus hasardeuses et plus difficiles si le Sultan était resté à Fez, où nous ne pouvions songer à transporter notre Mission sans être très probablement obligés d'aller l'y protéger, l'y défendre, et où peut-être nous serions arrivés trop tard ! Nous avions, au contraire, retiré notre colonie de Fez comme l'avaient fait toutes les Puissances. Notre but était de réduire le plus possible nos opérations. Les tribus châtiées par nous, il fallait que le Makhzen arrivât à proximité pour les maintenir et pour faciliter la reprise de relations normales entre Casa Blanca et l'intérieur. Il fallait que, sans nous départir des scrupules qui nous ont toujours dicté notre politique à l'égard de toutes les Puissances, nous fussions à même de traiter directement le Sultan.

Ce n'est pas nous, contrairement à ce que disait M. Dubief, qui avons décidé son voyage. Ce voyage avait été décidé par le Sultan lui-même dès le lendemain de l'assassinat du Dr. Mauchamp à Marrakech. Il devait venir à proximité de Marrakech pour essayer de nous assurer les satisfactions que nous avions réclamées, mais nous avions pensé qu'à un moment donné le voyage de Rabat était plus utile et plus nécessaire que jamais. C'est ce que nous avons dit à la Banque d'État, institution internationale, qui a fourni les moyens d'accomplir ce voyage et j'ajoute que nous n'avons aucunement à le regretter.

Maintenant, je voudrais dire un mot d'une question qui m'a été posée par M. Jaurès et par M. Ribot. Il s'agit de l'emprunt. M. Jaurès l'a fortement raillé, il a représenté El Mokhri transportant le cadavre de l'emprunt dans sa malle, et il a parlé de cet emprunt avec une sollicitude, qui m'a étonné de sa part, en faveur des capitalistes. (*Rires au Centre. Interruptions à l'Extrême Gauche.*)

M. Ribot m'a demandé tout d'abord de lui déclarer qu'il n'était pas question en ce moment de l'emprunt ; je déclare qu'en effet il n'en est pas question. Mais M. Ribot a voulu que j'aille plus loin et que je lui dise que le Makhzen ne chercherait pas dans l'avenir à contracter un emprunt.

M. Ribot.—Je n'ai pas demandé cela, M. le Ministre !

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—Alors, c'est M. Jaurès. (*On rit.*)

Je ne puis vraiment pas donner l'assurance qui m'a été demandée.

Il est possible que le Makhzen ait besoin d'argent, c'est même le contraire qui serait une nouveauté. Mais cette question a été prévu par l'Acte d'Algésiras ; des dispositions ont été prises et l'assurance que je donne, et que je donne de la façon la plus formelle, c'est que, s'il était question d'un emprunt à contracter par le Gouverne-

ment Marocain, il ne pourrait l'être qu'aux termes et dans les conditions prévus par l'Acte d'Algésiras.

Nous ne sommes pas chargés des finances du Gouvernement Marocain. Il peut se faire qu'à un moment donné le Gouvernement Marocain, pour payer ses dettes et nous rembourser l'argent qu'il nous doit, car il n'est pas sans nous en devoir, quand ce ne serait que pour les frais de notre intervention militaire et les indemnités de Casa Blanca. (*Exclamations et applaudissements ironiques à l'Extrême Gauche et sur divers bancs à Droite et au Centre.*) C'est l'évidence même.

Je le répète, il peut se faire—et je suis hors d'état de donner aucune assurance à cet égard—que le Gouvernement Marocain ait à contracter un emprunt. La seule assurance que je puisse et doive donner au Parlement, et que je donne de la façon la plus formelle, c'est qu'en aucun cas cette question ne pourra être introduite que conformément à l'Acte d'Algésiras.

Voilà notre politique. Les événements qui, je le reconnais, la compliquent, ne sauraient la modifier. Elle reste invariablement la même dans ses inspirations comme dans ses manifestations qui ne subissent, comme toute chose en ce monde, que le contre-coup inévitable des circonstances dont nous ne sommes pas toujours les maîtres : défense de nos droits universellement reconnus, respect des Conventions qui nous lient aux autres Puissances, protection de nos colonies, exécution, d'accord avec l'Espagne, de notre mandat Européen, loyalisme à l'égard du Sultan qui est en possession du pouvoir, qui a négocié avec les Gouvernements étrangers comme avec le nôtre et qui représente encore, qu'on le veuille ou non, une force légale, une barrière contre l'anarchie. Pas d'immixtion dans les dissensions intestines de l'Empire, pas de Protectorat, pas d'action qui nous y conduise, pas d'expédition à l'intérieur. Nous n'irons ni à Fez, ni à Marrakech. (*Très bien! très bien! sur divers bancs à l'Extrême Gauche et à Gauche. Mouvements divers.*)

Nous sommes prêts, d'ailleurs, comme c'est notre devoir, à envisager toutes les éventualités. Si Abd-el-Aziz échoue, ce qui est bien possible, le Sultan qui lui succédera nous trouvera en mesure de causera avec lui à la fois en notre nom et en vertu du mandat Européen qui nous a été confié. Notre cause sera celle de l'Europe, des reformes, de la civilisation.

Nous aurons préparé par nos moyens, par notre persévérance, par nos sacrifices, par la dignité et la fermeté de notre conduite, autant au moins que par la force des choses, l'exécution des décisions d'une Conférence que nous n'avons ni souhaitée ni convoquée, mais qui a donné aux intérêts généraux de l'Europe des solutions dont, à certains égards, nous sommes garants.

Messieurs, si vous avez quelque chose à reprendre à ce programme, dites-le. Nous vous écouterons et nous sommes prêts à l'améliorer. Il n'y a qu'une limite que nous nous imposons à nous-mêmes, c'est celle au delà de laquelle nos intérêts distincts et spéciaux, ceux que nous tenons de notre situation de grande Puissance Africaine et du voisinage de l'Algérie, seraient sacrifié. Nous avons dit souvent pourquoi nous ne voulions pas d'un Maroc internationalisé plus qu'il ne l'a été par l'Acte d'Algésiras.

La sécurité de l'Algérie, celle de notre Empire Africain, l'importance et la nature de nos intérêts politiques, la prépondérance de nos intérêts commerciaux s'y opposent. Je n'y reviens pas.

Mais, Messieurs, je ne veux pas m'exposer au reproche que formulait M. Delcassé dans notre dernière séance, de n'envisager notre politique Marocaine qu'au point de vue spécial des événements Marocains et de ne pas la mettre dans son vrai cadre, qui est celui de notre politique générale.

Pour ma part, je ne l'en ai jamais détachée. Je ne lui ai pas subordonné toute notre politique extérieure, mais je l'ai maintenue à sa place avec sa valeur, dans l'ensemble de nos préoccupations.

Elle est intimement liée aux pensées qui nous inspirent notre attitude à l'égard des Gouvernements étrangers et qui nous dictent nos relations avec les Puissances d'Europe. C'est pour elle une garantie de succès comme c'est pour nous une garantie de sécurité.

Et, si on voulait la séparer des préoccupations dont je parle, la traiter à part, en envisager les solutions comme acquises par le seul fait qu'elles ont été projetées ou qu'elles ont fait l'objet d'accords isolés, nous risquerions de la voir échouer dans de dangereuses aventures. (*Très bien! très bien!*) Son sort dépend de notre loyauté comme de notre force, de la sincérité avec laquelle, appuyés par un Parlement complètement renseigné—(*applaudissements sur un grand nombre de bancs*)—par une opinion publique à laquelle nous n'aurons rien caché de nos desseins. (*Nouveaux applaudissements.*)

Nous en ferons valoir l'intérêt général qui se confond avec la légitimité de nos droits.

Votre loyauté n'est pas en cause ; elle est établie par tous nos actes, elle n'est contestée nulle part. Je ne doute pas de notre force ; elle tient à cette politique extérieure de la France qui n'est l'œuvre ni d'un homme, ni d'un Gouvernement, ni d'un parti—(*vifs applaudissements*)—mais qui est le résultat des efforts accumulés, depuis trente-sept ans, par la République, pour rendre à notre pays la place qu'il occupait dans le monde et qu'il avait perdue dans une catastrophe dont on se demandait, lorsqu'elle s'est produite, s'il pourrait jamais s'en relever.

Ah ! Messieurs, gardons-nous bien de nous donner aujourd'hui comme les inventeurs de cette politique : nous n'en sommes que les héritiers. (*Très bien ! très bien !*) Gardons-nous de la représenter comme appartenant en propre à tel ou tel des membres de Gouvernements passés ou présents, qui ont eu ou qui ont la charge des destinées de la France, atteinte par ses défaites, mais toujours grande par ses richesses, par ses ressources, par son rayonnement, et par ses idées. Nous serions injustes pour un trop grand nombre de nos prédécesseurs vivants ou morts qui ont été les ouvriers de la noble tâche entreprise par l'Assemblée Nationale au lendemain même de nos désastres, et qui a abouti, à travers toutes les tempêtes qui ont assailli la République, à nous donner la situation que nous avons reconquise, et qui nous assure la place qui nous appartient dans le concert des peuples civilisés. (*Applaudissements sur un grand nombre de bancs.*)

Oublions nos divisions, nos controverses. Faisons trève a nos récriminations pour nous réconcilier, ne fût-ce qu'un instant, dans la constatation de ce fait que notre pays, avec la grande alliance qu'il a conclue, avec les ententes qu'il a nouées, avec la confiance qu'il inspire partout parce qu'il ne menace les droits de personne, est en mesure de poursuivre en paix, avec autant de dignité que de fermeté, et avec autant de foi que de sagesse, l'accomplissement des devoirs qui lui incombent partout où son honneur est engagé. Ne voyez-vous pas que ce serait amoindrir singulièrement la portée de cette politique que de l'associer dans votre pensée au sort d'un Ministre ou d'un Ministère ? Ce serait aussi inexact qu'imprudent ; ce serait dire que lorsque les Ministres tombent, lorsque les Ministères disparaissent, la valeur des engagements que nous avons souscrits s'atténue, la confiance des Puissances qui les ont signés avec nous diminue. Non, Messieurs ; les Ministres tombent, les Ministères disparaissent ; la valeur des engagements souscrits subsiste. Elle n'en est aucunement atteinte. (*Applaudissements.*) Jamais elle n'a été diminuée parce que, suivant un mot célèbre, il reste la France ; il reste le Gouvernement, qui la représente. L'unité morale et matérielle de notre pays survit.

Je m'associe, cela va sans dire, au grand éloge qu'on vous fait de l'alliance Franco-Russe, de l'entente cordiale avec l'Angleterre, de nos accords avec l'Espagne et l'Italie, de notre amitié avec les États-Unis.

Me sera-t-il permis de rappeler que cette politique, qui doit nous réunir tous dans un sentiment d'unanime approbation, a été poursuivie dès la première heure par ceux qui ont eu l'honneur de gouverner la République et qu'elle n'a cessé d'être l'objet de leurs vœux et de leurs négociations ? Me sera-t-il permis de rappeler que du Duc Decazes à M. Ribot, qui en a été le Signataire, en passant par Gambetta, qui toujours l'avait souhaitée, l'alliance Franco-Russe a été de tout temps voulue et préparée par les Ministres de notre Gouvernement. (*Vifs applaudissements.*)

Me sera-t-il permis de rappeler que l'entente Franco-Anglaise a toujours été recherchée, et proclamée comme une nécessité pour les deux pays qu'elle unit dans une action de paix et de civilisation par tous les hommes qui représentaient au Gouvernement ou dans l'opposition les forces vives et les partis les plus divers de la République ? Et, sans sortir du Gouvernement lui-même, n'y trouverais-je pas un homme qui a été, à toutes les époques, l'un des apôtres les plus fidèles et les plus fervents de cette idée ?

Me sera-t-il permis de rappeler que nous avons tous travaillé bien longtemps avant d'être au pouvoir, au rapprochement de la France et de l'Italie, à l'effacement des divisions de ces deux nations désunies par des malentendus aussi incompréhensibles que funestes et que jamais, même aux heures les plus troubles, et dans les temps les plus difficiles, nous n'avions pensé qu'une telle désunion pût subsister. (*Vifs applaudissements.*)

Faut-il rappeler enfin que, depuis quinze mois, nous nous appliquons avec une conscience opiniâtre à resserrer les liens qui nous attachent à l'Espagne, et que nous n'avons aucun mérite à y réussir en présence de la confiance et de l'amitié que nous témoigne toujours son Gouvernement ? (*Applaudissements.*)

Mais, Messieurs, encore que je ne veuille parler qu'avec la plus grande réserve de l'œuvre accomplie par les membres du Cabinet dans la politique étrangère de notre pays, n'est-ce pas nous qui, pour donner plus de gages à la paix du monde et plus de force aux concours qui nous ont été légués, avons négocié et conclu l'accord avec le Japon—(*applaudissements*)—l'accord Méditerranéen avec l'Espagne ? (*Applaudissements.*) N'est-ce pas nous qui avons réglé nos affaires avec le Siam, et fortifié ainsi notre situation en Extrême-Orient ?

Croyez-vous que nous ayons été simples spectateurs dans la réconciliation du Japon et de la Russie, et dans le règlement des difficultés pendantes entre le Royaume de la Grande-Bretagne et l'Empire du Tsar ? Cette politique, qui est le développement naturel des traditions qui vous ont été exposées, qui met la France à sa place, à son rang, qui lui assure la part qui lui appartient dans les conseils de l'Europe, qui lui permet d'envisager l'avenir avec tranquillité, nous entendons ne la pratiquer qu'avec toute la prudence nécessaire pour qu'elle n'ait jamais que de bienfaisants effets.

Nous voulons qu'elle n'apparaisse comme dirigée contre personne—(*vifs applaudissements*)—qu'elle ne cherche à isoler personne—(*nouveaux applaudissements*)—mais qu'elle soit au regard de tous—et cela lui suffit—destinée à fournir des gages nouveaux à la paix du monde. (*Applaudissements.*)

Et parce que, un jour, acceptant la réunion d'une Conférence Internationale, elle s'est inclinée librement et en toute indépendance devant un scrupule qui lui interdisait de risquer, pour un but insuffisant et d'ailleurs aléatoire, ce bien si précieux de la paix—(*vifs applaudissements à l'Extrême Gauche et à Gauche*)—parce qu'elle a consenti à soumettre à l'examen des Gouvernements de l'Europe des questions dans lesquelles elle était sûre de son droit et, par suite, de sa victoire, parce qu'elle a sauvegardé de cette façon ce qu'il y avait d'essentiel et de supérieur dans ses droits, n'allons pas dire, Messieurs, qu'elle a faibli, qu'elle s'est humiliée, qu'elle a manqué de confiance en elle-même. (*Applaudissements.*)

Quelle était donc la situation au moment où il s'est agi de la Conférence d'Algésiras ? Nous avions avec l'Angleterre un accord, celui du 8 Avril, 1904, par lequel le Gouvernement Britannique reconnaissait qu'il appartenait à la France, notamment comme Puissance limitrophe sur une vaste étendue, de veiller à la sécurité du Maroc et de lui prêter son assistance pour toutes les réformes administratives, économiques, financières, et militaires dont il a besoin. Les deux Gouvernements avaient affirmé, par le même acte, leur égal attachement au principe de la liberté commerciale au Maroc, ils s'étaient engagés à se prêter l'appui de leur diplomatie pour l'exécution de leurs projets.

La même entente avait été conclue par nous avec l'Espagne. Nous avions en somme, par rapport aux Gouvernements de Londres et de Madrid, le droit d'agir au Maroc dans la limite des accords que nous avions stipulés ; mais en ayant le droit, il restait à nous en procurer le moyen. Lorsqu'il fut question de passer à l'exécution de ces accords, qu'arriva-t-il ? D'indiscutables complications internationales surgirent. Allèrent-elles jusqu'au danger de guerre ? Je ne veux pas, Messieurs, trancher cette question. Ce qui est certain, c'est que nous nous trouvâmes en face de complications redoutables. Pour les éviter, ce qui est le rôle, le mandat de la diplomatie, on chercha un procédé et alors naquit l'idée de la Conférence Internationale. (*Très bien ! très bien !*)

Était-ce une Conférence sans conditions, dans laquelle tous nos droits allaient être remis en cause, tous nos accords avec le Makhzen et les Gouvernements étrangers détruits ? Vous savez bien le contraire.

Dès le premier jour, le Gouvernement de la République fit savoir qu'une telle Conférence serait inacceptable, qu'il ne pourrait y souscrire et refuserait d'y participer. (*Très bien ! très bien !*) Il prit soin de faire réserver d'une façon explicite, en termes nets et précis ce qui constituait l'essence même de nos droits dans l'Empire Chérifien, notre situation privilégiée de Puissance Algérienne, la raison même de notre accord avec le Makhzen aussi bien qu'avec les Gouvernements de Londres et de Madrid ; et lorsque le principe de la Conférence fut formulé, lorsqu'il fut soumis à vos délibérations, qui donc s'est levé pour le combattre, qui donc a protesté, qui donc est venu à cette tribune demander de le repousser ? (*Vifs applaudissements à Gauche et à l'Extrême Gauche.*)

Ce fut à l'unanimité, si j'ai bonne mémoire, que le principe de la Conférence fut adopté et que nous résolûmes d'y prendre part.

Non, la France n'a pas faibli ; non, ses Représentants ne l'ont pas humiliée ; non, vous n'avez pas douté de vous-mêmes et vous n'avez pas manqué de confiance en elle.

Vous avez donné à nos droits une base nouvelle qu'il y aura peut-être lieu d'élargir et de fortifier par la suite, mais qui, telle qu'elle est, nous garantit contre le péril des aventures et des risques auxquels nous étions exposés.

La politique que je résume est l'œuvre du Parlement de la République autant que des hommes qui l'ont gouvernée. C'est à vous de veiller sur elle, à vous d'en prendre et d'en garder le dépôt.

Pour surveiller et contrôler cette politique qui doit dominer toutes nos divisions et assurer au dehors l'unité de notre pays, il faut, Messieurs, que vous soyez constamment et complètement renseignés sur les desseins, sur les vues, sur les actes du Gouvernement. (*Applaudissements à l'Extrême Gauche et à Gauche.*)

Ce n'est pas le Gouvernement actuel qui essayera jamais de vous rien cacher. Il vous fournira tous les renseignements, toutes les indications, toutes les explications qui vous paraîtront nécessaires, et il se félicitera toujours de la pleine lumière qui sera répandue sur ses décisions. Il prendra sa responsabilité comme vous prendrez la vôtre, et je suis sûr que la France pacifique et républicaine, grandie par l'universelle confiance qu'elle inspire et par les amitiés qu'elle sait conquérir, n'aura jamais rien à en regretter.

Inclosure 2 in No. 54.

Extract from the "Journal Officiel" of January 29, 1908.

M. Jaurès.—Je disais l'autre jour, M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, que la diplomatie Française—ou tout au moins une partie de la diplomatie Française—n'avait pas toujours eu à l'égard de Moulay Hafid cette attitude et ces sentiments.

Il y a eu une période où vous le considériez comme un ennemi des Européens moins farouche, et où, devant les combinaisons possibles d'Abd-el-Aziz, il apparaissait à quelques-uns de vos diplomates que Moulay Hafid pouvait être pour la France une réserve. Je me référais pour cela à quelques lettres de la fin de la vie du Dr. Mauchamp.

Ces lettres, Messieurs, je n'en ai pas exagéré et je n'en exagère pas l'importance ; elles ne sont qu'un élément accessoire dans ma discussion ; mais je vais en donner très simplement lecture à la Chambre, après les avoir communiquées à M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères :—

"Mon cher ami, "*Gibraltar*, 1er *Janvier*, 1907.

"Deux mots rapides en passant pour vous apporter mes meilleurs vœux de bonne et heureuse année et pour vous annoncer que vous pouvez donner à notre ami . . . ."—la suite des lettres vous montrera, Messieurs, que c'est Moulay Hafid—". . . . . l'assurance que tout va bien pour lui. J'ai déjà préparé les choses ; à Tanger, excellent accueil. Je vais achever l'affaire à Paris. C'est en excellente voie."

Autre lettre :

"Mon cher ami, "*Paris*, 22 *Janvier*, 1907.

"Je ne suis pas évaporé complètement, comme pouvait vous le laisser supposer mon silence depuis Tanger, au contraire ; j'ai travaillé ferme pour notre ami, et avec tous les rendez-vous et les conversations j'ai été si bien absorbé que je n'ai pas trouvé le temps de vous écrire . . . ."—le Dr. Mauchamp écrit à un Arabisant qui, à Marrakech, lui servait d'interprète auprès de Moulay Hafid—". . . . je suis tout à fait satisfait de mes démarches, et c'est le plein succès après la satisfaction de Tanger. J'ai obtenu ici ce que j'attendais du Ministre. . . . ."

M. Stéphen Pichon (Ministre des Affaires Étrangères).—Pas de moi !

M. Jaurès.—M. le Ministre, je vous ai communiqué ces lettres. Je ne puis me porter garant de l'exactitude de détails des lettres de M. le Dr. Mauchamp. Il se peut que par "le Ministre," il entende, non la personne, mais le Cabinet du Ministre.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—Je ne l'ai jamais vu.

M. Jaurès.—Vous verrez tout à l'heure—et vous le savez—qu'il y a eu, dans tous les cas, une intervention de fait du Ministère.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—Je vous ai dit pourquoi ; cela ne se rapporte en rien à des affaires politiques. Vous le savez, je vous l'ai dit.

M. Jaurès.—Si vous voulez, nous commenterons ces lettres . . . (*Interruptions à droite.*)

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Il me paraît difficile que nous établissons, M. le Ministre et moi, un commentaire contradictoire sur ces lettres, tant que je n'en aurai pas donné complètement lecture. (*Très bien ! très bien ! à l'Extrême Gauche et à Gauche. Lisez !*)

Je reprends: "Je suis tout à fait satisfait de mes démarches, et c'est le plein succès. Après les satisfactions de Tanger j'ai obtenu ici ce que j'attendais du Ministre à qui j'ai dit que l'affaire Lassalas était entièrement terminée, tous les coupables arrêtés. J'espère que l'événement ne viendra pas démentir mes affirmations. Vous pouvez déjà dire à notre ami que dès à présent il peut être entièrement rassuré pour sa personne et ses biens; on n'y touchera pas. Vous comprenez que je ne puisse préciser davantage par lettre. Dans un avenir qu'il ne dépend que de notre ami de rendre plus prochain, par la réalisation de quelques garanties que j'indiquerai, sa situation sera encore plus définitivement et plus clairement protégée sans que personne puisse soupçonner cette situation. Il a déjà dû recevoir de Tanger une lettre officielle où on lui dit qu'on n'oubliera pas les services rendus. On ne pouvait insister plus clairement par lettre ; mais il a compris ce que cela voulait dire. En outre je suis chargé par Paris de lui choisir un cadeau de la part du Ministre . . . ." (*Mouvements divers.*)

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—Ce n'est pas de moi qu'il s'agit. (*A l'Extrême Gauche. Lisez ! Lisez !*)

M. Jaurès.—"C'est un superbe tapis de Beauvais, qui lui sera remis discrètement, sans qu'on connaisse la provenance. Je suis chargé de le lui remettre, ce sera un gage d'entente. Vous pouvez dire tout cela dès maintenant, j'apporterai de vive voix toutes les précisions nécessaires."

Puis, Messieurs, une nouvelle lettre de Chalon-sur-Saône cette fois, datée du 6 Février, 1907. La voici :

"Vous avez dû recevoir ma lettre il y a douze jours environ, où je vous annonçais que j'avais obtenu toutes les satisfactions demandées par notre ami et que je lui porte un présent de notre Ministre, deux superbes tapis qui ont été exposés à l'exposition de Saint-Louis. . . . ."

Et voici les dernières lignes :

"Vous le ferez porter vous-même et vous lui rappellerez que c'est le Gouvernement Français qui lui offre cela lui-même et que ces sortes de tapis ne se trouvent point dans le commerce . . . ." (*Exclamations ironiques sur divers bancs.*)

M. Allemane.—Il fait valoir son cadeau !

M. Jaurès.—". . . . mais sont généralement envoyés en cadeau aux Souverains et aux grands personnages."

Mais j'ai déjà dit à M. le Ministre et j'ai dit à la Chambre que je ne forçais pas le sens de cette démarche et de son résultat. Pour qui connaît cependant les habitudes de l'Orient, où les cadeaux envoyés de Gouvernement à Gouvernement et à personnages sont une marque de bienveillance et le signe d'engagements réciproques, la chose a un peu plus de valeur que vous ne le prétendez.

[3276] No. 55.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey—(*Received January* 30.)

(No. 23.)
Sir, *Tangier, January* 24, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to report that, in accordance with the Regulations communicated to you in Sir G. Lowther's despatches Nos. 181 and 188 of the 9th and 15th June last, the Spanish, Portuguese, Russian, British, and French Legations have to nominate Delegates to form the "Comité Spécial des Travaux Publics," and the Austrian and Netherland Legations appoint those on the "Commission Générale," the "Délégués Suppléants," if required, being nominated by Belgium, Germany, and Italy in turn. The United States abstains from appointing Delegates to either Committee.

At the meeting of the Diplomatic Body held on the 8th June, it was decided "les Délégués Titulaires ou Suppléants devront appartenir à la carrière Diplomatique ou Consulaire. Chaque Chef de Mission aura le droit de désigner un Délégué pris parmi les Agents d'une autre Mission." By virtue of this arrangement the Portuguese Minister, who has at present no Diplomatic or Consular officer at his Legation, has expressed the desire to appoint a member of this Legation as Portuguese Delegate, leaving to me the choice of the person to be appointed.

I have informed Count Martens-Ferrão that I would refer to you for instructions. Subject to your approval, I propose to appoint Mr. Russell as British, and suggest Mr. Rattigan as Portuguese, Delegate on the "Comité Spécial."

As it is desired that the appointments should be made as soon as possible, I should be grateful if instructions could be conveyed to me by telegraph.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

[3382] No. 56.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey. – (*Received January* 31.)

(No. 50.)
Sir, *Paris, January* 30, 1908.

M. PICHON told me yesterday that the German Government have agreed to the French proposal that the conclusions of the German Commission on German Claims at Casa Blanca shall be subject to revision by the International Commission.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[3276] No. 57.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. White.

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Foreign Office, January* 31, 1908.

YOUR despatch No. 23 of the 24th January: Appointments to the Public Works Committee.

Both appointments approved.

[3476] No. 58.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 1.)

(No. 24. Confidential.)
Sir, *Tangier, January* 25, 1908.

I HAVE heard privately, from a well-informed source at Rabat, that the Sultan is very anxious as to the policy the French Government may decide to adopt in view of the Proclamation of Mulai Hafid at Fez and Mequinez and in the greater part of the interior, as His Majesty realizes that it will be practically impossible for him to stand against the movement without material assistance from France in addition to the moral help lent to his cause by the refusal of the European Powers to recognize Mulai Hafid.

When the news of the proclamation at Fez first reached the Sultan, His Majesty requested M. Gaillard, the French Consul at Fez, who is at present kept by his Government at Rabat, to express to his Government His Majesty's hopes that M. Regnault would return at once to Rabat, and also that the French Government would send an expedition to Fez. His Majesty was, I understand, prepared to put forward the request formally in writing, if he was assured that it would be formally received by the French Government.

No reply has yet been received to this request, and none will, I believe, be sent, an expedition to Fez not entering in any way—in the present position of affairs, at any rate—into the plans of the French Government. Steps are, however, being taken to reassure the Sultan, who was much perturbed by a recent leading article in the "Temps" advocating neutrality in regard to the claim of Mulai Hafid to the throne, and considers that it would be most unjust that he should receive no assistance to crush this movement, which has been brought about by his own loyalty towards the Act of Algeciras and desire to be on good terms with France. His Majesty will doubtless be still further alarmed when he learns the statements recently made by M. Clemenceau on the subject to a reporter of the "Matin." It will, I believe, be explained to His Majesty that, though the French Government must maintain theoretically a position of neutrality in this matter, the steps they will take for the purpose ostensibly of maintaining order at the ports will practically amount to upholding His Majesty. The need of His Majesty for financial assistance will also be met by advances of money, though

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there may be difficulty at present in negotiating a loan. How far these assurances will reassure the Sultan it is difficult to say. There is a rumour current here that some of the Sultan's advisers are endeavouring to persuade His Majesty that he will receive no assistance from the French, who are merely advancing into the interior of the country in their own interests, and thereby rendering His Majesty's cause more unpopular, and are recommending an appeal to Europe, through the German Legation, against the action taken by the French troops beyond the limits laid down in the Act of Algeciras.

The French Chargé d'Affaires informed me confidentially this morning that he had heard that the German Minister had reported to his Government to this effect. He added that he had made inquiries both here and at Rabat, but could obtain no confirmation of this rumour, and attached no credence to it. I told Count Sainte-Aulaire that the news I had received from Rabat in no way confirmed this report, but, on the contrary, was to the effect that the Sultan looked to France for support and approved of the action taken by the French troops. It is, however, possible that some of the Viziers, who have valuable property at Fez, and who, I am informed, are themselves much alarmed and keep His Majesty in a perpetual state of fear, may be carrying on some intrigues.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. E. WHITE.

[3477] No. 59.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 25.) *Tangier, January 26, 1908.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of events based on news received during the past week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 59.

Summary of Events in Morocco during the past week.

NO development of importance has taken place in the situation during the past week. It appears, however, that reinforcements have been telegraphed for by General d'Amade, and that a financial adviser has been placed with the Sultan at Rabat. Commandant Farrian, of the French Military Mission, is holding this appointment pending the arrival of a civil official. This officer is also given control of all the troops and their payment.

Further arrests have been made by the French military authorities, including those of four of the principal instigators of the recent troubles, but none of the actual murderers appears to have been caught.

It is reported that during the fighting round Settatt the Moors lost about 150 killed and 200 wounded. The French force reached Bershid at 1 A.M. on the 15th after twenty-six hours of marching and fighting. The distance covered was about 26 miles, and the engagement lasted ten hours. General d'Amade, after returning to Casa Blanca on the 19th, left again on the 21st with a column, taking also the military balloon. Mr. Madden learns that the General is now between Fedalla and Buznekka, and that the troops are making a military demonstration with a view to clear the district. There are 1,500 troops left at Casa Blanca, and Bershid, Mediuna, Fedalla, Buznekka, and Satcherat-el-Kronfel are all occupied by columns, the last place being about 19 miles from Rabat.

Commerce, which had become brisk after the taking of Mediuna, has ceased since the Battle of Settatt, owing to the French commandeering all camels for transport purposes.

At Mogador tranquillity again prevails, fighting having suddenly ceased on the 20th ultimo, owing, apparently, to the fact that the rebel army had received orders to suspend hostilities pending the arrival of Mulai Hafid. This restoration of tranquillity has been followed by a revival of commerce.

Captain Massoutier, of the French artillery, arrived at Mogador on the 15th for

the purpose of organizing the police. This news was received by the native population with complete indifference, but it appears that Kaïd Anflus has warned the Governor, Bel Ghazi, that he will not tolerate the organization of the police by the French at Mogador, and his attitude is affording grave cause for anxiety to the French, and it is stated that he has again threatened to throw in his lot with Mulai Hafid. The French Consul at Mogador is of opinion that the Kaïd could clear the whole district of the Hafidists, but that nothing will induce him to take the offensive.

Mr. Nairn, a Scotch missionary, who has returned to Mogador from a visit to Marakesh, reports that all is quiet in the southern capital. The population appears to have taken the occupation of Mediuna very philosophically—news of the defeat at Settatt had not then reached the city—and showed very little depression. The majority do not seem to be in a fighting mood, and on his way back Mr. Nairn met scores of deserters from Mulai Chaffa's mehalla.

Mr. Consular Agent Lennox has received news of a later date than that supplied by Mr. Nairn with regard to the situation at Marakesh. He is informed that considerable enthusiasm is being shown in regard to the holy war, but it is apparently considered to be directed rather against the French than against Christians in general. Big meetings are being held in the houses of rich Moors, who are equipping with arms and money those going to the front. On the 19th the holy war was still being shouted by criers, who are followed by crowds of boys cursing the Christians. Mulai Hafid is reported to be at Sok-el-Arbaa, in Rehamna, about sixteen hours from Mazagan, where the well-to-do Moors appear to still hope that the Great Powers will intervene in his favour.

From Rabat Mr. Neroutsos reports that the Spanish Mission is delaying its departure with a view to obtaining the nomination of a Commission to fix the locality of Santa Cruz de Mar Pequena.

Mulai Mehammed, elder brother of the Sultan, is reported to have been appointed Khalifa, and it is stated that an army is to be sent under his command into Showia. This is regarded as a dangerous step on the part of the Sultan, as Mulai Mehammed formerly enjoyed the greatest popularity, and may seize the opportunity to create a party for himself. It would certainly appear somewhat unlikely that he should entertain no feelings of resentment towards his younger brother, who has kept him imprisoned for so long.

News has been received from Fez that Ben Dowd and the fanatical Shereef El Kittani are stirring up the people to sack the houses of the Tazzi and other officials of the late Government, and are causing much anxiety to Mulai Hafid's Viceroy. The Government are evidently in straits for money, and are resorting to any means to obtain it. They are making appeals for loans, and have compelled Fez merchants to change sums of obsolete copper coinage for silver, under promise of repayment when funds are available.

It must not be lost sight of that the situation in the south, as described above, was that existing prior to the receipt of the news of Mulai Hafid's proclamation at Fez. This news must now have reached Marakesh and the southern ports, and there is no doubt that it will increase Mulai Hafid's prestige with the tribes to a very considerable extent.

(Initialled) F. R.

[3478] No. 60.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.— (Received February 1.)

(No. 26.) *Tangier, January 27, 1908.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a letter from a Mr. Nairn, a missionary, describing a visit recently paid by him to Morocco city.

This letter, which I have received through His Majesty's Consul at Casa Blanca, is of interest as affording some information on the condition of affairs in a district concerning which reports have of late been scarce and unreliable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. WHITE.

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Inclosure in No. 60.

Rev. C. Nairn to Consul Madden.

Mogador, January 20, 1908.

Dear Mr. Madden,

MY object first of all in going to Marrakesh was to put matters there in connection with our various houses on a more satisfactory basis. Our very hurried exit in August last made this impossible then. Apart from this. I wished to satisfy myself that it was unwise to think of resuming work under present circumstances. Short as my stay was, I accomplished all I wished to do.

Going and coming I was accompanied by only one man, a local muleteer. We were without arms of any kind, and, though in native dress, I was well known by the way. I found the road perfectly quiet and safe, and the natives as agreeable and civil as at any other time. Ploughing was much more in their minds than fighting, and I think I may safely say the area under cultivation is in most districts greater than usual. I noticed that the district formerly held by El Menebhi, about six hours from Marrakesh, was almost all unploughed. With this exception the outlook was encouraging. Even as I passed every man who could muster a yoke was busy.

On my return journey I passed through locusts for about 6 miles, within two or three hours from Mogador.

I entered Marrakesh during a thunderstorm, so had a good chance for passing along unobserved. My Moorish friends were surprised to see me, and most strongly advised me not to move about without an escort. They assured me that the town was absolutely quiet, but they dreaded the thought of any annoyance for me from some fanatic or other. I readily complied with their wishes and refrained from moving out by day. The Sub-Governor called to see me, and said that the Basha had heard of my arrival, and wished to see me. It was rather a disappointment for them that I had not come with letters from our officials. They thought my arrival was a sign of the British Government's willingness to acknowledge "El Hafid." I said our Government did not wish any quarrel with this country, and because of the disturbed state of things they did not wish any of us in Marrakesh presently. I had simply come without permission, and therefore I did not wish to call upon any official. Latterly, however, I agreed to look in upon the Basha for a few minutes, so this satisfied the Sub-Governor. I then took the liberty of talking plainly to him about the desecration of the European cemetery. I said that it was an international place, and if Mulai-el-Hafid wished to gain favour with the various nations the least he could do was to order the restoration of what had been destroyed there. On minute inquiry I think we may safely conclude that Mr. Bonich's coffin was not disturbed. The door was burned down and a hole dug over this grave, and also in the former site of Mrs. Muir's grave, but nothing more. One of our servants reported the burning of the door to a friend who has influence in official quarters. He at once went to the Sub-Governor, who sent off soldiers to investigate the matter. Some people who live in huts near by were threatened for allowing the outrage to take place, and made responsible for its not being repeated. Since then the people know that anything they do to the place will be punished by the authorities. I appealed to the Sub-Governor to replace the door, even out of his own pocket if necessary, for the sake of his own reputation. He promised faithfully to get it done at once, but, I fear, got no further.

Escorted by two soldiers I visited the Basha one night after sunset. He seemed very pleased to see me, offered to do anything he could for me, &c. I was most careful to say nothing which might lead him to think I was in sympathy with, or in favour of, the Hafidy movement.

After being there for three days I came to the conclusion that, while I might be able to live quite safely in seclusion, I could not do any real work, so I made up my mind to leave as soon as possible. I made out an inventory of our belongings in our various houses, and arranged for their being looked after, &c., and then took my departure. I arrived in Marrakesh on the 4th and left again on the 9th. During those days in Marrakesh news began to filter in about ongoings in Showiah. First it was said a messenger had come from the camp there with a verbal message to Mulai Hafid; something that could not be written. Next day it was said that Wold Mulai-er-Rashid had written saying that if Mulai Hafid did not come to his help at once; he wished to retire, and go to Tafilelt. A day later the report was that the French had taken Mediuna. Great preparations had been made for Mulai-el-Hafid to celebrate the Ram Feast at Tazart, and El Glawi was to entertain the whole army for a week at

that place. The Showiah news upset their plans, and it was said the army was moving there at once.

To condense the various impressions I received while there I would say that, apart from a few who are deeply committed to the existing Government, or benefited by it, there is little real genuine satisfaction in the hearts of the people. They are afraid of something, yet hardly know what. Mulai Hafid has not realized their expectations, and as one put it, "He is only bent on amusements." Everybody believes El Glawi is the prime mover, in fact, "he is the Makhzen." I question if any other of the old Kaïds is really pro-Hafid. In the city things are cheap, quietness reigns, but justice is at a low ebb. The days of the old Governor El Warzazi are recalled sadly. I fear money has now become the only evidence of right in a lawsuit.

Questioned by some as to the French intentions, I said I believed they meant to re-establish Mulai Abd-el-Aziz firmly on the throne. But few, if any, think for a moment that the other Powers will permit the French to subjugate the country with French soldiery for El Aziz. Only one man, however, waxed furious at this thought. He declared that he would be the first to die in resisting them. As I looked at his burly form I thought in all likelihood he would stop a bullet if he were there. Two things I was told rather interested me. It was said that the answer the Hafidy Envoys received in London was pronounced a very correct one by El Hafid. They were asked if they brought the signature of his acceptance by the Moorish and British Representatives in Tangier. As they had not done so, they were told our Government could not recognize nor receive them. Mulai-el-Hafid said this was a proper answer, and could not be found fault with. Another thing was that, but for his Proclamation in August, Marrakesh would certainly have been looted. I had not thought of this before, but I believe it is true. At that time Casa Blanca news had just permeated the town and tribes, and feelings were hot enough for mischief. His Proclamation focussed the minds of all, and the presence of a Government was at once recognized. Should his Government come to smash now, I fear Marrakesh may have a trying time of it yet.

I found the Mellah almost empty so far as well-to-do Jews go, yet I could not find that the Jews were molested, if they removed their shoes in the town. I fully verified the fact that Mulai-el-Hafid gave prompt orders to the contrary when he learned that a house which the Basha wished to seize was in our hands. I do not know of any conscious anti-European action on his part, but it is reported truly, I think, that the very day I left the city public proclamation of the Holy War against "the French," not against "the Christians," was made by his express orders. Time will reveal if the people are ready with a hearty response. Certainly he would have got it six months ago.

I am, &c.
(Signed) C. NAIRN.

P.SS.—I did not hear an uncivil word nor notice an antagonistic look neither by the way nor in the city.

C. N.

I have omitted to say that a friend told me the Basha had written to Mulai Hafid in his camp outside, saying that I was in the city. He also hinted to me that it might lead to an invitation for me to go there—an invitation I might have difficulty in refusing. He suggested that if I really wished to get away I had better go before the reply to the Basha's letter arrived. I had already arranged to leave on the 9th, and the reply came on that date, but after I was far on the way. The nature of the reply, however, I do not know. I was quite aware that my visit to Marrakesh might vex you. I did not go there seeking adventure nor notoriety, but simply from a strong sense of duty. Having satisfied myself, I was as anxious as you can be to avoid anything and everything that might lead to complications; and I must wait on the coast until we are able to reside again in Morocco city.

C. N.

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[3661] No. 61.

Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 42.)
Sir, *Berlin, January 29, 1908.*

M. DELCASSÉ'S speech has produced curiously little comment in the German press. Indeed, the only paper which contains any remarks worthy of record is the "Kölnische Zeitung." This journal prints a communication from Berlin which, it appears, is derived from official sources, and is therefore of interest, as it represents the view which the Government wish to be considered as theirs in regard to the late Minister for Foreign Affairs' speech. It states that it would have been better not to have stirred up old antagonisms, especially as the Moorish question cannot yet be looked at with the calm judgment of history. It is still in the forefront of public interest. This question may still be the cause of many exchanges of views between Germany and France, and matters will not be facilitated if a statesman of the reputation of M. Delcassé strikes chords of a distinctly Chauvinist tone with the applause of the Chamber. The approval with which his hearers greeted M. Delcassé's speech confirms the views of those who hold that cleverly enunciated Chauvinism invariably has an effect upon a French audience. M. Delcassé's arguments are, according to the communiqué, in many respects incomprehensible and unsupported by facts. As is well known, he was obliged to resign because the Chamber would not follow in a policy which seemed to it questionable, adventurous, and dangerous. M. Delcassé now says that these misgivings were unjustifiable, as Germany would never have dared to attack France, strengthened as she was by alliances and friendships.

Such seems to be the view which the Government wish to be held on M. Delcassé's speech. The communiqué then goes on to administer a warning to France by repeating the words of Prince Bülow in one of his speeches on the Morocco affair. His Serene Highness said that on two occasions Germany had found herself in a situation which threatened danger. Germany would no more have made war upon France over Morocco than over the Hohenzollern candidature for the Spanish throne in 1870. But Morocco, like the other question, might be an occasion for defending Germany's honour, prestige, and position in the world.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANK C. LASCELLES.

[3813] No. 62.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 7.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, February 3, 1908.*

RAISULI has informed me that he will bring in Maclean this evening.

I propose to draw bill on the Chief Clerk for the amount of indemnity, 5,000*l.* for payment to Raisuli, and 15,000*l.* for deposit at interest at the State Bank.

[3813] No. 63.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. White.

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 3, 1908.*

RELEASE of Kaïd Maclean.

You are authorized to act as proposed in your telegram No. 7 of the 3rd instant.

Please report exact nature of arrangements and any payments required in addition to indemnity.

[3866] No. 64.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 20.)
Sir, *Madrid, January 31, 1908.*

THE Spanish newspapers report that the defeated Imperial Mehalla, numbering about 1,000 besides camp followers, which has been encamped for some time on the

spit of land separating the Mar Chica from the Mediterranean, migrated the day before yesterday to a place prepared for it within the town of Melilla. Precautions were taken against a surprise from the Roghi's followers, who watched the movements of the Mehalla from a distance. The Sultan's soldiers appear to have arrived in a very tattered and forlorn condition. Considerable expense will be incurred in feeding them, and the Spanish Government desires to get them transported to Tangier as soon as vessels can be procured for the purpose.

Señor Allendesalazar is not very definite in his replies to the inquiries which I and some of my colleagues have made as to the intentions of the Spanish Government in regard to the military occupation of the vacated tongue of land. I gather that they would like to keep the Roghi's adherents away from it, but do not wish to make a military movement unless compelled to do so.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[3970] No. 65.

Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 48.)
Sir, *Berlin, February 2, 1908.*

IN the issue of the "North German Gazette" published last night, a semi-official communiqué is published, dated the 31st ultimo, in regard to the arrangements between France and Germany respecting the International Indemnity Commission at Casa Blanca, translation of which I have the honour to inclose.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANK C. LASCELLES.

Inclosure in No. 65.

Extract from the "North German Gazette" of February 1, 1908.

(Translation.)

THE announcements in the Parisian press concerning an arrangement between Germany and France with regard to the International Compensation Commission at Casa Blanca, are based on the following:—

It is arranged that the assessments of damages already made by the German Commission at Casa Blanca, for the purpose of apportioning the Imperial grants, should be tested by the International Commission, as to whether they correspond, in the calculations of damages, to the principles laid down by Germany in accordance with the other Powers involved. Only if, and in so far as, these principles have not been observed in individual cases, will a new assessment be made. Moreover, France and Spain have undertaken, as far as it is in their power, to be responsible for the serious consideration of the assessments made by Germany and other States.

Berlin, January 30, 1908.

[4011] No. 66.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 9.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, February 4, 1908.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 8 of to-day.* Having left Kaïd Maclean in Beni M'sour with Raisuli and a large number of tribesmen, the Consular Agent at Alcazar, who reports Maclean to be in good health, returned this evening. Beni M'sour is about six hours distant from here. Raisuli sent a letter by his brother, who accompanied Consular Agent. He requires modifications of terms, some of which I do not consider acceptable, as they would affect our control over the sum deposited. I am to discuss matter with Raisuli's brother to-morrow morning, and as I fear that if we show weakness there will be a succession of fresh demands, I propose, at first at any rate, to insist that conditions as already accepted by Raisuli be maintained.

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* Not printed.

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[4205] No. 67.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 7.)

Tangier, February 7, 1908.

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

RAISULI has just brought in Maclean, and surrendered him; he is in good health.

[4711] No. 68.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

Foreign Office, February 7, 1908.

(No. 19.)

Sir,

I HAD some further conversation with the Spanish Ambassador to-day on the subject of Morocco.

He explained to me that some time ago the Germans had represented to him that, after the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 was made, Spain would get on very well with France as long as she had German support, by which she could be backed in differences with France, and that, as England was coming to terms with France, England would naturally take the French side, and Spain would not get such effective support from her as she could get from Germany.

The Ambassador told me that he had considered that the relations of Spain with France could not be comfortable if Spain was backed by any one who was on bad terms with France, and he had, therefore, preferred the present situation.

I said I thought Spain was much safer under the present arrangement. The result of the Algeciras Conference had been that she and France were now two partners in a special position in Morocco. It was much better for her to be thus in Morocco with a partner with whom she had a satisfactory Secret Agreement than to have other Powers, with whom she had no arrangement, brought into Morocco.

As far as we were concerned, our only desire was to see things work smoothly between Spain and France. We had no other object in view, and there was no price to pay for our friendship.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. GREY.

[4516] No. 69.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

Madrid, February 8, 1908.

(No. 6.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

MOROCCO. The measures which it may be necessary to take to secure the safety of the maritime towns of Morocco are at present being discussed between the French Ambassador and the Spanish Government. The authority of Abd-el-Aziz seems to be nearing its end; he has exhausted his resources and can raise no more money in Paris. M. Révoil fears grave difficulty may arise over the question of the chief command at Tangier, as the Spanish Government are still persisting in their claim that Spain must take the lead in that town.

[4615] No. 70.

List of Heads of Foreign Missions at Tangier, 1908.

[Reprinted from Inclosure in Mr. G. Lowther's despatch No. 85 of the 13th May, 1906, with additions and corrections supplied in Sir G. Lowther's Annual Report of the 20th January, 1908.]

COUNT KOZIEBRODZKI is the *Austro-Hungarian* Minister. I have been privileged with the previous acquaintance of this somewhat irascible young diplomatist, who, I believe, has succeeded in making himself generally disliked in all his posts. Of exceedingly violent temper, he does not hesitate to lay hands upon native servants and

others who provoke him, and it remains a wonder to us all that he has not yet met with retaliatory measures.

Increasing age and transfer to a post where he might have more interests to watch might possibly produce a sobering influence upon him, but the severe reprimand he received at the recent Conference at the hands of Marquis Visconti Venosta did not have the anticipated effect. He is distinctly unpopular, is married to an extremely quiet German lady of good family, but with insufficient strength of character to check the violent outbursts to which he is prone.

Count de Buisseret, the *Belgian* Minister, I have known in several posts during his career. Keenly intelligent and quick-witted, his usefulness is somewhat marred by an extremely nervous temperament, which at times provokes him to great obstinacy in the meetings of the Diplomatic Body, of the Conseil Sanitaire, and of the Light-house Commission. He takes much interest in promoting Belgian trade here, and his labours have been rewarded by seeing a recent advance in that direction. He is married to an American lady from Washington.

He has been on a mission to Fez, and his success was limited, it is said, to obtaining from the Sultan the use of a piece of ground for playing polo here. He is also convinced that his recent services at Algeciras entitle him to promotion.

M. Regnault, the new *French* Minister, entered the service in 1883, and has been mostly employed in Tunis and latterly in Switzerland; but in 1904 he represented the French bondholders in this country, and accompanied M. Saint-René Taillandier on the mission to Fez.

A simple *bourgeois*, he is somewhat superior to the modern type of French diplomatist. Of untiring energy and activity, he brings to bear on the great variety of subjects now dealt with here a technical knowledge seldom at the command of a diplomat *de carrière*; and during the very numerous meetings held here for the construction of the "Règlements," the outcome of the Act of Algeciras, he displayed a considerable power of clearly exposing his views with fairness and moderation. Of admirable temper and free from all excitability, he generally produced a better impression on the meetings than his more nervous, though more learned, German colleague.

M. Regnault has some reputation as a financier, and was employed as an expert at Algeciras, eventually signing the Act as one of the Delegates. On his recent visit to the Court he seems to have created as good an impression as was possible on the Sultan. Although entirely lacking the suave manners of a diplomatist of the Courts of Europe, he yet generally has succeeded in acquiring a certain measure of popularity and reputation for straightforwardness amongst his colleagues with the exception of the German Minister, with whom his relations are far from cordial. Personally I have found him a colleague with whom it is easy to work.

M. Regnault is under 50 years of age, and it is probable that he will be called to higher functions in the service of his country. He is married, and has a large family of daughters.

Dr. Rosen, the *German* Minister, is the true type of intelligent and learned German *bourgeois*, his good manners being rather more forced than natural. The son of George Rosen, one of the greatest German Orientalists, who was for many years Consul-General at Jerusalem, he spent his boyhood in Palestine, where he learnt Arabic as his mother-tongue.

In 1885–86 he accompanied the present Lord Dufferin as tutor to India, and I believe that the high opinion that the late Lord Dufferin formed of his talents induced him to recommend Dr. Rosen to the notice of Bismarck.

Dr. Rosen's great knowledge of the Persian language and a journey he made through Persia from India led to his employment as first dragoman at the German Legation in Tehran, where he remained for some years, and took charge of the Legation during the Minister's absence.

For the last few years he has been Director of the Oriental section of the German Foreign Office, and also conducted a recent mission to Abyssinia. Last summer he was sent to Paris to negotiate the preliminaries of the Conference at Algeciras. He has a thorough knowledge of English and French, and always expresses himself with great admiration for English institutions and for our rule in India. He always endeavours to give the impression that his attitude is an extremely moderate and conciliatory one, but he will nevertheless, I am convinced, prove a dangerous opponent to any energetic policy on the part of the French here. His manner is one that is likely to appeal to the Sultan and the Moors. He does not conceal his disapproval of the action of his predecessor, Count Tattenbach. My relations with him are very pleasant. He is married to a

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Mme Roche, half-English and half-French, but educated in England. He has taken rather a dislike to his post, perhaps feeling that the rôle he will be called upon to fill is not so active a one as he anticipated.

Dr. Nerazzini has replaced M. Malmusi at the *Italian* Legation. Dr. Nerazzini was previously Consul-General at Shanghae. He began life as a doctor in the navy, and accompanied the Duke of the Abruzzi on some of his travels. He also received some credit from his Government for effecting successfully the negotiations for the exchange of the prisoners after the Abyssinian war. His conversation is mainly centred on narrating his political triumphs in Abyssinia, and his energies here seem to have been directed to discovering facts to the discredit of his predecessor, more especially in connection with a letter handed to M. Malmusi by the Sultan at Fez containing certain reserves in His Majesty's acceptance of the Algeciras Act, and which documents M. Malmusi suppressed for some time. It is in connection with this incident that M. Malmusi is said to now have been placed *en disponibilité*.

Dr. Nerazzini lives in an extremly modest, not to say slovenly, style, and makes no attempt at extending hospitality of any kind either to his colleagues or to the Italian colony. His principal desire appears to be directed to obtaining a speedy transfer; but in the meantime his policy is certainly not in support of French interests, in spite of his protestations to the contrary to the French Legation.

The *Netherland* Minister is the Chevalier de Rappard. Holland had for many years been represented here by Germany, and it has never very clearly appeared why that country was not satisfied to allow that condition of affairs to continue. The interests of Holland in Morocco are practically nil. The only persons with any claim to Dutch nationality are a family of some thirty persons of Jewish persuasion, who have only been brought into daylight by the attentions shown to them by the new Minister.

M. de Rappard is a man of some 42 years, of considerable energy, a good linguist, and with a desire to be extremely impartial; but his sympathy for Germany, where he has spent some years of his previous career, is apt at times to predominate. He followed with great care and attention the discussions of the Diplomatic Corps for the construction of the "Règlements" arising out of the Act of Algeciras last winter, and was often most useful in finding a formula to satisfy all parties.

In order to justify to some extent his appointment, he is anxious to push Dutch trade, and is a frequent visitor at the local grocers' establishments endeavouring to introduce curaçao and other Dutch delicacies into the local markets.

Assisted by a wealthy but somewhat unpolished wife, he dispenses considerable hospitality here. He has no business with Moorish officials and is popular with them.

Count Martens Ferrão, the *Portuguese* Minister, both to appearance and to the position he occupies, somewhat resembles his colleague in London, M. de Soveral. Having no axe to grind, and practically no interests to safeguard, he rarely finds himself in disagreement with his colleagues, with all of whom he is on the best of terms. Married to an Italian lady with private means, he entertains to a considerable extent. He has never been to Fez, and has practically nothing to do with the Moorish authorities. Having lately represented his Government at Algeciras as Second Delegate, he considers himself entitled to a higher post, and has now proceeded to Lisbon with a view to moving the powers that be in that direction.

M. Botkine has recently succeeded M. de Bacharacht (now Minister in Switzerland) as *Russian* Minister here, the post having for over a year been filled by M. Sabline as Chargé d'Affaires.

M. Botkine is younger than most Ministers in the Russian service, and has quite recently been promoted to the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary. He has previously been employed in Washington, Lisbon, Sophia, Brussels, and recently in London, and is married to a fashionable American lady. He has not until now developed any interest in the situation in Morocco, and declares that his Government is equally indifferent as regards the affairs of this country. But there are indications that his sympathies are more strongly French than those of his predecessor, and though not taking his duties very seriously, his support will evidently be unflinchingly thrown into the balance to favour the policy of France in Morocco.

M. Llaveria, the *Spanish* Minister, was my colleague in Chile, and there I enjoyed the most pleasant and cordial relations with him. Of very quiet and courteous manners, he always endeavours to be conciliatory. Straightforward and honest, though without any particular talent, he is devoted to his work. Unfortunately his health is most precarious, and his life is spent either in bed or at his desk, which he rarely leaves, being devoted to detail. He has a troublesome colony to manage, and so far has steered well

through his difficulties. He cannot be said to have much influence with Moorish officials, all Spaniards being, as is well known, despised by the people of this country. He is, unlike his colleagues, married to a countrywoman of his—the daughter of a former Spanish Minister here. He does not entertain, owing probably to the high prices ruling and to insufficient salary, and he is rarely seen outside his house.

Mr. Gummeré, the *United States'* Representative, was here for some years as Consul-General, and was last year raised to the rank of Envoy. Possessing only a very superficial knowledge of the French language and no acquaintance with any other except English, he does not take much interest in the deliberations of the Diplomatic Corps. His attention is occupied with questions of protection, and, unlike some of his predecessors, has avoided getting mixed up in doubtful transactions in this connection. He is a man of no special ability, and is unmarried.

[4616] No. 71.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 10.)

(No. 27.)

Sir, *Tangier, January* 31, 1908.

THE death is reported of Hamed Bulhaish, one of the family of brigands known as the "Valientes." He will be remembered, among other acts of outrage, for the part he played in the capture of two British officers in October 1905. Some account of the Bulhaish family is given in Sir G. Lowther's despatch to you No. 26 of this day year, and in his No. 56 of the 7th March is reported the death of Hamed's elder brother (see pp. 37 and 67 of "Affairs of Morocco," Part 32). Hamed Bulhaish, who was reputed the leader of the band, had not recently brought public attention upon himself. His death, however, removes a source of disorder in the district he inhabited, and of possible insecurity to Europeans. He is stated to have been killed in the neighbourhood of Tetuan by an adherent in a dispute consequent upon a division of booty.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

[4617] No. 72.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 10.)

(No. 28.)

Sir, *Tangier, February* 2, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Spanish Minister arrived at Tangier on his return from Rabat on the 29th ultimo, but, owing to rough weather, was not able to land till the following day.

I have not yet been able to see M. de Llaberia, who is suffering from the fatigues of his voyage, and nothing definite appears to be known as to the results achieved on his Mission, or even as to the matters treated of, a somewhat sensational list of which appeared in some Spanish papers. The First Secretary of the Spanish Legation, who remained in charge here during the absence of the Mission, professed his ignorance as to the nature of the negotiations at Rabat, the Minister, he said, having been in direct communication with his Government, telegrams and despatches not passing through the Legation.

So far as I have been able to gather, the proposal of the Spanish Minister that his Government should undertake to deal with the Pretender in the neighbourhood of Melilla, referred to in the concluding paragraph of Sir G. Lowther's despatch No. 481 of the 15th ultimo, would appear to have been accepted by the Sultan, as it is reported that Spanish troops will occupy Mar Chica; the Moorish troops hitherto operating in that district are to be shipped from Melilla to Tangier or Rabat. The Spanish Minister also put forward a claim for the expenses incurred in connection with the Moorish troops at Melilla, but I have not ascertained whether any definite settlement was arrived at. In any case, the Sultan would be unable, in the present state of his finances, to pay any considerable sum.

The old-standing question of Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña was again dealt with. This fishing station, formerly held by Spaniards, was ceded to Spain by the Treaty of 1860, and, after prolonged negotiations as to its situation, Ifni was selected as the place to be ceded (see Sir E. Hertslet's Memoranda of the 20th December, 1877, and of

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the 3rd December, 1888). The Spaniards, however, never obtained possession, but would now appear to desire to do so, as I am informed that M. Llaberia was negotiating with the Sultan as to the extent of the territory to be included in the cession.

Advantage was taken by M. Llaberia of his presence at the Court to endeavour to settle the pending claims of Spanish subjects, but I believe he has expressed himself as not very satisfied with his negotiations in this respect.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

[4619] No. 73.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 10.)

(No. 30.)

Tangier, February 3, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of events, based on information which has been received during the past week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 73.

Summary of Events in Morocco during the past week.

THE principal event of which the news has reached Tangier during the past week is the fighting that took place between the French troops and a body of Mdakras and other tribesmen on Wad Mellah on the 24th ultimo. The tribesmen were put to flight with some loss, but the punishment inflicted was not very severe, as the encircling movement of the French troops failed owing, it is said, to the Arabs having fled precipitately from their homes on catching sight of the military balloon in the distance.

Mr. Madden reports a rumour that an expedition would leave Casa Blanca shortly, its objective being Settat, where Mulai Hafid's adherents are collecting with a view to attacking the French at Bershid. There has also been some unrest in the district, a French convoy having been attacked between that place and Mediuna. The French Consul at Casa Blanca, however, stated that instructions were awaited before making any further forward movement. It is probable that the French Government postponed giving any instructions until the conclusion of the debate in the Chamber. The French troops in the Casa Blanca district now number about 12,000 men of all arms.

It is not thought at Casa Blanca that Mulai Hafid will himself cross the Umer Rabia River, on the banks of which he is at present encamped, at Meshra-esh-Shavi. He is probably unwilling to risk a defeat in person at the hands of the French, and will endeavour to reach Fez if possible without coming into collision with them, satisfying the ardour of some of his adherents for a Holy War by sending an expedition into Showia under one of his lieutenants.

In the meanwhile, the Holy War had been proclaimed in due form, and emissaries have been sent in all directions with letters calling upon the people to flock to the standard of Mulai Hafid to fight against the Christians and drive the French out of the country. It is difficult to ascertain the effect of these letters. Wild rumours are current among the Moors as to the large contingent that the various tribes are sending. There seems, however, little likelihood of the movement assuming really serious proportions. The lack of money is much felt by Mulai Hafid and his partisans, and without funds little can be done. Forced contributions are being levied in Marakesh, Fez, Mequinez, and other places on Mussulman and Jew, the loyalists and the families of the Sultan's Viziers and other officials being naturally those most to suffer. At Fez guards are placed on their houses nominally for their protection, but really to prevent any persons leaving or any goods being removed, and they are in constant fear that their houses will be looted.

Great uneasiness has been felt at Fez and at Mequinez, as it was believed that the French were about to march on those places to re-establish the Sultan's authority, in which case serious disorders were anticipated. Arms and ammunition have been distributed to the populace at Mequinez and Old Fez, but the Governor of New Fez

has resisted the pressure that has been brought to bear upon him, and has refused to give out the Government arms. A disorderly element has been let loose both at Mequinez and Old Fez by opening the doors of the prisons and setting all the prisoners free in honour of the proclamation of Mulai Hafid.

It is hoped, however, that when it is seen at Fez and at Mequinez that there is no intention of the French to march on those places the excitement may subside, though there is a party at Fez, headed by the Shereef-el-Kittani, who are believed to be doing all in their power to create disturbances, while the Viceroy, Mulai-el-Amrani, is endeavouring to maintain the peace, his action and that of the Governor of Fez having an excellent effect.

It is difficult to see what Mulai-el-Amrani's secret policy really is. He is certainly apparently swimming with the tide and pushing Mulai Hafid's cause, but it is quite possible that he may be at the same time also in secret correspondence with the Sultan, whose tutor he used to be. There is undoubtedly a party at Fez in favour of Mulai Abdul Aziz, and His Majesty entertains hopes that their secret negotiations with some of the tribes may bring about a movement in his favour.

The documents containing his proclamation at Fez has not yet been sent to Mulai Hafid, but that of his proclamation at Mequinez was sent on the 19th ultimo.

(Initialled) H. E. W.

[4774] No. 74.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 11.)

(No. 32.)

Tangier, February 5, 1908.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 21 of the 22nd ultimo, I have the honour to report that, upon the arrival at Tangier of the prisoners from Fez, I caused Raisuli to be informed that I was in a position to carry out the arrangement arrived at between himself and Sir G. Lowther for the release of Kaïd Sir H. Maclean. Translation of the document embodying the terms of this arrangement are transmitted herewith.

Raisuli replied that he was ready to carry out the agreement, but that thirteen of the prisoners on his original list were men for whom he could not be responsible, and therefore he desired to substitute others in their places. He further asked for the addition of six prisoners to the list of those to be released.

I made inquiries of the Moorish authorities in regard to the nineteen men on this new list, and found there was no reason why they should not be released. Most of them were put into prison merely as being friends of Raisuli, and nine of them had been sent for under promise of safe conduct and then seized. I accordingly asked Sir H. Maclean to inform Raisuli that I would accede to his request on the understanding that he would keep his word and send him into Tangier at once.

I beg leave to transmit herewith copies of two letters I then received from Raisuli, one addressed to Sir H. Maclean to be forwarded to me, and the other to Mr. Carleton, Consular Agent at Alcazar, who has throughout the negotiations been used as a medium of correspondence with Raisuli. In these letters Raisuli engaged to bring Sir H. Maclean to my house if I sent Mr. Carleton out to meet him.

I felt justified in running the risk of sending Mr. Carleton out as desired, as I did not think it at all probable that he would be made captive; the risks were, in fact, smaller than those incurred on previous occasions when the exchange of prisoners had been effected.

Mr. Carleton left early on the 3rd instant, but the Kaïd did not arrive on that evening as had been promised. Last night Mr. Carleton returned and informed me that a number of the Khamas and other tribesmen had accompanied Raisuli to the Beni M'sowr country, and that they would not allow Sir H. Maclean to leave their lands till their relatives in prison had been released. Mr. Carleton informed me that Raisuli had sent in his brother and his secretary, who were coming to see me in the morning, and he handed to me a letter which Raisuli had requested him to deliver. In these letters, translation of which is inclosed herewith, Raisuli stipulates that before he sends in Sir H. Maclean I should release all the prisoners and female servants and send him the 5,000*l.*, the certificate of protection, and the signed Agreement. He further stipulates that the monthly payment which he is to receive should be 50*l.* instead of 40*l.*, and that the 15,000*l.* should be deposited at Mr. Pariente's Bank under a deed to be drawn up by Moorish notaries; and, further, that the title-

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deeds of any properties he may decide to purchase with the whole or any portion of the 15,000*l.* should be deposited with his mother instead of at the Legation.

It seemed to me imperative to at once decline to entertain any discussion of the terms of arrangement which had been settled by Sir G. Lowther, and I requested Mr. Carleton to inform Raisuli's brother that I would see him in the morning, but that I could not accept any modification of the terms; that if Raisuli would not abide by those terms he might detain Sir H. Maclean in captivity, and the prisoners would not be released.

As a matter of fact, I was ready, if necessary, to give way on the point of the monthly payments. Sir G. Lowther had arranged with the Banque d'État to receive the 15,000*l.* on deposit, and pay interest on it at the rate of 4 per cent. per annum, which would amount to 50*l.* per month; but it is desirable to retain the balance of the interest for meeting various expenses incurred, such as 500 dollars for bringing prisoners from Fez, and therefore I held firm on this point, as well as on the others, when I met Raisuli's brother and Secretary this morning. Finding that it was useless to endeavour to extort further concessions, Raisuli's representatives agreed to abide by the original terms of settlement. A messenger has accordingly been sent out to Raisuli with two copies of the documents containing the terms signed by myself. It has been arranged that Raisuli should bring Sir H. Maclean to a village about 7 miles from Tangier, and should then send in the terms of agreement signed by himself. Upon receipt of this document I shall have the prisoners released, retaining Raisuli's brother and another important adherent of his as hostages. Raisuli will then bring in Sir H. Maclean and receive the 5,000*l.* and the certificate of protection, and have his female servants returned to him. I shall at the same time also deposit the 15,000*l.* at the Banque d'État, so that the interest may begin to run.

When dealing with a man of Raisuli's antecedents one can never be sure that no treachery is intended, but I think that in the present case he will feel it is in his own interests to carry out the arrangement, as he will not expect to obtain any better terms. The tribesmen are doubtless pressing for the release of their relatives, and I am not surprised at their refusing to allow Sir H. Maclean to leave till the prisoners have actually been released, especially as it would be contrary to the precedents established at the release of Mr. Harris and of Messrs. Perdicaris and Varley. On the other hand, Raisuli himself will obtain nothing until Sir H. Maclean is free, and his brother and another remain till then as hostages in our hands. It will therefore be in his interests to conclude the business as soon as possible, and I trust that Sir H. Maclean will be free within the next two days.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. WHITE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 74.

TERMS agreed upon by Sir G. Lowther and Muley Hamed Raisuli for the release of Sir Harry Maclean, and under which Muley Hamed Raisuli undertakes to hand him over to the above-named British Minister in Tangier or his representative.

1. BRITISH protection will be accorded to Muley Hamed Raisuli, also to his two wives, his four children, his three brothers, his sister, her husband, and their five sons, his nephew Sid Abdslam Kerouan, and his uncle Hossain, and the following members of his family (here follow nine names), as long as they remain of good conduct.

2. Muley Hamed Raisuli holds himself responsible for the future good behaviour of all the above-named.

3. The house owned by Muley Hamed Raisuli in Tangier will be returned to him.

4. Muley Hamed Raisuli will have full liberty to reside where he pleases, with the exception of Alcazar, Arzila, and Tetuan, but shall notify his place of residence to the British Minister.

5. Muley Hamed Raisuli's black women now at Fez shall be returned to him.

6. The prisoners on the list furnished by Muley Hamed Raisuli, and copy of which is annexed herewith, shall be released. Muley Hamed Raisuli renders himself responsible for the good behaviour of all these in the future.

7. Muley Hamed Raisuli shall receive at the moment of the release of Sir Harry

Maclean the sum of 5,000*l.* A further sum of 15,000*l.* shall be handed to Muley Hamed Raisuli at the expiration of ten years from the date of Sir Harry Maclean's release. In the meantime a sum of 40*l.* per month shall be paid to him by the British Legation, which allowance shall cease at the expiration of ten years. This allowance shall no longer be paid to Muley Hamed Raisuli if he or any of his protected family, or any of the released prisoners referred to, commit any act which the British Minister may consider sufficient reason for ceasing the monthly payment, and in the same manner if he or any of his protected family, or any of the released prisoners, commit any act which the British Minister may consider sufficient reason the sum of 15,000*l.* shall not be paid to him at the expiration of ten years.

The British Minister will accord to Muley Hamed Raisuli the same assistance in prosecuting his just and legitimate claims as he would to Sir Harry Maclean if the latter had claims.

9. Should Muley Hamed Raisuli desire to purchase properties in Tangier or in any other town under the full control and authority of the Sultan, he shall be allowed to do so from the above-mentioned 15,000*l.* The title-deeds of all such properties shall be kept by the British Legation until the end of the above-named term of ten years. In the meantime Muley Hamed Raisuli will receive the rents accruing therefrom. A proportion to be established by the British Legation shall be deducted from his allowance of 40*l.* a-month for the sum withdrawn for the above purpose. It is understood that the properties so purchased will be governed as regards forfeiture by the same conditions as those governing the original sum of 15,000*l.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 74.

Raisuli to Mr. White.

(Translation.) 1 *Moharram*, 1326 (*February* 4, 1908).

I HAD written to you saying I was coming in to you because that course would be beneficial to all concerned and remove all misunderstandings, idle rumours, and doubts; and when I left my place a great number of men came with me and I could not come in with that crowd, because it would be (misunderstood ?). My intention was that my coming in should be secret, but as this difficulty has arisen I have decided to refrain and have sent in to you my brother Sid Mohammed to act for me in receiving delivery of the prisoners you hold and the money which is to be sent to me, and the persons I indicated to you shall be (under protection ?) and the female servants and the signed documents with the Legation seal which I am to hold and those you are to hold also. The balance of the money I have decided to place with the sons of Pariente, through the intermediary of the Legation, and by documents drawn up by notaries, and they shall give a written engagement to pay 50*l.* in gold monthly and under the conditions established in all banks, as Oolad Parientes are natives of that town and they know how to deal with all classes of people, and especially because they have dealings with the English Government. If I require to buy properties it shall be done through them and through the Legation and my agent in Tangier, and the whole be handed over to my mother in the presence of Consul Bibi. You are not unaware of the difficulties for not sending in Kaïd Maclean, as you understand the country people, who do not understand things, and especially the relatives of the prisoners are with me, and they are awaiting the coming of their relatives. As regards my coming in to you, if you wish it and it is necessary when the Kaïd comes and the prisoners are in my hands and each of them goes his way I will come in to you, and if you wish to postpone this until the Bashador comes that will do.

(Signed) RAISULI.

Inclosure 3 in No. 74.

Raisuli to Sir H. Maclean.

(Translation.) 26 *Hejja* (?), 1325 (*February* 1, 1908).

YOU told me that the Chargé d'Affaires asks me to take you into Tangier, he having consented to the release of the prisoners I asked for, for which thanks. I agree to what he asks. Even had it been more I would have accepted it because of the

good way he has treated me; but I can only take you in by night between sunset and the asha (6·45 P.M.), because I desire secrecy. Consul Bibi (Carleton) must also come out and meet me to a distance of from three and a-half to four hours from Tangier, between Zinat and Beni Msour. When I meet him we will all go in together to the house of the Khalifa of the Bashador (Mr. White) outside the town and by night as already said, and the bearer of the letter will go with Consul Bibi to show him the road to where I am. When I meet the Khalifa (Mr. White) he will hand to me the protection and the written undertaking of the Legation about the conditions agreed upon, and I will also give my signature to what is agreed upon. He will also hand to me the 5,000*l.* in cheques, and I will leave my men at the Khalifa's so that he will deliver to them the prisoners and slaves in the morning. Peace.

Inclosure 4 in No. 74.

Raisuli to Mr. Carleton.

(Translation.) 27 (?) *Hejja*, 1325 (*February* 1, 1908).

I RECEIVED your letter and understood its contents. You say that everything is satisfactory except that the taking out of the prisoners is not possible because of the excitement it will create, as people are watching to see when you go out and they will then all accompany you, and you consequently ask that I shall come into the Bashador or send in my brother or some one else to act for me. Know that I had thought of all this and had written to you to that effect already, and I therefore agree to it, except that (my ?) coming is not possible save after seeing you on the road and we will then all come in together. I have given my written undertaking to Kaïd Maclean to this effect so that he may send it in to the Bashador, and I have also spoken to him on the matter, and it suffices.

[4891] No. 75.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 11.)

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, February* 11, 1908.

I HAVE learnt confidentially from the French Chargé d'Affaires that, in reply to inquiries which he has had made at Rabat with reference to the appeal to restrain French action alleged to have been made to Germany by the Moorish Government, the Moorish Foreign Minister informed the French Consul at Rabat that there was no foundation for the rumour. Ben Sliman stated that, to his astonishment, the German Minister had written privately to him mentioning a communication to the above effect received by him from the Moorish Government suggesting that all the Powers should be approached on the subject. All knowledge of any such message was denied on behalf of the Sultan and Viziers in the reply of Ben Sliman to the German Minister, which was confidentially communicated by the former to the French Consul. This note further inquired through whom and by whom the alleged message had been dispatched.

The sincerity of Ben Sliman is in no way doubted by Count Saint Aulaire.

[4902] No. 76.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 12.)

(No. 57.)
Sir, *Paris, February* 11, 1908.

IN the Chamber of Deputies, M. Jaurès yesterday addressed three questions, of which he had given previous notice, to M. Pichon, relative to the affairs of Morocco. The questions were:

1. What was the object of the military movements between Ber Rechid and Settat that have taken place recently, and what orders have been given to General d'Amade?

2. Was it true that Abd-el-Aziz had appealed against France to the Powers signatory to the Act of Algeciras, and especially to Germany?

3. Was it true that the German Government had made a communication on this subject to the French Government, and if so, when, and in what terms?

In the short speech in which he introduced his questions, M. Jaurès declared that the fighting of the last few days had taken place partly owing to the French troops having advanced on foraging expeditions, and partly owing to the desire of General d'Amade to ascertain whether the tribesmen in his front were part of the troops of Mulai Hafid.

In replying to the first question, M. Pichon reiterated that the task of the French troops at Casa Blanca was to maintain order, to chastise the tribes guilty of the murders of last summer, and to keep open communication by land with Mazagan and Rabat in case it became necessary to withdraw the European colonies from those ports. He quoted the orders dispatched to General d'Amade since the middle of January, and the reports received from time to time from that officer.

Turning to the second question, M. Pichon stated that on the 22nd January the Councillor of the German Embassy had declared to him verbally that Abd-el-Aziz had expressed to the German Government the hope that they would protest against the action of the French Government, which he regarded as contravening the Act of Algeciras. At the same time Baron von der Lancken had stated that Mulai Hafid had requested his Government to prevent France from interfering in the quarrel between himself and his brother. In reply to these communications, the German Representative at Tangier had been instructed to state that the French Government had several times declared their intention of keeping their action within the limits laid down by the Act of Algeciras; that the Moorish Government, if they could prove that these declarations had not been adhered to, could address themselves to all the Powers signatory to the Act; that Germany, adhering to the Act, could not take any steps alone, but was ready to convey to the French Government the desires of the Makhzen. This communication from the German Government M. Pichon regarded as courteous and cordial, and as showing that the German Government did not wish to create difficulties for France.

M. Pichon went on to state that he had made inquiries as to Abd-el-Aziz's alleged complaint. The Sultan himself, Ben Sliman, El Guebbas, and El Torres, however, had all denied that they had any grievance against France or that they had formulated any complaint. From the friendly conversations which had taken place with the German Government it appeared that the incident originated in an interview which Ben Sliman had at Rabat with the merchant who acted there as German Consular Agent. This circumstance, M. Pichon considered, considerably reduced the intrinsic importance of the affair, which was now deserving of notice merely as showing the correct and courteous disposition of the German Government.

In the last part of his speech M. Pichon reminded the Chamber of the difficulties they would cause if they harassed the Government with questions on every little incident in Moroccan affairs, and he once again formally declared that the Government would restrain their action within the limits of the order of the day passed by the Chamber on the 27th ultimo (see my despatch No. 47 of the 28th January). M. Jaurès had been unable to vote for the resolution then passed, but the part of the resolution which he had been least able to approve was that in which the Chamber had conveyed its congratulations to the French troops in Morocco. Had M. Jaurès voted for that he would have risked finding himself disavowed by the revolutionary and anti-patriotic politicians with whom he is associated.

After a reply from M. Jaurès the incident was declared closed.

I have the honour to transmit herewith, extracted from the "Journal Officiel" of to-day, a full account of the proceedings in the Chamber.*

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

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* Not printed.

[4985] No. 77.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 59.)
Sir, *Paris, February 12, 1908.*

ON receipt of your despatch No. 39 of the 25th ultimo I asked M. Pichon to inform me as to the views of the French Government with regard to the manner in which the joint expenses of the Commission to examine claims arising out of the disturbances at Casa Blanca should be met.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the reply which I received from M. Pichon last night, stating that, in the opinion of the French Government, any such expenses should be charged to the Government of Morocco.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

Inclosure in No. 77.

M. Pichon to Sir F. Bertie.

PAR une note en date du 29 Janvier dernier, son Excellence l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a demandé à connaître l'opinion du Gouvernement de la République sur le point de savoir comment seraient payées les dépenses communes que pourrait avoir à faire la Commission Internationale des Indemnités de Casa Blanca.

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de faire connaître à son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie que, dans l'opinion du Gouvernement Français, ces dépenses éventuelles devraient être mises à la charge du Gouvernement Chérifien.

Paris, le 8 Février, 1908.

[5085] No. 78.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 14.)

(No. 23. Confidential.)
Sir, *Madrid, February 10, 1908.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 6 of the 8th instant, I have the honour to report that the French Ambassador has again called the serious attention of the Spanish Government to the situation in Morocco. In a conversation with Señor Allendesalazar on the 8th instant, M. Révoil dwelt on the necessity which might soon arise of taking measures for the effective preservation of order along the coast. Since his arrival at Rabat, Sultan Abdul Aziz had kept up a semblance of authority, but without money his waning power must soon disappear altogether. The Sultan had tried in vain to raise money in Paris. He was not likely to be more successful elsewhere. When his followers realize that nothing more is to be got out of him they will join the other side and swell the forces of disorder. Europe will then look to France and Spain to keep the peace in the coast towns. It might be necessary to take action very soon.

Señor Allendesalazar thought Spain would be able to deal with the situation in the towns for which she was particularly responsible. The "Numancia" had already been sent to Larache, and a force could be landed if necessary. At Tetuan there was no present sign of disorder, and no trouble was to be anticipated in that quarter. M. Révoil touched on the position of affairs at Tangier, and, as usual, was quite unable to move the Spanish Foreign Minister on the question of the chief command in the event of troops having to be landed at that port. M. Révoil informs me that France can never agree to the chief command being in Spanish hands, or to Spain exercising the military command outside Tangier while France occupies the urban zone, thus reversing the Arrangement concluded last February with regard to the police. France must insist on keeping the outside command, and if the native police force under French and Spanish instructors, which is now in process of formation, proves insufficient to keep order, and the police force grows into a military force fed by detachments from the French and Spanish ships, the Ambassador's idea is that the outside and inside zones must still remain respectively under French and Spanish

direction. Should military operations become necessary beyond the outside zone, as defined in the February Arrangement, it might be possible to allow Spanish troops to hold, for instance, the road to Tetuan, the French troops holding the road to Fez, with complete independence of command. But his Excellency desires above all things to avoid, if possible, the necessity of any landing in force at Tangier, feeling that difficulties with Spain could hardly fail to arise.

The natural solution, in M. Révoil's opinion, would be that, in case of need, the native force, which Major Fournié has so long been engaged in instructing, should be intrusted with the task of assisting the police to keep order in Tangier. But he realizes that this would raise an outcry in Spain, where Major Fournié's force is still regarded by many people as a nucleus out of which at any time a practically French corps could be formed which would place the control of events at and around Tangier in French hands, to the exclusion of the legitimate influence of Spain.

M. Révoil thinks Spain will soon have to do something at Larache, and that she will probably act in the Spanish way, by taking military possession of the town and turning it into a "presidio," like Melilla, without attempting to exercise authority beyond its walls. France can look after the coast towns in her own sphere. Casa Blanca, and especially Tangier, are the places at which, owing to the mixed control, difficulties may be expected to arise.

The French Ambassador understands that the Spanish position at Melilla is at present rather an awkward one. General Marina, the Governor, cannot get rid of the interned Imperial Mehalla, which the Sultan is now either unable or unwilling to have removed to Tangier. Moreover, by the removal of the Mehalla from its former camping ground into the town, the Kebdana tribes, which occupy the left bank of the Muluya, near its mouth, have been left exposed to the attacks of the Roghi. It is said that these tribes have petitioned the French for protection, but M. Révoil states that France will rigorously abstain from all intervention across the Muluya. Meanwhile, the Spaniards have not yet seen their way to occupy the spit of land separating the Mar Chica from the Mediterranean, and the country adjoining Melilla is said to be coming more and more under the authority of the Roghi.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[5182] No. 79.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 14.)

(No. 7.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, February 14, 1908.*

MOROCCO. I am informed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Spanish Ambassador in London was to make an official communication to you to-day notifying the occupation by a Spanish force of a point on the Mar Chica.

This step, Señor Allendesalazar tells me, has been taken in order to keep the peace and prevent illicit traffic in arms in the region adjoining Melilla, and is in accordance with Treaty rights of Spain.

The French Ambassador, while raising no objection, has reminded Señor Allendesalazar that Spain would be bound by Article II of her secret Convention with France of 1904, in the event of her being compelled to take action extending into the interior, to obtain the previous consent of the French Government.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed with this view, and the question has in no way impaired the friendly relations existing between him and M. Révoil.

It is realized by the Spanish Government that the Roghi will be annoyed at the action they have taken.

[5249] No. 80.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 34.)
Sir, *Tangier, February 9, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of events based on information received during the past week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 80.

Events of the Week.

NO important development has yet taken place in the general situation. Reports have reached Tangier to the effect that the official Act of Allegiance is to be dispatched from Fez to Mulai Hafid within the next few days. It is possible that upon receipt of this Act of Allegiance the Pretender may decide upon some definite move, such as an advance upon Fez.

Meanwhile, some activity has been shown by the Arabs opposed to the French, culminating in a determined attack upon a column near Bershid on the evening of the 1st February. It appears that Colonel de Bontigourd had made a reconnaissance in force, raiding the country in the vicinity of Bershid, when on his return he was completely surrounded by the full forces of the mixed tribes of Showia. The combat was very severe, and lasted for some hours, the French firing no less than 700 shells. The Arabs were heavily punished, leaving 576 dead on the field, many dead being, as usual, carried away, while the French losses amounted to one officer and five men killed, and fifty-two wounded, including Colonel Passard. Upon receipt of the news, General d'Amade at once left for the scene of the fight, and considerable quantities of stores and ammunition have been dispatched to Bershid. The attack was led by Kaïd Essekhtani at the head of 10,000 tribesmen, with five Canet guns, which had been sold to the Sultan by the "Compagnie Marocaine." The Arabs appear to have fought with much greater determination than usual, and the French were forced to abandon one mitrailleuse with all its ammunition. Before its abandonment, however, the breech-block was removed, thus rendering the gun useless to the Arabs. It is worthy of remark, in connection with this affair, that although it was known for some time at Casa Blanca that the tribes were assembling in considerable force near Bershid, yet no special precautions appear to have been taken by the French. This want of foresight nearly led to a serious reverse, which would naturally have had the worst possible effect upon the tribes. It is reported that there are no less than seven Arab camps in the district round Settat, composed of a vast number of men, so that further serious fighting seems probable. It is rumoured that Medinna is to be the next place to be attacked. The wireless telegraph is working satisfactorily between Casa Blanca and Bershid, so that the latest news can be sent promptly to Paris.

From Rabat Mr. Neroutsos reports that considerable discussion is taking place at Court in regard to future plans. Preparations are ostensibly being made for an expedition to Fez, to punish those responsible for the proclamation of Mulai Hafid. There does not, however, appear to be any real intention of undertaking so hazardous an adventure, the failure of which would finally destroy the Sultan's cause. His Majesty has evidently decided to remain at Rabat for the present, and await events, a policy which always commends itself to the Moorish mind. Such a course is not necessarily so fatal in the case of the Sultan as it would be in that of Mulai Hafid, who must do something striking if he is to preserve the interest of leading Moors in his cause. There are evidences that this interest is already on the wane. The Sultan continues to receive assurances of military support from various tribes in the event of a punitive expedition being undertaken against Fez. These promises mean no more than that the tribes are willing to assist in looting the town.

F. R.

[5387] No. 81.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 8.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, February 15, 1908.*

MOROCCO. I am informed by M. Révoil that a loan of 2,500,000 fr. to Sultan Abd-el-Aziz is being issued by a number of French banks, and that a Spanish group will take part in it with the consent of the Spanish Government. Its object is to obviate the necessity for a landing of fresh troops by providing for the payment of the Imperial forces at Tangier and elsewhere.

[5721] No. 82.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 69.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 15, 1908.*

M. CAMBON informed me in general terms to-day that France and Spain were taking measures to stop the importation of contraband arms into Morocco.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[5400] No. 83.

Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 62.)
Sir, *Berlin, February 12, 1908.*

IN the Budget Committee of the Reichstag yesterday the discussion of the Foreign Office Estimates took place. In reply to a question of Herr Erzberger, the Foreign Secretary declared that Germany claimed nothing in Morocco but the "open door." Her political position in Morocco rested entirely on the Act of Algeciras. The Casa Blanca indemnity question would come to a friendly settlement. At present Germany had paid out 250,000 marks, or about 25 per cent., of the value of the damage done. Only direct claims would be indemnified. Those indemnified would be obliged to sign an undertaking by which they would be compelled to repay the Imperial Government, should France obtain the money for the indemnity from Morocco. The action of France is of a provisionary character. France does not wish to depart from the four corners of the Algeciras Act, and her action in Morocco does not contravene that Act, but is entirely in conformity with it. The declarations of the French Government on the subject are made in a thoroughly loyal spirit.

While reporting Herr von Schön's official declaration on the subject of Morocco, it is interesting to record an account which appeared in a Berlin telegram to the "Hamburger Nachrichten," and which is generally regarded as being well founded, in regard to the correspondence which has taken place between the two rival Sultans of Morocco and the German Government. On the 16th January the German Vice-Consul at Rabat informed Dr. Rosen that Abdul Karim-ben-Sliman, Moorish Minister for Foreign Affairs, expressed the hope of the Sultan Abdul Aziz that Germany would protest against the proceedings of the French in Morocco, which are contrary to the Act of Algeciras. A few days later Muley Hafid inquired of Dr. Rosen, through the German Vice-Consul at Saffi, whether it was the case that the French penetration into the interior of Morocco was sanctioned by a mandate of the Powers, in which Germany took part. He also requested that France might not be permitted to intervene in the dispute regarding the throne, on the ground that the matter was one which concerned the internal politics of Morocco alone.

The German Minister communicated these messages to his Government, and, under instructions from Berlin, sent the following answer to the two Sultans :—

"The French Government have recently and repeatedly assured the Imperial Government that their intention in all their proceedings in Morocco was to observe the Act of Algeciras. Should the Moorish Government consider themselves to have ground for complaint, their remedy would be to address themselves to all the Powers signatory of the Act. Since the Act came into force, Germany was unable to take any separate action, but the German Government would bring the views of the Moors to the knowledge of the French Government."

Prince Radolin was then instructed to bring the matter confidentially to the knowledge of the French Government.

In addition to the remarks of Herr von Schön in the Committee of the Reichstag, a semi-official communiqué has appeared in the "Süddeutsche Reichscorrespondenz" in reply to statements in the Paris press to the effect that Moorish ports were being transformed into French towns.

The communiqué runs as follows :—

"If the statements that Moroccan ports are being transformed into French towns are known to the Moors, it is not to be wondered at that the fear lest the projects of French policy may transgress the limits of the Act of Algeciras cannot be allayed at

Fez, Marrakesh, and elsewhere. The German Government, in view of the repeated assurances of the French Government, regard such fears as unjustified. The occasional utterances of private Frenchmen mislead the Moors as to the attitude of Germany. Even in the Maghzen the belief has been aroused that Germany has entirely renounced her Moorish interests in favour of France, and commissioned the French with the protection of her subjects in the coast towns. In order to avoid misunderstandings, it is well that such inaccuracies should not go uncontradicted."

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANK C. LASCELLES.

[5786] No. 84.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 18.)

(No. 9. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, February 18, 1908.*

SPANISH Minister at Tangier.

I learn from a confidential source that the post vacated through the death of M. de Llaberia will be filled by Señor Merry del Val. The new Minister is a brother of the Cardinal, and this renders his appointment distasteful to the French Government, who fear that the French public may think him likely to exercise an influence hostile to their interests. The matter is, however, I believe now settled, although the French Ambassador has hinted to the Spanish Government that they would do well to reconsider it. Señor Allendesalazar informed M. Révoil that his conciliatory disposition had been one of the chief reasons for the selection of Señor Merry del Val.

The new Minister has often been of great assistance to His Majesty's Embassy in his capacity of Head of the Commercial Department of the Spanish Foreign Office.

[5620] No. 85.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 24.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 20, 1908.*

THE Spanish Ambassador called at this Office on the 14th instant to announce the intention of his Government to occupy a point on the strip of land dividing Mar Chica from the Mediterranean, 18 kilom. to the east of Melilla, adding that a simultaneous communication to this effect was being made to all the Powers Signatories of the Act of Algeciras.

His Excellency went on to explain that a considerable trade in contraband and arms was carried on through Mar Chica which lies within the Spanish sphere. The Spanish Government intended that their occupation of this place should be of a temporary nature.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[6026] No. 86.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 74.)
Sir, *Paris, February 20, 1908.*

THE Political Director at the Quai d'Orsay informed me yesterday, with reference fo the accompanying extract from "Le Temps," that the State Bank of Morocco will be urnished by a French Syndicate with 2,000,000 fr. towards the advance of 2,500,000 fr. to be made by the Bank to the Sultan Abd-el-Aziz, for the payment of the Shereefian troops occupying the ports.

M. Louis also told me that the Spanish Government have reserved for Spanish financiers a participation in the advance to be made to the State Bank, and the German Government have expressed the desire that right should also be reserved for German financiers to join in providing the advance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

Inclosure in No. 86.

Extract from the "Temps" of February 18, 1908.

LA BANQUE D'ÉTAT MAROCAINE.

AINSI que nous l'avons annoncé, la Banque d'État Marocaine a, dans sa réunion de Samedi, consenti une avance de 2,500,000 fr. au Sultan Abd-el-Aziz sous la réserve que cette somme serait exclusivement réservée au payement de la solde des troupes Chérifiennes occupant les ports.

Cette mesure a pour but d'assurer le maintien de l'ordre et par conséquent la sauvegarde des intérêts Européens.

L'emploi déterminé de cette somme de 2,500,000 fr. sera contrôlé par des représentants de la Banque d'État.

Enfin, cette somme ne sera pas remise dans sa totalité, en une seule fois, au Makhzen.

Elle sera versée par mensualités.

[6027] No. 87.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 75)
Sir, *Paris, February 20, 1908.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 32 of the 18th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the Paris papers publish accounts of further fighting which took place on the 16th, 17th, and 18th instant between the French forces in the Casa Blanca district and the native tribes. On the 16th the column under Colonel Taupin was attacked in the defile of Ber Rebaa, and after a battle lasting four hours on that day and eight hours on the following day succeeded in repulsing the enemy. The column returned, however, to Fedalah on the coast where they arrived on the morning of the 18th with their killed and wounded. The casualties consisted of two officers and three men killed and twenty soldiers wounded.

Another engagement took place on the 18th between a column under General d'Amade, which was marching northwards presumably to take the Medakra in the rear, and the tribes of the Ziaidia and the Mzab who had joined the Medakra. The tribes were supported by a column of Hafidists with a cannon. The French losses are reported as small, consisting of one killed and four wounded. Further skirmishes are reported from Tirs and coast district.

I inclose herein the account of the fighting, as published in the "Matin" of to-day's date, giving a rough map of the scene of hostilities.*

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[6099] No. 88.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, February 20, 1908.*

OCCUPATION of Mar Chica. My despatch No. 28 of the 20th instant.

As a result of the Spanish action at Mar Chica, I understand that relations between Spanish Chargé d'Affaires and Moorish authorities here are very strained.

I am informed by Sid Guebbas that the Sultan refused to entertain the suggestion of the late Spanish Minister that Spanish troops should replace the Moorish force at Mar Chica, and confirmation of this is contained in the statement made to Dr. Verdon by His Majesty. Sid Guebbas states that in spite of this, and in defiance of the orders of the Maghzen, the Moorish Commander at Mar Chica was induced by the Spanish authorities to lead his troops into Melilla. A strong protest was made by the Makhzen, and the withdrawal of the Spanish force was demanded so that Mar Chica might be reoccupied by Moorish troops who are still at Melilla. Moorish authorities would send reinforcements. As a statement has appeared in the press that

* Not printed.

the Spanish Foreign Minister had denied that any protest had been received from Moorish Government, latter have further requested that their protest may be made public.

(Secret.)

Sid Guebbas went on to say, begging that the information might be kept secret, that, in view of arrangements existing between the French and the Pretender, that the latter should not molest Moorish troops at Mar Chica, there was no fear of any disturbances in that district.

[6169] No. 89.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 22.)

(No. 35.)

Tangier, February 14, 1908.

Sir,

THE question of the appeal, said to have been made by the Sultan to Germany to restrain French action in Morocco, has excited considerable interest here.

The French Chargé d'Affaires, Count Saint Aulaire, has been to see me several times on the subject. He informed me that the Moorish Government categorically denied having made any such appeal to Germany, and he was anxious that publicity should be given to this denial, as the belief that the Sultan had appealed to Germany had made it very difficult to obtain any loan for the Moorish Government in France. It was all important that an advance should be obtained at once, as there was only sufficient money for the Shereefian Treasury to pay the troops for ten days, and should the Sultan stop paying the troops his position would become untenable, there would probably be troubles at the ports, and it might become necessary to land troops, as, at this season, communication between the ships-of-war and the ports was frequently interrupted.

Count Saint Aulaire communicated to me, confidentially, the substance of a letter which, according to the French Consul at Rabat, had been addressed to the German Minister by Sid-ben-Sliman. I have now been able to obtain, however, from Sid Guebbas a copy of this letter, as also of the unsigned Memorandum handed to Sid-ben-Sliman by the German Vice-Consul at Rabat, to which this letter refers. I have the honour to transmit, herewith, translation of these documents, which you will observe are not quite in the terms originally reported to Count Saint Aulaire, as communicated in my telegram No. 13 of the 11th instant.

Acting under instructions received from the Court, Sid Guebbas has taken steps to give publicity to the denial by the Moorish Government of its having appealed to Germany.

The action of the Moorish Government has, I am informed, given considerable umbrage to the German Minister who maintains that the appeal was certainly made to the German Vice-Consul, verbally, it is true, but in a formal manner, the actual words used by Sid-ben-Sliman having been at once noted by the Vice-Consul and communicated to the Legation.

There is confirmation of this from other sources. I have been assured by two persons that they have seen a letter, written at the time, by one of the Viziers to his brother at Tangier, criticizing the action of the Sultan in appealing to Germany against the advice of the Viziers.

On the other hand, it is difficult to understand how the Sultan can have appealed to Germany to restrain French action when, on the 11th ultimo, he appealed to the French Government through their Consul at Rabat, to send an expedition to Fez. The only possible explanation is that, in a moment of discouragement, fearing that the French were going to abandon him and refuse him any further advances of money, he may have turned to Germany.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 89.

Literal copy of a Memorandum received from the German Minister through the German Consul at Rabat.

Praise to God.

(Translation.)

THE French Government has recently repeatedly given the fullest assurances to the German Government, that it is not its intention in what it is doing in Morocco to go beyond the Algeciras Agreement.

If the Shereefian Government is of opinion that it can now bring forward proof showing that the action of France constitutes a violation of the Algeciras Agreement, it has the right to refer to the Powers Signatory to the said Agreement on the subject, through their Representatives in Tangier.

As the said Agreement is now in force it would be difficult for the German Government to do anything in this matter alone, still, notwithstanding, it has not been remiss in bringing the requests referred to it by the Moorish Government before the French Government without delay, conformably with your request.

The German Government had thought, judging by recent events, that the operations of the French troops were possibly undertaken with the consent of His Shereefian Majesty.

Literal copy of the reply sent to the said Minister.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.) *24th Hejja*, 1325 (*January* 29, 1908).

His Shereefian Majesty received the Memorandum sent by you through M. Neudorfer, your Consul at Rabat, informing of the declaration recently made by the French Government, explaining the course it is following in putting into force the Agreement drawn up at Algeciras, and that it is not going beyond its limits (*i.e.*, stipulations) and that the honoured German Government had not been remiss in bringing before the French Government the requests of the Moorish Government to which you refer, &c.

My master, God exalt Him, has commended me to write to you this letter to inform you of the receipt of the said Memorandum, and to say that He (compliments) thanks the glorious German Government for the marks it has shown of its interest and sincere friendship towards this Shereefian Government. This is as was confidently expected from it, save that His Shereefian Majesty does not understand what is meant by the requests to which you refer, as it never entered His Majesty's mind to give instructions on this subject, either in writing or verbally, and it is, therefore, incumbent to write to your Excellency to that effect, to avoid anything which might possibly contain a difference or misunderstanding between the two sides. In any case, His Shereefian Majesty is sure of the friendship of the honoured German Government and of its sincere amity as is customary with it.

May you, &c.

[6170] No. 90.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 22.)

(No. 36.)

Tangier, February 14, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a Memorandum, prepared at the request of His Majesty's Minister by Mr. Consul Macleod, on the Law of Real Estate in Morocco as affecting foreigners.

The Memorandum is based on a recent French treatise on the above subject, copies of which are thereto annexed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 90.

Memorandum respecting the Law of Real Estate in Morocco as affecting Foreigners.

IT has often been remarked, with perfect truth, that scarcely any country was so ill understood, both by its own inhabitants and by foreigners, as Morocco. In no important particular is this more observable than in regard to real estate. The ignorance, exclusiveness, and anarchy in which the country has existed for many ages have given rise to two radical misapprehensions. On the one hand, inhabitants have formed the impression that foreigners have not, and by right ought not to have, any rights in the country, and that their position should be merely that of honoured guests, as in the case of Ambassadors and their subordinates, or of humble dependents, as in the cases of merchants and others pursuing their avocations. On the other hand, foreigners have formed such impressions as that, in effect, no laws existed in Morocco; that the Sultan was all-powerful so far as his power practically extended; that might really constituted right, and that there existed numerous small properties and vast areas not owned by individuals, and of which the Sultan could dispose—for foreign colonization or exploitation—with absolute freedom.

That clear and surprisingly liberal and equitable laws existed on those points has long been known to those natives and foreigners who gave such questions unprejudiced close study. Racial and religious antipathy on the part of natives, and, on the part of foreigners, the fact that adverse political circumstances rendered these questions of little or no practical interest hitherto, have, however, combined to leave those laws in such obscurity that even the makers of international Treaties appear to have had but a limited idea of their full scope and significance.

Nevertheless, the Treaty-makers always foresaw that native law, whatever it might be, alone afforded a common means by which to adjust questions of real estate, as between natives and foreigners, or between foreigners, although, in other respects, each foreign nation represented in Morocco retained jurisdiction over its respective subjects.

The recent developments in Morocco, the extension of foreigners' interests there, and the probability of their being likely to increase more and more rapidly, have now made it necessary that the laws governing matters of real estate should be clearly understood.

In two small but clearly reasoned treatises, viz.: "Le Droit de la Propriété dans la Loi Musulmane, particulièrement au Maroc" and "Le Régime Foncier au Maroc," M. Daniel Saurin, a French advocate practising at Tangier, has recently done timely and valuable public service in providing such information.

In the former he tells what the law is, and what are, and are not, the rights and obligations of the State—*i.e.*, of the Sultan. In the latter he treats of its practice in general, and of the application of it, as regards foreigners, resulting from the provisions of the General Act of the Algeciras Conference, and the procedure to be followed in the acquisition and transference of real estate is clearly defined.

The chief points in these treatises to which attention may be specially called are the following:—

1. Labour alone establishes an original title to land—that is to say, a piece of land is, to begin with, ownerless and vacant. It is cultivated and built upon by some person. That person thereby becomes the owner of it, with full rights of sale, transference, bequest, &c. So much is this the case, that even should a non-Moslem owner, in war, fly from his land and it be taken by a conqueror, the original owner could claim, subject to certain dues payable to the Moslem Sovereign, restoration of it.

2. The Sovereign is not (speaking generally) the owner of vacant or conquered lands, nor can he dispose of the same. Properties may accrue to the Sovereign, however, by confiscation (*e.g.*, for treason committed by the owner) or by reason of the owner having died intestate and without heirs.

3. The Sovereign's rights and functions in regard to property generally, consist only in his authorization of the judicial authorities being necessary for the preparation of the deeds recording the facts of ownership, transference, or inheritance. This authorization is necessary in order to insure that the rights ascribed in regard to it do not encroach upon those of properties belonging to the Sovereign, to the Mosque, or to absent persons.

It may be mentioned here that it is the exercise of this apparently most reasonable and innocent provision that has given rise to all the difficulties, wrongs, abuses,

and corruptions connected with real estate held by, or sought to be acquired by, foreigners.

Local native public feeling was, generally, strongly against the acquisition of property by foreigners, and fanatical native officials found it easy to harass or punish vindictively Moors whom they learned were desirous of selling their properties to Europeans. Native officials' procrastinations at every step of such proceedings were so endless to oppose, or so costly to overcome, as to prevent any important acquisition of, or development of, real estate by Europeans. On the other hand, unscrupulous Europeans, by bribery or other undue influence, sometimes acquired properties, and, still more often, added to properties they already possessed, sometimes to the injury of private owners, and still oftener to that of the public domain.

The foreign Legations and Consulates found themselves constantly unable, with just promptitude, to obtain their subjects' rights, or promote their subjects' interests in the one class of case, and were still more unable to check the abuses incidental to the other.

These are the reasons for the Powers having, from time to time sought, even at the cost of somewhat limiting them, to insure recognition of foreigners' rights in regard to real property, by specific articles in Treaties rather than to base such rights on the wider, but less known, and less definite, provisions of Moslem Law.

In "Le Régime Foncier au Maroc," M. Saurin has, with much conciseness, co-ordinated the general Moslem Law of Property with these Treaty provisions, and has shown clearly how both of them, under the Act of Algeciras in particular, have now to be applied.

In the course of application no doubt omissions and differences of view may appear, and amendments may suggest themselves. During the translation and minute study now being given to that treatise (*i.e.*, "Le Régime Foncier au Maroc") comment may become necessary. But even as it stands the treatise cannot fail to prove of the highest value to all persons in search of reliable information on those points, and very particularly as a guide to Consular and officials encharged with the application of the Real Property Laws, now obtaining in Morocco.

(Signed) J. M. MACLEOD.

February 1, 1908.

[6171] No. 91.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 22.)

(No. 37.)

Sir, *Tangier, February* 15, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith translation of a letter recently addressed by Mulai Hafid to the British Vice-Consul at Saffi, and forwarded by him to me, as also of a letter addressed to me direct by Mulai Hafid, and received through the German post, the letter having evidently been sent to some person here for delivery, as it bears only the Tangier post-mark.

The other Legations here have also received similar letters through their Consuls at Saffi, but I have not heard that any of them have received a second letter sent direct.

Both letters are much to the same effect, protesting against the action of the French, and begging that they may be made to withdraw their troops and not interfere on behalf of Mulai Abd-el-Aziz, who has been deposed by the people. The letter addressed to this Legation contains in addition a reference to the Holy War which Mulai Hafid says he declared in order to tranquillize the excitement of the people.

The idea of declaring a Holy War in order to bring tranquillity to a country is certainly original, but as a matter of fact it is surprising how little excitement or fanaticism it has caused at places where Christians are resident. The cause, however, is, I think, not far to seek, the salutary lessons which the Showia tribes have received at the hands of the French have had their effect outside the limits of those tribes. It is merely fear of the consequences which has restrained the people, and any serious reverse of the French arms might lead to an outbreak of fanaticism.

It is clear from these letters as well as from the unwillingness of Mulai Hafid to cross the Um-er-Rebia River, that he fully realizes his powerlessness against the French, and also that unless the French change their policy, his chances of occupying the throne are small.

I am informed by Count Saint Aulaire that Mulai Hafid has addressed somewhat similar letters to him, and has also been in communication with General d'Amade, to whom he has endeavoured to excuse the presence of his troops among the forces that attacked the French, by saying that it is impossible for a General to restrain the ardour of his men, and that when fighting is taking place they take part in it without the knowledge and consent of their Commanders. He even added that he would punish the men in question. Count Saint Aulaire observed that he omitted to explain the presence of his cannon with the force that attacked the French.

This communication was made by a French correspondent who has been with Mulai Hafid for some time, and who presented himself dressed as a Moor, carrying a white flag and accompanied by two Moors. General d'Amade did not give his compatriot a good reception and prevented him from returning to Mulai Hafid's camp.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 91.

Moulai Abd-el-Hafid to Vice-Consul Hunot.

(Translation.)

In the name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate, and there is no strength or power save in God the High, the Mighty.

To the enlightened Consul of the British Government at Saffi, after compliments,

WE have repeatedly written to the Ministers of the respective Governments at Tangier, and to you also manifesting our desire for the continuance of peace and concord between our Islamic Moghrebin nation and the other Powers, and we have not been remiss in publishing this and in protesting from our watchfulness to maintain security and the preservation of good relations. Then when the French troops went and occupied the centre of Showia, and we did our utmost to calm the excitement of the populace pending the arrival of the reply from the respected Minister of your Government, those troops attacked the Moslems in their own lands unexpectedly yesterday, and fought them with cannon, causing the loss of many lives, men, women and children to the Moslems, and the loss of much property and numbers of domestic animals, all this being done masterfully and by force. This calamity affected the people more because such a thing had not entered their minds, and because of our commands to them to put aside their arms and be tranquil in their minds as the Makhzen was attending to this matter in the proper quarter with the foreign Representatives. This is a serious matter that has happened to the independent Moorish nation, caused by the said troops who are intent on provoking conflicts (disturbances) in the country. What Conference would consent to such calamitous wrongs which are not allowable by any laws nor permitted by any religion.

We hasten to send you notice of this great harm as a further protest, asking for justice, and for recognition of our rights of national independence, which are recognized to every independent nation, as no man will give up his just right nor will he willingly forego it.

I wish you to send this letter, in original, to the Minister of your nation at Tangier, and write informing him of the true friendship of our Government—the happy—for your respected Government, and of its sincerity towards it, and we rely with confidence on the good relations existing between our respective Governments, and we trust that he may hasten to reply to us after he shall have attended to the matter with the French Minister, so that the troops of occupation may be restrained and caused to depart from the land of Islam, and cease intervening between the nation and Moulai Abdel Aziz, who has been deposed by the consent of the nation in the interests of its religious law and of its territory, and in order that the regular course may be followed in all this.

Finished 29th Hejja, 1325 (3rd February, 1908).

(Seal of Moulai Abd-el-Hafid.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 91.

Moulai Abd-el-Hafid to Mr. White.

(Translation.)

In the name of God the Merciful and Compassionate, and there is no power nor strength save in God the High and Mighty.

To the intelligent, respected Envoy of the glorious English Government at Tangier.
(After compliments.)

WE would bring to your notice the complaint of the people of Morocco of all classes regarding what has happened to their children, their land, and their adult males, the which is not justified by any law, civil or religious. The demanding of rights by warfare and occupation of territory is not a symbol of peace, nor is it what humanity would dictate. As also there is no reason to compel a nation to continue under the weak rule and excesses of a Sultan it has abandoned because of his incapacity to attend to its welfare, as that is not enjoined by any Treaty or religion. We therefore ask the aid of your views in disclosing this important matter which has overtaken the people of Morocco. You are renowned amongst men for justice and equity and for love of prosperity, and it would not be becoming to you to remain silent about these happenings. All the Powers have been on an equality, both commercial and otherwise, in Morocco since of old, in accordance with the international rights of nations as is shown by the Madrid Treaty and supported by the independence of Morocco.

As regards any reports which may have reached you of the proclaiming of the Holy War, we merely employed that as a stratagem to tranquillize the excitement of the people on seeing their land occupied by force, the slaughter of their kin on their own territory, and their being prevented from ruling in their own country. We had the intention to place Governors over the Showia Province in order to put an end to the disorder, but the troops which have penetrated into the centre of the country stood in the way of that course being followed, as possibly had we gone to the Showia it is not improbable that these troops would have employed some stratagem to bring about a battle, which we do not want; our object being merely to tranquillize our subjects and firmly establish security in the country and on the roads. As regards what is said to the effect that the object of the troops in going out to Showia is to protect the Dar-el-Baida, in order that trade may continue to be carried on there and for the protection of Europeans there. We are entrusted with the whole of Morocco and all in it, whether natives or Europeans, as regards their lives, their properties, and everything else. As also we desire to follow only the path of justice in making the troops leave the country so that it may remain in the sole possession of its people; as, so long as the occupation lasts, security is inconceivable, as you will have seen during the last six months or more. Do you not see the condition of the country and the towns which have continued in the normal state? Their people have maintained security and tranquillity and nothing whatever has occurred in them to cause disturbance, nor has any foreigner been killed, robbed, or harmed there since Morocco has been under our charge—praise is to God.

The intelligent of the French nation will concede this and not dispute it, and the reports spread by interested people that we are inimical and contrary to the European nations are nothing but pure untruths and falsehoods, and circumstances disprove them, and the intelligent amongst the Europeans know it, and those who speak those things cannot be counted as belonging in any way to mankind. This is proved by the repeated letters we have written you on this subject.

As regards what is happening in Morocco in the deposing of Moulai Abdel Aziz by consent of the nation and the proclamation of him upon whom its unanimous choice fell cannot in justice be considered as an extraordinary occurrence, as a similar case occurred in Turkey between Abdel Hamid and Murad, and how many similar cases have occurred amongst the European nations generally and in France in particular, and I ask you in all justice what reason warranted interference between us and him who has been deposed by the nation?

We trust that you will make some movement which this nation will count as one of its treasures.

Written on the 24th Hejja, 1325 (the 29th January, 1908).

(Seal of Abd-el-Hafid.)

[6172] No. 92.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 38.)
Sir, *Tangier, February 15, 1908.*

IN his despatch No. 434 of the 5th November, 1907, Sir Gerard Lowther reported the ceremony that took place at the Spanish cemetery at Tetuan, when wreaths were placed for the first time on the graves of the Spanish soldiers who fell in the war of 1860, and observed that the ceremony was probably suggested by political motives and a desire to accentuate the importance of Spanish interests in northern Morocco.

It is presumably with the same object in view that the Spanish Government has now bestowed the first class of the Order of Military Merit upon the Governor of Tetuan, and the second class of the same order upon the Colonel in command of the troops, in recognition of the courtesy shown by them on the above-mentioned occasion. The orders were presented on the 8th instant with considerable ceremony by the Spanish Consul, who was accompanied by all the Spanish officials, police officers, &c. I understand that some officers were to have come from Ceuta for the ceremony, but were prevented by the bad weather.

The Spanish Government opened a school at Tetuan last month for the purpose of teaching the Moors Spanish; the expenses of the school are, I am informed, supported by the Spanish Government.

In the meantime, the Spanish officers appointed for the police at Tetuan are actively enlisting men for the force. The hostility originally shown by the Moors has apparently subsided, and over a hundred men have now been induced to enlist. As the people learn the true nature of the police, and realize that they are regularly paid, there will, I anticipate, be no difficulty in getting as many men as may be required.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. WHITE.

[6173] No. 93.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 39.)
Sir, *Tangier, February 15, 1908.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 33 of the 7th instant, I have the honour to report that Raisuli has returned to Tazerut, the place where he held Sir H. Maclean captive, and has not yet informed me where he will definitely take up his residence.

Before leaving he handed to Kaïd Maclean, for delivery to the Sultan, a letter he had addressed to His Majesty containing protestations of loyalty, and throwing on some of the Vizirs the blame for "the differences which arose between himself and the Moorish Government." He states that he persuaded the tribes to remain loyal, and he promises to do his utmost to put an end to the troubles.

This letter has not yet reached the Sultan, but I understand that the Moorish Government are anxious to obtain Raisuli's assistance, and are approaching him with that object. It is possible that, feeling himself safe with his British protection, Raisuli may come to Tangier to confer with the authorities, or even go to Rabat to see the Sultan. He enjoys considerable prestige, and has shown himself capable; it would, therefore, not be surprising if the Sultan were to make use of him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. WHITE.

[6174] No. 94.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 40.)
Sir, *Tangier, February 16, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of news based on reports received during the past week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 94.

Summary of News respecting Morocco during the past Week.

NOTHING has occurred in the past week to alter the general situation. The prospects of Mulai Hafid are resuming the somewhat shadowy character which they lost for a time after his proclamation at Fez. This gives an improved appearance to the position of the Sultan, but of which any decisive action or forward movement of the Pretender will at once deprive him. For the moment, tension at Rabat is relieved. Dr. Verdon writes that all signs of panic have quite subsided, and that the local population do not seem indisposed to the Sultan. El Mrani, Mulai Hafid's lieutenant at Fez, has written to explain that all he has done has been under compulsion, and Mulai Reshid, who was up till lately fighting the French in the Showia district, has made an offer of his services. It may be concluded that both are anxious, like the majority of leading Moors at the present time, to remain as far as possible "on the fence." The financial straits of the Government, which appeared to have reached a climax, have been momentarily relieved by the discovery that a cheque for 5,000*l.*, forming part of the French loan of 1904 has, for some unexplained reason, never been cashed.

Apparently reliable news of Mulai Hafid was received from a French press correspondent who has been with him, more or less under restraint, since last July. He says that the Pretender is camped on the Um-er-Rebia River with about 8,000 men. The tribes have suffered very heavily in their recent fighting with the French. Their losses in the engagements of the 2nd and 7th instant are put at over a thousand killed. The correspondent in question came to General d'Amade's camp with an offer of terms from Mulai Hafid. These were that he should pay the French the fine required by them from the Showia; that the French should withdraw and undertake not to interfere in the contest between him and his brother. The General said he was not empowered to negotiate, and detained the Frenchman. Beyond a vague intention of going to Fez, this man knew nothing of Mulai Hafid's plans.

General d'Amade is continuing the chastisement of the Showia tribes and the pacification of the district. The submission of four tribes is reported. A corps, under a French officer, of men drawn from among these tribes has been formed, and is said to have done good service against their compatriots. This illustrates the predominance of tribal hostility over national sentiment among the Moors. There were further engagements on the 6th and 7th instant. The Arabs attacked the French camp by night after having been driven off, and the General then made a march in pursuit of twenty-one hours, scattering the enemy in all directions. The French force has been to Settat again, but evacuated it as before, as it is situated in a deep valley in a position unsuitable to hold. There is said to be only one tribe, the Emdakra, who continue obdurate, and General d'Amade is now dealing with them.

Mr. Wilkinson reports that everything is quiet at Mogador. The organization of the police is proceeding actively, and it looks as though there, as at Tetuan, active opposition to it had entirely subsided.

(Initialled) C. R.

February 16, 1908.

[6128] No. 95.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, February 21, 1908.*

OCCUPATION of Mar Chica.

The Spanish Government are not seriously disturbed at the ill-will shown by the Maghzen regarding the occupation of Mar Chica by Spanish troops, as reported in Mr. White's telegram No. 14 of the 20th instant. This Government are quite ready to hand the position over to a well-equipped Moorish force sufficiently strong to keep order in the district behind Melilla, but the Moorish force at present there could not resist the Roghi for a single day. The Spanish Government are under the impression that the Roghi and all the neighbouring tribes are glad to see Mar Chica in occupation of a Spanish force as they feel that there is now some prospect of the maintenance of peace in the district in question.

[6685] No. 96.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February 26.*)

(No. 80.)

Paris, February 25, 1908.

Sir,

M. JAURÈS, leader of the Unified Socialists, yesterday put three questions to the Government on the subject of recent events in Morocco, which led to a debate of considerable length. The first question dealt with the loan of two millions by the State Bank of Morocco to the Sultan Abd-ul-Aziz. M. Jaurès desired to know on what security such a loan could be guaranteed, as the Customs were already fully hypothecated, and for what purpose the loan was to be made. His second question was on the subject of the letter of Moulai Hafid to the French Representative at Tangier, and the third on the tenour of the letter of Moulai Hafid to the French Consul at Casa Blanca.

M. Pichon replied that the loan had been contracted on the conditions laid down by the Act of Algeciras. As regards the letter of Moulai Hafid to M. Malpertuy, the French Consul at Casa Blanca, asking that the French troops should cease to fight against him, M. Malpertuy had assured the Government that it was impossible to put any faith in the professions of Moulai Hafid, whose actions were in direct contradiction to his words, and who was engaged in preaching a holy war against Europeans. M. Pichon also read out to the Chamber the letter received by the French Representative at Tangier from Moulai Hafid. It was impossible for the French Government to reply to it directly, as he was a Chief in revolt against the legitimate authority of the Sultan, and in addition to that was fighting against France and mutilating the dead bodies of her officers and soldiers. The Government had instructed the Consul at Casa Blanca to inform him that France refused to interfere in the internal affairs of Morocco, and only desired to chastise the assassins of her nationals.

M. Pichon went on to deplore the press campaign which had as its object the exaggeration of the dangers of the military situation. General d'Amade, he stated, had won every time he had fought, and the total number of casualties was up to the present fifty-seven killed, six of whom were officers, and 214 wounded. The details of the operations were entirely in the hands of the Military Commander. The Government's orders to him were merely to pacify the Shawia, and to bring about such a situation as would render feasible the organization of the police.

M. Jaurès replied to the effect that the question was whether it was in the interest of France to assume these responsibilities, and for whose advantage France was expending blood and treasure. In the hilly country of Settat the French had only just escaped a disaster. England and Holland had, indeed, encountered greater difficulties. But to support her, as regarded the Transvaal, England had the prospect of a final triumph. In the case of France there existed an International Act which forbade her to gain supremacy in Morocco. Should France bring these operations to a successful issue Europe would cry "Stop!" They must have the truth respecting this policy of mystification.

M. Emile Constant (Radical) desired to turn the question into an interpellation. The proper policy was to instruct the troops not to leave the immediate vicinity of Casa Blanca. M. de Villebois-Mareuil (Nationalist) called attention to the alleged insufficiency of cartridges. General Picquart, Minister for War, after short speeches by Admiral Bien-Aimé and M. Trouin, defended the Government against this charge. After referring to the exaggerated accounts of the losses in Morocco which appear daily in the press, he explained the military operations that had taken place. General d'Amade's system consisted in making raids in the district and then returning to a series of fixed posts for revictualling; these movements could not therefore be construed each time as defeats. The lack of cartridges might be attributed to the hasty and impulsive methods of the Tirailleurs d'Afrique, who wasted enormous quantities of ammunition, a remark which called forth a violent protest from M. Lasies (Nationalist) and others sitting near him. General Picquart declared that every single demand for stores or munitions made by General d'Amade had immediately been granted.

At the end of General Picquart's speech, M. Lasies made an attack against the methods of the French War Office, and the Marquis de Rosambo also spoke to an inattentive and noisy house.

M. Etienne, the leader of the Colonial party, defended the Government against the criticisims of the Extreme Left. What was wanted was the dispatch of further

re-inforcements. General d'Amade was right in proceeding some distance from Casa Blanca. It was only doing what General Lyautey, a soldier of the first rank, had done with the greatest success in the case of the Beni-Snassen on the Algerian Moroccan frontier.

M. Clemenceau spoke towards the end of the debate. He replied to various points which had been raised by previous speakers, and gave the explanations of the policy of the Government which have already been stated on previous occasions. His intervention in the debate was chiefly remarkable for the warning which he addressed to the House on the subject of hampering the Executive at every fresh piece of news which was telegraphed from Morocco. He gave the House his word that absolutely nothing had been kept back from them, that no secret orders had been sent. If the Chamber had no confidence in the Government, let it clearly say so. "S'il est entendu," he said, "que vous nous suivez, alors suivez-nous, et si demain matin il y a un poste Français surpris, s'il y a quatre hommes tués, s'il y a des soldats qui manquent de cartouches, montrez que vous êtes des hommes décidés, que vous avez l'obstination dans la tête et la résolution dans le cœur."

The Chamber finally passed a Resolution of confidence in the Government by 370 votes to 105. I am informed that the debate was conducted amidst continued excitement, and that much personal and political bad feeling was shown. The Prime Minister was violently taken to task at one moment by M. Emile Constant for what he considered a slighting allusion to him, and the incident lasted for nearly ten minutes before order could be restored. The Minister of War spoke under difficulties, and was continually interrupted by excited shouts from the Socialists and Nationalists.

I believe that it is generally felt that the right of criticizing the Government in regard to events in Morocco has been overdone of late. The circumstances under which the French military operations are being carried out are of such a kind that it is impossible to avoid all cause for criticism on the part of some group or other in the Chamber. During yesterday's debate the most contradictory accusations were levelled against the Government, and they were made for the most part in an extremely acrid and exasperating manner. The "Gaulois," one of the chief organs of the Right, published an article by M. Arthur Meyer, its editor, the day before yesterday, inciting the members of that party to use the occasion of M. Jaurès' questions to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to join in any attack which might be made on the Government, and it was the attitude of the Nationalists and the Right generally which prolonged the debate and gave it an irritating character.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[6863] No. 97.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February 28.*)

(No. 31.)

Madrid, February 24, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a translation of an official communication to the Press, in which the Spanish Government replies to the complaints of the Maghzen as occasioned by the Spanish occupation of Mar Chica.

I have, &c.

(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Inclosure in No. 97.

Communication to the Press by the Spanish Government respecting the Spanish Occupation of Mar Chica.

(Translation.)

ON the 17th February was received at Madrid the text of the note addressed by the Sultan's Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires of Spain at Tangier on the 1st February. The note asks the support of the Governor of Melilla in sending back the Mehalla which had taken refuge there to its former position, in order that the Pretender might not take advantage of the opportunity to occupy it. Señor Padilla was instructed to reply by reminding the Minister for Foreign Affairs that both General Marina and the late Señor Llaberia repeatedly, by writing in the months of May, June, and July, and by word of mouth, called the attention of the Sultan's

Delegates at Tangier and of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the state of affairs in the Riff country, which was so prejudicial to the interests of the Sultan and of Spain, and begged that it might be remedied, and that the Sultan would fulfil his Treaty obligations. Notwithstanding these repeated efforts and offers, the Mehalla, reduced as it was by desertions, was left on more than one occasion without any resources, and the Representatives of Spain pointed out the danger in which it lay of being annihilated by the enemy, or ceasing to exist by the men abandoning their leaders and joining the ranks of the Pretender. When, in the middle of December, the leaders of the Mehalla announced their intention of taking refuge within the fortress, Spain would not allow them to be taken in without first consulting the Maghzen. They were advised to wait for orders. Food was promised them in the last extremity, the merchants of Melilla being unwilling to supply it except in the case of absolute necessity. In the end, when they declared that they could hold out no longer, the Governor of the Fortress, moved by sentiments of humanity and friendship to the Maghzen, took them in, after first making the rebels promise that they would offer no opposition, and even himself going out with a force to meet the Mehalla in order to secure its safety. The demand that the Mehalla should return to its old position is, indeed, a surprising one, for when Señor Padilla begged El Guebbas to ascertain where the Sultan wished the Mehalla to be conveyed to in a Spanish ship, as it could not be kept on indefinitely at Melilla, he replied that it would be a danger anywhere, seeing that it was composed of partisans of Muley Hafid. The instructions sent to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires explain the grounds on which the spit of land was occupied; they recall that the Maghzen is under an obligation to keep a contingent near Melilla, according to Article IV of the Convention of 1894; and they conclude with the declaration that the Spanish Government, inspired by its enduring respect for the sovereignty of the Sultan and for the integrity of his dominions, continues to be ready to examine with the Maghzen the best means of restoring normal conditions to the frontier region, and that, so soon as the Sultan shall adopt the necessary measures in order to cause his Treaty obligations to be fulfilled, the point which to-day is provisionally held by Spanish troops will be restored to its legitimate owner.

Mohammed Torres also addressed a note the day before yesterday to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires asking that peremptory orders might be given with a view to the removal of the Spanish troops from Mar Chica and its reoccupation by the Maghzen's troops, and protesting against the consequences of the removal of the Mehalla to make way for the Spanish troops in that quarter.

Yesterday, in consequence of a Press telegram published in Tangier which seems to have declared that the Spanish Government was proclaiming the occupation of Mar Chica as having been accomplished by agreement with the Maghzen, Mohammed Torres wrote to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires complaining of this statement. Señor Padilla is instructed to reply that it is unfortunate that Sidi Mohammed Torres should have taken this step without waiting to learn the facts. What the Government said in the Cortes was that, immediately on resolving to take action, information was given to the Delegates of the Sultan at Tangier, as, indeed, was done. In informing the Governments of the Powers, who all replied by the 15th February that they took note of the occupation without raising any objection to it, no mention was made of Morocco having concurred. A reference to the record of the proceedings in the Senate on the 15th February will suffice to prove this.

The reports received from the Governor of Melilla, as to the reception given by the leaders of the Mehalla to the Sultan's Commissioners who took them the order to return to their positions, show that the impression produced on them was one of astonishment. The Mehalla consisted of some 1,800 men and 600 horses. It will be readily understood how futile is assistance of the 25,000 pesetas which, in response to the petitions he has received during the last two months, the Sultan, after many months of neglect, vouchsafes to send as the sum total of the aid he can afford to his soldiers.

[7155] No. 98.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 2.)

(No. 42.)

Sir, *Tangier, February* 22, 1908.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 11 of the 11th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul

at Casa Blanca summarizing the results arrived at up till now in the preliminary inquiry instituted into British claims arising out of the events of August last.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. E. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 98.

Consul Madden to Mr. White.

(No. 20. Confidential.)

Sir, *Casa Blanca, February* 18, 1908.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 7 of the 6th January, I have the honour to report that the preliminary inquiry I was instructed to hold into British claims due to the late bombardment and siege has been concluded. All complete claims received at this Consulate up to date have been examined in as thorough a manner as possible, and a report drawn up on each. Fifteen more claims have been notified to me from firms outside Casa Blanca, but the details of these are still incomplete. They cannot, therefore, be examined at present, and it is proposed to take them at a later date. The Commission has accordingly adjourned, one of its members having to visit England on private affairs. There have been twenty-one sittings of the full Commission and eighteen of the Sub-Committee.

As the final allocation rests with the forthcoming International Claims Commission, the amounts passed by the present preparatory Commission, both collective and in individual cases, have been considered strictly private, and have not been communicated to parties interested.

I beg to append below a summary of the results arrived at:—

			£		£
Number of claims examined ..	68	Amount claimed ..	143,250	Amount passed ..	78,700
Number of claims, details of which are still incomplete	15	,, ,, ..	20,000	Estimated amount after examination	10,000
Totals	83	.. ..	163,250	.. ..	88,700

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

[7157] No. 99.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 2.)

(No. 44.)

Sir, *Tangier, February* 22, 1908.

CONTRADICTORY rumours being current as to the acquiescence of the Moorish Government in the occupation of Mar Chica by Spanish troops, I requested Mr. Irwin to call upon the Assistant Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Cid Mohammed Guebbas, with a view to ascertaining the facts of the case.

Cid Guebbas stated that the Spanish Legation had for some time past been endeavouring to obtain the consent of the Moorish Government to the substitution of Spanish troops for the small Moorish force maintained at Mar Chica, the point being also pressed by the late M. Llaberia whilst at Rabat. The Sultan and his Government had, however, always declined to entertain this proposal, and had sent orders to the officer in command of the Moorish troops at Mar Chica to maintain his position there. The ground upon which the Spanish Legation based the suggestion for the withdrawal of these troops was their alleged state of destitution and the danger of defeat by the neighbouring tribes. This, however, had been always denied by the Moorish authorities, who also considered it important to retain that force at Mar Chica, as it was composed of southerners, who would be a source of danger if removed from the Riff, as they would in all probability desert and join the forces of Mulai Hafid.

When the news was received that the Spanish General at Melilla had assisted the Moorish troops to withdraw from Mar Chica by sending boats to convey them to Melilla, several meetings took place between Cid Guebbas and the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, the last of which appears to have been of a somewhat stormy character,

Cid Guebbas having repeated that there was no necessity for the Moorish troops to leave Mar Chica, and having, as I understand, gone so far as to hint that bribes had been given to the Moorish officers to induce them to withdraw their men contrary to their orders. At the conclusion of the interview Cid Guebbas requested that all further communications on the subject might be made in writing.

Cid Guebbas stated to Mr. Irwin that the Moorish force could not have been in any danger, as secret negotiations had taken place between the French and the Pretender, who had engaged that the troops in that district should not be attacked. Cid Guebbas, however, begged Mr. Irwin to treat this information as secret.

On hearing that a Spanish force had landed at Mar Chica, Cid Torres and Cid Guebbas addressed a note to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires protesting against the action of the Spanish authorities at Melilla, and throwing on them the responsibility for any untoward incident that might arise therefrom. In this note they gave a résumé of all that had passed between them and the Spanish Legation on the subject, and requested that the Spanish force be withdrawn to allow of the return of the Moorish troops, which would be reinforced. They expressed the hope that this would be done so that the friendly relations hitherto existing between the two Governments might be maintained.

A further written protest was addressed to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires on the 20th instant, by Cid Torres and Cid Guebbas, in regard to a statement said to have been made in the Senate by the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, explaining the action taken by the Spanish Government at Mar Chica, and saying that no protest had been made by the Moorish Government. They requested that an official communication be made to the press rectifying this statement.

Cid Guebbas observed that the Spaniards had recently shown a strong desire to take a leading part in all matters at Tetuan and Laraiche, and that the Moorish officials had had some difficulty in restraining them. He gathered from their action at Mar Chica that they were preparing for the partition of Morocco, and he added that the general opinion in Moorish circles is that the French would not have permitted the landing of Spanish troops at Mar Chica had not the British Government been in favour of that course, but that he personally knew that this was not the case.

The statement now made by Cid Guebbas is not quite in accord with the language held by himself in October last, as reported in Sir G. Lowther's despatch No. 411 of the 15th of that month. At that time at any rate the Makhzen must have contemplated withdrawing their troops from the neighbourhood of Melilla, and it was apparently Cid Guebbas who first broached the subject with the Spanish Minister, who subsequently communicated to him the willingness of his Government to grant facilities for the transport of the Moorish troops to Rabat or elsewhere.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. WHITE.

[7158] No. 100.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 2.)

(No. 45.)
Tangier, February 22, 1908.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 33 of the 7th instant, I have the honour to inform you that, in order to avoid all risk of any future misunderstanding as to the conditions on which Kaïd Sir H. Maclean's release had been effected, I addressed Sid Ben Sliman a letter, forwarding to his Excellency a copy of the Agreement signed by Raisuli and myself.

I beg leave to transmit herewith translation of this letter, as also of the reply I have received from Sid Ben Sliman expressing the Sultan's pleasure at Kaïd Maclean's release, and his thanks to His Majesty's Government and to this Legation for their assistance in this matter, and communicating His Shereefian Majesty's acceptance of the conditions as set forth in the Agreement which has been signed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 100.

Mr. White to Sid Ben Sliman.

(After compliments.)
Tangier, February 8, 1908.

IT is with pleasure that I inform you that Kaïd Sir H. Maclean has at length obtained his liberty on the terms arranged between His Majesty's Minister and Raisuli with the concurrence of the Shereefian Government. I transmit to you herewith a copy of the document containing those terms, which was signed by myself and Raisuli, and the names of the members of Raisuli's family to whom protection has been granted as agreed upon with the Makhzen, as well as a list of the prisoners who have been released.

I have drawn upon His Majesty's Government for the 20,000*l.* which they have advanced on behalf of the Sultan as requested by His Majesty as a loan to be repaid as soon as may be possible; 5,000*l.* of this amount I have handed to Raisuli, and the remaining 15,000*l.* I have deposited at the Banque d'État, and the monthly allowance of Raisuli will be paid to him from the interest accruing therefrom.

There are various other expenses which have been incurred and remain to be paid in connection with this case, a statement of which will be communicated to your Excellency in due course.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 100.

Sid Ben Sliman to Mr. White.

(Translation.)
(After compliments.)
February 15, 1908.

I RECEIVED your letter reporting the release of Kaïd Maclean on the conditions agreed upon between his Excellency the British Minister and Raisuli, and inclosing a copy of those conditions as signed by you and Raisuli. As also you inform me that you have drawn upon the respected British Government for the 20,000*l.* advanced by it for account of His Shereefian Majesty as a loan, and that you had delivered 5,000*l.* of this sum to Raisuli and deposited the remaining 15,000*l.* in the Banque d'État in order that the monthly sum mentioned in the conditions may be paid to Raisuli from the interest thereon. You also promise to send information of the further expenditure incurred.

I took note of this and reported it to His Majesty, and His Majesty was pleased at the release of Kaïd Maclean and at his obtaining his freedom, and he thanks you and your honoured Government for the assistance given in obtaining this result, and he accepts the said conditions and sanctions the signature of them as in the copy you sent.

May you, &c.
(Signed) ABDELKRIM-BEN-SLIMAN.

[7159] No. 101.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 2.)

(No. 46.)
Tangier, February 22, 1908.

Sir,

SINCE the date of my despatch No. 37 of the 15th instant letters from Mulai Hafid, identic with that sent to this Legation direct, have reached most of the other foreign Representatives, who have, so far as I have been able to ascertain, not yet sent any reply thereto, but have communicated them to their respective Governments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

No. 102.

[7160]

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 2.)

(No. 47.) *Tangier, February* 22, 1908.

Sir,

I AM informed that the preparations for sending an expedition to Fez are being pushed on at Rabat in view of the favourable reports received from that place and from the tribes. The expedition will be placed under the command of Kaïd Bushta-el-Bagdadi, and will be accompanied by a younger brother of the Sultan, Mulai Zeen. I am informed that the Prince is an amiable young man, honest, sensible, and not fanatical; he is devoted to the Sultan, but he is not in any way a strong man, and has not hitherto been intrusted with any mission.

It would appear, from what I hear from Rabat, that the French are urging the Sultan to send this expedition to Fez, and I am informed that Cid Mokri telegraphed to His Majesty from Paris that it was very important that the force should start at once. It is, I believe, hoped that a rapid move to Fez will take the hostile tribes by surprise and prevent any combined attack, whilst the show of force and determination will induce many tribes now "sitting on the fence" to declare for the Sultan and join the expedition in the hope of sharing the spoils.

It appears to me, however, that considerable risk will be incurred, as the promises of assistance received from the tribes cannot be relied upon, and contingents which join the Sultan's forces may at any moment treacherously join in the attack on them, as occurred at the disaster to Bagdadi's expedition when proceeding to Showia. A similar disaster to a larger expedition on its way to Fez would be most unfortunate. On the other hand, there are doubtless some tribes which will remain loyal, and the better classes at Fez are said to be tired of the state of unrest produced by the proceedings of the Shereef-el-Kittani and his followers, and will welcome a return to a quieter régime.

It is, I am informed, also proposed that the Sultan himself should accompany another smaller force to march south from Rabat into the Showia district next month, when it is expected that the rebel tribes will have been completely subdued by the French.

If, however, M. Regnault should intend to visit Rabat again before returning to Tangier, as desired by the Sultan, and as appears possible, no important decision will, I presume, be taken until his arrival.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. WHITE.

[7161]

No. 103.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 2.)

(No. 48.) *Tangier, February* 23, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of events, based on information which has been received during the past week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 103.

Summary of Events for the week ending February 22, 1908.

NEWS has arrived from Mazagan to the effect that the brother of Kaïd Glawi entered Azemour on the 13th instant with 1,300 men and two guns. With a view to protecting Mazagan against attack two war-ships have been stationed at that port, but the French authorities state that, at present, complete tranquillity prevails in the town. The French Consul at Casa Blanca is of opinion that it might be expedient to bombard Azemour, in order to punish the partisans of Mulai Hafid for the decapitation of some French soldiers during the recent fighting, but it is doubtful whether this will be done.

The French troops continue to sweep the Shawia, and further fighting of a somewhat severe nature appears to have taken place during the past week. Mr. Madden learns from M. Gaillard that it is the intention of the French authorities to themselves

force the tribes to pay the indemnity for the events at Casa Blanca in August last. M. Malpertuy stated that the tribes had been given every chance to escape punishment by submitting peaceably, but they had broken their agreements, and must now take the consequences. He added, in reply to an inquiry by Mr. Madden, that the French had no wish to fight Mulai Hafid, but that, if the latter were to try and advance on Rabat, he would have to traverse a part of the Showia, and it was certain that the tribes would compel him to attack the French. There is little doubt that Mulai Hafid himself has no desire to take the initiative against the French, notwithstanding his proclamation of a Holy War. The Pretender at present remains at Meshraa es Shaer, where, since the interview between the French journalist M. Houel and General d'Amade, he has been engaged in endeavouring to convince his adherents that a settlement has been arrived at with the French. M. Houel appears to have informed the French authorities that Mulai Hafid's force is composed of 9,000 men, fairly well armed and provided with ammunition, but with weapons and ammunition of a very diverse character.

Severe fighting took place on the 16th and 17th instant, between the French and the Emdakra with other tribes. Though details are not yet known, it is reported that a complete defeat has been inflicted upon the tribes. Another engagement of a somewhat serious nature took place on the 18th near Fedalla. The French are reported to have been attacked by Arabs under the Berber Chief Hammu Akka, with cannon. Ammunition running short, the French fought with the bayonet, and were obliged to fall back upon Fedalla. It is stated that the French losses were 20 killed, 40 wounded, and 12 missing. Official information, however, is difficult to obtain. Something approaching a panic appears to have been caused at Casa Blanca, on the 18th, by the landing of French Marines from the "Kléber," it being supposed that an attack upon the town was imminent. It appears, however, that the Marines were merely replacing troops required to convoy ammunition and supplies to the front, of which a very large quantity has been dispatched. It is considered that the French may require reinforcements to effectively hold all the outposts in the country which they have recently occupied. General d'Amade and the troops returned to Casa Blanca on the 20th instant. Judging from details obtainable, it would seem that the net result of the operations has not been particularly satisfactory, or likely to be of permanent value. The General will probably return after a short time to the Emdakra country, with a view to again punishing that tribe.

A war-ship has been stationed off Buznika, doubtless as a result of the recent fighting near there.

His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Mogador states that much activity is being shown by the French officers in organizing the police at that port; 270 men have already offered to serve in the force, while officers and non-commissioned officers go about in uniform without exciting anything more than curiosity on the part of the natives. Perfect tranquillity prevails in the town.

At Mazagan, hopes are expressed by many of the leading citizens, that His Majesty Abdul Aziz may advance south in order to free them from the power of Mulai Hafid, the exactions of whose General appear to weigh heavily on the district. The Pretender desired, it appears, to make an advance on Fez, but his Viziers objected to this course, as they argued it would leave the south open to Abdul Aziz, when their own provinces would be plundered.

It is reported that Sid Mohammed Merani, the brother of the Viceroy, has left the northern capital for Mequinez, where he is collecting a large army with which to besiege Rabat. The Shereef El Kittani is also engaged in collecting a force, with a view, it is supposed, to fighting the French.

The call to a Jehad appears to have reached Mequinez, where considerable enthusiasm is being shown in collecting money and provisions for the cause.

Greater optimism appears to prevail at Rabat, where there is much talk of an expedition to Fez, as also to Showia. Mr. Neroutsos, however, states that intense hatred of the French appears to exist among the population, which is pushed to such an extent that the troops, in many cases, desert rather than receive pay from the French officer entrusted with the distribution of it. Considerable resentment appears to have been provoked by the Sultan handing over to the French, for use as police barracks, a building which dominates the river and surrounding country. This is regarded as a strategical move on the part of the French.

(Initialled) F. R.

[7402] No. 104.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 3.)

(No. 84.)
Paris, March 2, 1908.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 75 of the 20th ultimo, I have the honour to report that another engagement of a serious character has taken place between the forces under General d'Amade and the Medakra tribesmen to the east of Casa Blanca. General d'Amade, who had concentrated his forces last Thursday at Mediouna, proceeded on Friday into the Medakra country, and on Saturday was attacked at Souk-el-Tnin, 40 kilom. from the coast.

The official account published this morning is to the following effect:—

"A telegram from General d'Amade, dated, Souk-el-Tnin, the 29th February, 10 P.M., informed the Minister for War that he had proceeded to Souk-el-Tnin, on the Mellah River, with the columns of Tirs and the coast tribes, reinforced by fractions of the columns of Ber-Rechid and Fedalah. This operation was protected by covering forces of different arms of the service. The cavalry was violently attacked by the infantry and cavalry contingents of the Medakra. After a serious engagement, our cavalry, in order to free itself, made a charge, repulsing the enemy.

"Losses: 10 killed (2 officers and 8 privates), 23 wounded (2 officers, 1 sergeant, 1 lance-corporal, 18 privates, and 1 goumier). Not contented with having repulsed the Medakra, General d'Amade took the offensive and pursued the enemy for 7 kilom., causing them serious losses.

"Our losses during this pursuit consisted of 3 killed (1 sergeant of zouaves, 2 Algerians) and 17 wounded (13 zouaves, one of them being a sous-officier, and 4 Algerians). The fighting lasted from 8 o'clock in the morning until night."

Rumours are current of considerable agitation of the tribes on the Algerian frontier, but, according to a telegram received by the Government from General Bailloud, in command of the XIXth Corps at Algiers, the situation on the frontier has become distinctly more favourable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[7403] No. 105.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 3.)

(No. 85.)
Paris, March 2, 1908.

Sir,

THE repeated conferences between M. Clemenceau, General Picquart, and General Lyautey during last week have given rise to the report that the latter officer would be sent to Casa Blanca to take command of the troops operating in that district. The "Temps" of this evening's issue states that it is not the intention of the Government to supersede General d'Amade, but that it is possible that General Lyautey, who is of higher rank than General d'Amade, may proceed to Casa Blanca on a tour of inspection.

General Lyautey has been long in command of the French troops on the Algerian–Moroccan frontier, and the occupation of Oudja and the recent operations against the Beni-Snasen were carried out with conspicuous success under his orders.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[7630] No. 106.

Oral Communication by M. Cambon, March 4, 1908.

LE Gouvernement de la République a décidé d'envoyer à Casa Blanca un renfort de 3,500 soldats environ; mais le programme de l'action militaire Française au Maroc demeure sans changement; ces renforts n'ont pour but que de hâter la pacification et de permettre d'organiser plus promptement la police locale.

Le Général Lyautey et M. Regnault sont envoyés en mission à Casa Blanca et à Oudjda, où ils étudieront les conditions d'organisation de cette police. Les accords spéciaux du Maghzen et de la France ont prévu cette organisation en ce qui regarde Oudjda.

[7694] No. 107.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 6.)

(No. 90.)
Paris, March 3, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a despatch which I have received from Lieutenant-Colonel Lowther, Military Attaché to this Embassy, relating to General Lyautey and the French military operations in Morocco.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

Inclosure in No. 107.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lowther to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 7.)
Paris, March 3, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that I yesterday had a long conversation with a French Colonel who has returned from the Province of Oran, and who is intimately acquainted with General Lyautey, whom he had just left.

This officer informed me that the Prime Minister had sent for Lyautey to offer him anything he pleased to ask: the command of the troops at Casa Blanca, with whatever reinforcements were desired; a special Mission to that place; commencement of operations from the eastern frontier—in fact anything, provided he will relieve the Government temporarily of their tiresome task, help them to tide over affairs until the Parliamentary recess, and allow time for some favourable opening to present itself to their Micawber-like policy.

Lyautey does not see the way out of the *impasse* any more than does any one else. Yesterday he had not decided to accept nor what to accept, and he was busily engaged talking himself into a definite policy.

The sending for Lyautey implies no slight on General d'Amade, with whom both the Government and the army are satisfied, for at least he shows activity and readiness to fight. He has had a few men killed, but the trite quotation relating to omelettes and eggs is as true as ever, and provided there is no serious loss of life among the conscript soldiers no one cares.

I am informed from the same source that the Germans have been very active along the Colomb–Bechar Railway, ostensibly travelling as tourists. Many have been got out of the country by making their lives a burden to them in petty ways, and by showing them they were very unwelcome, but there is no doubt that they are keeping a keen eye on the east frontier of Morocco, and are using all their endeavours to poison the native mind against the French.

An officer enlisted, I am informed, in the Foreign Legion under the name of Arendt. He spent thirty days in prison for espionage, and was eventually released and sent away. His real name was Von der Goltz, and he is said to be a nephew of Von der Goltz Pasha, who was employed with the Ottoman army twenty years ago.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. C. LOWTHER,
Military Attaché.

[7856] No. 108.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 7.)

(No. 52. Confidential.)
Tangier, February 29, 1908.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 44 of the 22nd instant, I have the honour to report that I have been informed by Cid Guebbas that the Moorish Government have

received satisfactory assurances from the Spanish Government that the occupation of Mar Chica is merely temporary, and that their troops will be withdrawn as soon as the Moorish Government is in a position to maintain order in that district.

From hints let drop by his Excellency in a confidential conversation with Mr. Irwin, I gather that it is hoped that in return for the acquiescence of the Moorish Government in the presence of the Spanish troops at Mar Chica and the withdrawal of the Moorish troops at present at Melilla, the Spanish authorities would support the Makhzen in re-establishing their custom-house at that place so that the revenue resulting therefrom should revert to the Sultan instead of passing into the hands of the Pretender as at present.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

[7858] No. 109.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 54.) *Tangier, March 1, 1908.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of events, based on information received, during the past week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 109.

News of the Week.

IT is believed by the French authorities that the Showia tribes will not hold out much longer, as they have been sufficiently punished to desire no more fighting. Punitive measures, however, still continue. Colonel Boutigourd left Casa Blanca with a strong column on the 24th ultimo, with the object of giving a severe lesson to the tribe of Ziaida, who recently surprised a French column, forcing it to retire with loss on Fedalla. Meanwhile, General d'Amade is giving the main body of his force a week's rest at Casa Blanca.

Mulai Hafid remains at Meshara-es-Shair. A serious difference of opinion is reported to have arisen between his two principal Viziers, Kaïds Glawi and Ci Aissa, and the French authorities believe that the Pretender will soon find himself forced to retreat to Morocco city and from there ask pardon of the Sultan. The people of Fez and the neighbouring tribes appear to be growing tired of the continued inactivity and procrastination of Mulai Hafid, and it is thought that if the latter does not very shortly make a decided move his cause will die a natural death. In view of these considerations it would appear the height of folly on the part of the Sultan to contemplate an expedition to Fez with a small undisciplined force. Such an undertaking would inevitably end in complete disaster, as the country between Rabat and Fez is peopled by hostile tribes, whose attacks the Government troops would certainly be unable to resist, even if they did not desert *en masse*. In the circumstances it would appear wiser for the Sultan to continue his policy of inaction and allow the cause of his rival to die of inanition. A somewhat serious factor in the situation is, however, the intervention of the fanatical Shereef-el-Kittani, who is reported to be collecting a large force with a view to attacking the French. This personage appears to enjoy great popularity among the tribes—no doubt by reason of his fanaticism—and as he is a man of considerable cunning and ability his appearance in the arena can only have a dangerous effect upon the situation.

At Mazagan the organization of the police is still proceeding quietly. Some 240 men have already enlisted in the force. A letter from Mulai Hafid has been received by the Consular Corps in that port requesting their assistance in evicting the Shereefian troops, or, in the event of their being unable to afford active assistance, asking them to remain in doors for twenty-four hours, when he would himself undertake the task. No answer was, of course, returned. Mr. Acting Vice-Consul Lennox reports that there is no danger of an attack from the Hafidist force in occupation of Azemour.

It is reported from Fez that the Act of Allegiance to Mulai Hafid was dispatched on the 25th ultimo. The son of Sid Dris, Zerouati, is intrusted with this mission, and he is accompanied by 150 Shereefs, Ulema, and principal townsmen and merchants, as well as by 300 horsemen of the Sheraga and other tribes.

Somewhat serious disturbances have occurred near Alcazar, where fighting has taken place between the Governor, Er Remiki, and the tribes as a result of the punishment meted out by the former to a neighbouring village for some acts of robbery. It is rumoured that a Hafidist movement has been started among the mountaineers in that district, and there has been some talk of an attack by them upon Alcazar.

(Initialled) F. R.

[8394] No. 110.

Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 103.) *Berlin, March 9, 1908.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that the "North-German Gazette" of the 7th instant publishes the following statement with regard to Morocco:—

"The communication of the French Government as to the impending sending of reinforcements to Casa Blanca was made here by the French Ambassador. In receiving the communication, the Foreign Office expressed to M. Cambon the hope that care would be taken to prevent German commercial interests, which have already been considerably affected by the military measures taken in Morocco, from suffering further damage. The Ambassador replied with an appropriate assurance in the name of his Government."

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANK C. LASCELLES.

[8514] No. 111.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 106.) *Paris, March 10, 1908.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 84 of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to report that, according to an official statement, copy of which I have the honour to transmit to you herewith,* General d'Amade made a further advance on the 8th instant into the Medakra country to the south-east of Casa Blanca. The enemy retreated towards Sidi Aceila, and were driven with heavy losses into the ravines of M'quarto and the Ach-Ach.

The Mzab tribes came to the assistance of the Medakra, but were kept back by a second French column. The Medakra were also supported by a Mehalla of Hafidian troops.

The enemy abandoned during their retreat a number of tents, ammunition wagons, &c.

The French losses were slight, in spite of the fact that the fighting continued without interruption from 6 o'clock in the morning until 7 in the evening.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[8600] No. 112.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. White.

(No. 8.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, March 12, 1908.*

KAID MACLEAN.

You should impress upon Sir H. Maclean, if you have not done so already, that it is desirable that he should take proper care, in the present disturbed state of affairs in Morocco, not to run any risk of again meeting with experiences such as he has recently undergone, adding that His Majesty's Government cannot accept unconditional responsibility for anything that may happen to him in the future.

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* Not printed.

[9043]

No. 113.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 16.)

(No. 56.)

Tangier, March 3, 1908.

Sir,

M. GAILLARD, French Consul at Fez, who has since the departure of M. Regnault from Rabat been used by the French Government as their Agent at that place for communication with the Sultan and his Viziers, has been at Tangier for a few days for the purpose of consulting with Count Sainte-Aulaire, and returns to Rabat by the first opportunity. He was good enough to call upon me this morning, and spoke at some length on the general situation in this country.

M. Gaillard informed me that one of the principal objects of his visit was to discuss the question of the retaking of Saffi by the Sultan. He said troops would be sent from Tangier and from Rabat for that purpose, and two French cruisers would anchor off that port to lend moral support. Since the bombardment of Casa Blanca he said there was great fear at the ports of a bombardment, and the presence of men-of-war was now sufficient to hold the people in check. He explained that it was not considered advisable to draw any troops from Mogador, as, though they were not required for the protection of the town against the Hafidists, against whom Kaïd Anflus was easily holding his own, it was undesirable to weaken the garrison there as Kaïd Anflus did not view the institution of the police in that town with any favour, so much so that a hint had been given by the French Legation to the officer in command of the police not to show too much zeal in recruiting men, but to feel his way carefully without exciting hostility.

M. Gaillard attached no importance to Mulai Hafid's letter to the Consuls at Mazagan threatening to send a force to take the town if it was not surrendered to him. He considered that the town of Mazagan was quite able to repel any attack that might be made against it; but as an additional security French ships of war were being kept there.

With reference to the proposed expedition to Fez, M. Gaillard told me frankly that the French were urging its dispatch. Thanks to the recent loan, His Majesty had now the means to send the expedition; in a few months he would be again without funds, and should he in the meantime have done nothing to establish his authority, it would then be extremely difficult to obtain a further advance of money, and without the means of paying his men his position would become very serious. M. Gaillard admitted that grave risks would be run by the expedition, but the Sultan had received encouraging letters from many persons, Mulai-el-Merani himself among others, and it was hoped that the move would be successful. The expedition, which he expected would start in eight or ten days' time, would travel rapidly through the tribes without molesting them, and would proceed not to Mequinez or Fez, but to the Sherarda tribe which was wavering, and on to Sheraga and Ulad Jemaa, which were well disposed. Kaïd Bushta-el-Bagdadi, who would be in command, had great influence in that district, and it was hoped that many would join the force, and that the loyalist party at Fez would then be able to cause the town to return to its allegiance.

M. Gaillard observed that he fully realized the danger of disaster owing to the little reliance to be placed upon the protestations of loyalty received by the Sultan, and he admitted that the consequences of a disaster to such an expedition would be most serious. He was also aware that time was in favour of His Shereefian Majesty owing to the inability of Mulai Hafid to advance; but, on the other hand, he thought that the Sultan should not remain inactive whilst he had the means of doing something, and a mere show of force in this country will frequently turn the scales in the case of tribes which are wavering.

Speaking of the Sultan himself, M. Gaillard said His Majesty had been much depressed at the time of Mulai Hafid's Proclamation at Fez, and was then considering the question of leaving the country; now, however, His Majesty was much more reassured, but was still vacillating, and easily moved by the last person who had his ear. The Viziers were incompetent and universally disliked, but the difficulty was to find good men to replace them.

On the whole M. Gaillard appeared to take a fairly hopeful view of the situation, though fully alive to the uncertainty attending it and the difficulty of making any reliable forecast.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. WHITE.

[9046]

No. 114.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 16.)

(No. 59.)

Tangier, March 7, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE heard indirectly from Sid Guebbas that the Moorish Government is desirous of employing Raisuli to influence the mountain and other tribes in the north to remain loyal to the Sultan and assist His Majesty in reasserting his authority. The French Chargé d'Affaires has been approached on the subject, and has informed Sid Guebbas that he sees no objection to this course.

Raisuli received an answer from the Court to the letter he had addressed to the Sultan, translation of which accompanied my despatch No. 39 of the 15th ultimo, and has again written to His Majesty in reply, but I am unaware of the contents of these letters, except that in letters addressed to Kaïd Sir H. Maclean Raisuli expresses his satisfaction at the misunderstandings having been cleared up, and hopes that "the matters on which he is engaged with a view to the restoration of order may have a satisfactory issue," and he asks Sir H. Maclean, when he meets the Sultan, to assure His Majesty that he will do all in his power to that end.

In the meantime Sid Guebbas has requested Raisuli to come to Tangier to confer with him, and it seems probable that he will request him to proceed to Rabat to see the Sultan.

Raisuli having informed Kaïd Maclean that he will not take any step without the consent of this Legation, it is probable he will inquire of me whether he should comply with Sid Guebbas' request. In such case I propose, subject to your approval, to inform him that I see no objection to his acting in accordance with the Sultan's wishes.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

[9047]

No. 115.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 16.)

(No. 60.)

Tangier, March 7, 1908.

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 21 of the 6th ultimo,* I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Casa Blanca, reporting on the steps he is taking to obtain from British claimants an acknowledgement of an abatement of 5 per cent. on all sums awarded to them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 115.

Consul Madden to Mr. White.

(No. 68.)

Casa Blanca, March 1, 1908.

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 14 of the 14th February, instructing me to obtain from all persons on whose behalf I am authorized to present claims due to the recent bombardment and siege to the forthcoming International Claims Commission an acknowledgment of an abatement of 5 per cent. on all sums awarded to them with a view of defraying the expenses of the Commission and the fee payable to the British Representative, I have the honour to report that up to the present I have obtained the required intimation from thirty-seven persons and firms, whose total claims, as passed by the British preparatory Commission, represent a sum of about 45,000*l*. I am taking the necessary steps to obtain similar consent from British claimants established elsewhere than in Casa Blanca, but some time must necessarily elapse before I can receive all the replies.

Though British subjects here have now for the most part signed the bond, it has not been without much demur on their part. They strongly represented to me that the 5 per cent. deduction should not fall on them, but on the Makhzen.

Considering the dangers suffered in the bombardment, and the injury to their

* Not printed.

businesses through loss of profits, which presumably do not come under the category for compensation, if the 5 per cent. charge has to be borne by them, they lose of necessity so much on what they are really entitled to receive as having directly lost.

I promised to bring these views to your notice, but I reminded them that the 5 per cent. abatement is on the same scale as the charge made on all sums recovered through the Consulate, and I pointed out that the expenses of the Commissioner could not possibly be allowed to fall on British public funds.

I may add that the British preparatory Commission has in its work endeavoured to reduce all British claims to a level which is believed fairly represents the legitimate losses of claimants. Their request, therefore, that the Moorish Government may be ultimately held responsible for the expenses of the Commission seems to me to be particularly fair in the British case.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

[9048] No. 116.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 16.)

(No. 61.) *Tangier, March* 7, 1908.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 37 of the 15th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith extract from a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Casa Blanca communicating the substance of the reply made by his French colleague, under instructions from his Government, to the letter of Mulai Hafid. Count Sainte-Aulaire informs me that Mulai Hafid has already replied to the letter of the French Consul in much the same sense as his first letter.

I beg to transmit also herewith copy of a despatch from Mr. Consul Madden, forwarding translation of the letter addressed by Mulai Hafid to the Consular Corps at Mazagan, as reported in the Memorandum accompanying my despatch No. 54 of the 1st instant. The Spanish Chargé d'Affaires informed me that his Government had instructed their Consul at Mazagan to reply to this letter, through the Spanish Semsar who had forwarded Mulai Hafid's letter, that the Foreign Consuls cannot interfere in the internal affairs of the country, and expressing the hope that Mulai Hafid would not carry out his project, as it would give rise to fighting, from which the interests of Europeans would suffer.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 116.

Consul Madden to Mr. White.

(No. 66.) *Casa Blanca, February* 29, 1908.

(Extract.)

The French Consul informs me that, acting on instructions received from M. Pichon, he has replied direct to Mulai Hafid's letter to the French Government. M. Malpertuy said that Hafid's communication was of an insolent nature, accusing the French of having unnecessarily shed blood. The French reply, he stated, was most correct, but at the same time most severe, and was sent from here four days ago. It was to the effect that Hafid has excited the Showia tribes, and has sent mahallas with his cannon, which have been used against the French; that he has preached a holy war against them; and that, under these circumstances, it is impossible to believe in his word or in his protestations of desire for peace.

Inclosure 2 in No. 116.

Consul Madden to Mr. White.

Casa Blanca, February 28, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Mulai Hafid has addressed a letter to the Consular Corps at Mazagan. The Spanish Acting-Consul there has communicated

a copy of this letter to Mr. Acting Vice-Consul Lennox, who has sent the same to me, and I beg to inclose herewith a translation of it.

Mr. Lennox is of opinion that Mulai Hafid's communication need not be taken seriously at all, because it has originated from a Spanish "semsar" who was Amin-el-Mustafad for Hafid at Mazagan, and who, on the arrival of the troops of Sultan Abdel-Aziz, fled to Azemour, where he remains afraid to return to Mazagan. The "semsar," besides, does not hold a very good character.

Mr. Lennox feels certain that Hafid has no intention of carrying out the threat in his letter, knowing as he does that the French cruisers would defend the town against his approach.

So far as is known, no reply will be sent to Mulai Hafid's letter, unless special instructions are received to the contrary.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

Inclosure 3 in No. 116.

Mulai Hafid to Consular Corps, Mazagan.

(Translation.) 15 *Moharram*, 1326 (*February* 18, 1908).

TO the intelligent and most worthy Consular Body of the esteemed nations at Mazagan. After salutations from us to you all:—

We have no doubt that you are aware that we strive to maintain perfect order and peace in the country, because of the good feeling that exists between us and the European Powers.

You are also aware that the whole Mahommedan peoples of the Moghreb have deposed Mulai Abdel-Aziz and proclaimed their submission to us by common consent and according to the rites of Shraa.

Be it known unto you that Mazagan town was under our authority, and only went from our hands through our desire not to disturb the peace and tranquillity of the town by placing soldiers in it.

You are aware that the whole of the Mahommedan people are collected under us, and that Mulai Abdel-Aziz remains only as one of my people and has no authority in any tribe or town.

Because of this we now write to you and we propose one of two things for Mazagan, viz.: firstly, that you expel the soldiers who are now in possession of the town, and we are responsible for the peace and security of the European community. Since we have been called to the Shereefian Throne no disturbance or anything contrary to the interests of Europeans has ever taken place.

Secondly, that you remain in your houses for one day until we chastize the soldiers of Mulai Abdel-Aziz, whom the people have deposed, and there will be no harm come unto you.

The security of a town is from outside, and not from inside; and the peace and security of Mazagan is secured by the surrounding tribes under our authority.

Therefore consider carefully these things, you who are just, and reply. Peace.

[9050] No. 117.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 16.)

(No. 63.) *Tangier, March* 8, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of events based on news received during the past week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 117.

Summary of Events for week ending March 7, 1908.

DISQUIETING news has been received in regard to the situation at Mogador. Great hostility is being shown to the organization of the police by Kaïd Anfloos, who not only refuses to let his men enlist, but has also threatened the authorities that he will create trouble if the organization is proceeded with. Some days ago he caused five of his men who had enlisted to be arrested, and returned their uniform to the French Commanding Officer. As a result of this hostility on the part of Kaïd Anfloos, only twenty men have been recruited so far. In view of these circumstances, the French Consul telegraphed by wireless to his Legation representing the situation as very serious. The general opinion, however, appears to be that there is no cause for anxiety. According to Mr. Vice-Consul Wilkinson, the one disquieting feature is the possibility that the 2,000 Makhzen troops now under the orders of Anfloos may desert with him and join Mulai Hafid. Even should this occur, however, Mr. Wilkinson does not believe that Mogador will be attacked so long as there is a war-ship in the roadstead.

The French Consul at Casa Blanca has informed Mr. Madden confidentially that a plot to regain possession of Mazagan for Mulai Hafid has been discovered by the French authorities. Large numbers of the Hafidist troops at Azemour have been enlisting in the Shereefian force at Mazagan, there being at the present moment no less than 450 of them in the town. In due course an attempt was to be made to overpower the Government forces and declare for Mulai Hafid. On the discovery of the plot, arrangements were at once made for the embarkation of these men to another port.

Further serious fighting has taken place between the French and the tribes. A small French convoy composed of cavalry and artillery was ambushed by the Arabs between Fedalla and Mediuna on the 29th ultimo. After a fierce fight the convoy succeeded in extricating itself, but the French loss amounted to thirteen killed and fifty wounded. Mr. Madden learns that all the tribes are on the move from Shtooka in the south to the gates of Rabat in the north. He considers that at least 20,000 French troops will be needed to deal effectively with these tribes. In the attack upon the convoy the Arabs are reported to have lost from 400 to 500 killed, suffering severely in the hand-to-hand combat which ensued. Notwithstanding this punishment, it is feared that the French are not making very much headway against the tribes, whose numbers and extreme mobility prevent an effective blow from being delivered.

Three so-called emissaries have arrived from Mulai Hafid's camp at Azemour, where they appear to have had an enthusiastic reception by the Hafidist force. They are a Frenchman named Vaffier and two Italians, who, in order to obtain some concession from Mulai Hafid, have, it appears, persuaded him to send them to the coast to "arrange matters with the French."

Mr. Hunot reports from Saffi that letters from the Pretender have been received by the Consular Corps at that port dealing principally with the situation at Mazagan. Details, however, have not yet arrived.

It is announced that the French punitive column under General d'Amade arrived on the 4th instant at Fedalla from Emdakra. Mr. Madden learns that the General will return immediately to the latter place.

News has been received that various tribes beyond the Atlas under the jurisdiction of the powerful Kaïd Glawi have revolted and refused to send contingents to Mulai Hafid.

F. R.

[9006] No. 118.

Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 16.)

(No. 118.)

Sir, *Berlin, March 14, 1908.*

IN his weekly review of foreign politics this week Dr. Schiemann returns to the question of Morocco, and prefaces his remarks with the observation that the declarations made by the French Ministry are highly correct. The unrest is growing, not decreasing, in Morocco, and General d'Amade, after telegraphing that he requires no more troops, has received 4,000 soldiers from Tunis and Algiers, a barbarous crew, who will not

contribute to the restoration of peace. Most of the French troops are provided from their Foreign Legionaries, and the bombastic applause which is bestowed on every slight success by the French home press stands in marked contrast to the quiet and dignified manner in which the German and English press accepted the sufferings and difficulties which their respective troops had to overcome in German South-West Africa and in the recent Afridi campaign.

France's assumed attitude of neutrality between the rival Sultans has long since collapsed, and she is now the visible champion of Abdul Aziz. Dr. Schiemann does not dispute the "Temps'" assertion of the necessity for peace and order to be re-established, in consideration of France's position in her North African Colonies; but he complains that it is disorder, and not order, which is being established. An English paper, the "Al Mogreb-al-Asie," remarks that the murder of some ten or twelve Europeans has been avenged by a deliberate slaughter of a thousand or more men, women, and children, mostly non-combatants; and the sanctuaries and open villages of the Moors have been destroyed. The Quai d'Orsay give the most soothing assurances, while the Commander-in-chief quietly goes his own way. No European trade can be carried on inland, and the French are piling up a debt and a hatred against themselves which centuries of "pacification" will not wipe out. But this is only the complaint of an English merchant in Morocco, which will not be re-echoed in England, while France can point to Egypt and India as the reverse side of the Moroccan medal.

Meanwhile, the disquiet has spread to the Oasis of Tafilet, where a population of about 4,000 persons is showing signs of agitation, an agitation which is hardly likely to be stilled by a prospective expedition on the part of the French.

Europe shakes her head as she looks on at these events and tries to cling for consolation to the assurances of French officials; but her inner feeling is that it is an ill-omened war which is being waged, the end of which is not within sight.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FRANK C. LASCELLES.

[9234] No. 119.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 43.)

Sir, *Madrid, March 13, 1908.*

THE Foreign Minister informed me yesterday that a small Spanish force had occupied the promontory facing the Chafarina Islands, which is known as the Cap de l'Eau or Cabo del Agua. An official communication to the press states that this step was taken at the request of the Kebdana tribe, which had agreed to the establishment of a victualling station for the benefit of the neighbouring islands on the point in question and had undertaken to guard it, but desired, nevertheless, that the post should begin by having the protection of an armed Spanish contingent. Reference is again made in this communication to the neglect by the Sultan of his obligations under Article IV of the Treaty between Spain and Morocco of 1894, requiring him to maintain tranquillity in the districts bordering on the Spanish possessions, and to the duty which consequently devolves upon Spain to undertake this charge herself. It will be remembered the occupation of Mar Chica was explained by similar reasoning.

From the newspaper account of the affair it appears that two companies of Spanish infantry, with a few mountain and machine guns, the whole under the command of Colonel Larrea, left Melilla on board the gun-vessel "General Concha" at dawn on the morning of the 11th March. They proceeded to the Chafarina Islands, picked up a third company there, and effected a landing at Cabo del Agua on the following morning. They are said to have been received by the natives with demonstrations of friendship.

The "Imparcial" adds that something will shortly be done to secure the position of the Spaniards in the neighbourhood of Ceuta, possibly by means of the occupation of the Sierra Bullones from Almansa in the north to El Negrón in the south. I have not been able to identify these places on the map.

The real object of the Spanish Government is no doubt the very natural one of asserting the influence of Spain in the rear of the several "Presidios" on the north coast of Morocco, and thus establishing her claim to dominate the coast up to the mouth of the River Muluya. The French Ambassador, as in the case of Mar Chica, is offering no objection. On the contrary, his Excellency has expressed to me his

satisfaction that by finding employment in the Spanish sphere this Government has come to regard with a much more friendly eye the general policy of co-operation with France in Morocco, which at first was accepted so very unwillingly by men of all parties in Spain. M. Révoil assures me that he is now well satisfied with the attitude of the Spanish Government.

I found his Excellency this morning greatly encouraged by intelligence from Paris to the effect that Muley Hafid and his chief supporter El Glawi have both been making overtures of submission to General d'Amade. El Mokri, who is passing through Madrid on his return to Morocco, after the conclusion of his loan negotiations, professes to be convinced that the star of Sultan Abdul Aziz is again in the ascendant.

On the other hand, M. Révoil has been informed by the Spanish Foreign Minister that Herr von Schön has been holding language to the Spanish Ambassador in Berlin which is calculated to show that the German Government is still far from approving the general trend of the French operations in Morocco. M. Polo de Bernabé appears to have reported that Herr von Schön lays a good deal of stress on the commercial losses of Germany consequent on the action of France, and that, while not exactly advocating the reassembly of a general Conference to deal with the Morocco problem, he has pointed to the probability that it may soon become necessary for the Powers principally concerned to take serious counsel with each other on the subject.

The Spanish Government, M. Révoil informs me, is not at all inclined to fall in with these suggestions. They have merely instructed the Spanish Ambassador in Berlin to reply that explanations are desired in Madrid as to the precise nature of the damages incurred by German commerce, and how the German Government consider that the French Government can be held responsible for them.

Señor Allendesalazar has given me much the same account of the matter as the foregoing.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[9569] No. 120.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 20.)

(No. 119.)
Sir, *Paris, March* 19, 1908.

I INFORMED the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the presence in Paris of Sir Gerard Lowther, and M. Pichon expressed the wish, if possible, to see him. We called yesterday morning by appointment at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and I have the honour to transmit a short Memorandum by Sir Gerard, giving an account of the conversation.

I had seen the sensational rumour alluded to in the last paragraph of Sir Gerard's Memorandum in the "Gaulois" that morning, and asked M. Pichon about it. He replied that he could not imagine who the "haute personnalité diplomatique" could be who had given such erroneous information, and said that he had given orders for the report to be denied at once.

A categorical "démenti" appeared in the "Temps" last night. Copies of the extract from the "Gaulois" and of the "démenti" are inclosed.*

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure in No. 120.

Memorandum by Sir G. Lowther.

I TOOK the opportunity, during a few days' stay in Paris, to pay my respects to M. Pichon, to whom Mr. Lister was good enough to introduce me. The conversation was naturally confined to matters relative to Morocco, and M. Pichon most courteously expressed, in a very pleasant way, his appreciation of the support I had invariably given to M. Regnault and to the French policy in that country, a support which he considered necessary and invaluable to France. M. Pichon dealt generally and in no

* Not printed.

novel vein with Moorish affairs. The only point in his conversation which appears to me to offer any special interest was an inquiry on his part as to whether I considered that it would be possible to re-establish the present Sultan in a firm position in his country. The manner in which the question was put appeared to me to indicate that he had some doubts on this point. Not considering that I was in any way called upon to offer any remarks that might suggest the advisability of a change of policy, I did not commit myself to any view that might be construed as not indorsing the present policy.

In reply to observations on the sensational news published by the "Gaulois," to the effect that the French Government intended to repudiate the Act of Algeciras and invite the Powers to a fresh Conference, M. Pichon said that the report was a pure invention, and added that he had already given instructions that a denial of this intention on the part of the Government should be inserted in the Paris press.

Paris, March 18, 1908.

[9673] No. 121.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 21.)

(No 65.)
Sir, *Tangier, March* 11, 1908.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 23 of the 24th January, I have the honour to report that the United States' Minister has addressed a letter to the doyen of the Diplomatic Body, stating that, upon further consideration, his Government have decided that the United States' Legation should be represented on the two "Comités d'Adjudications" in the same manner as other Legations. As, however, the diplomatic delegates for this year have already been appointed, the United States' Legation will not be represented on the Committees until next year.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

[9676] No. 122.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 21.)

(No. 68.)
Sir, *Tangier, March* 14, 1908.

I LEARN from Sid Guebbas that the Spanish Legation has for some time past urged the opening of a market on the mainland near the Chafarinas Islands, in order that the population of those islands, which has considerably increased of late years, should be able to purchase provisions. No arrangement had, however, been come to, and Sid Guebbas, on hearing that Spanish troops had been landed on the coast, made inquiries on the subject of the Spanish Minister. M. Merry del Val informed him that the Spanish authorities at Chafarinas had been in direct negotiations with the tribesmen, who were themselves anxious to trade with the islands, and that an arrangement was come to locally for the establishment of a market at Ras-el-Ma or Cabo de Agua on the understanding that the Spaniards should take steps for their own protection, the tribesmen declining all responsibility. A small body of Spanish troops had accordingly been landed for that purpose at the Cape.

Sid Guebbas expressed to the Spanish Minister his regret that such action had been taken at this time, as it would certainly be misinterpreted by many people in the country. He informed M. Merry del Val that he was reporting the matter to the Sultan, and in the meantime the Moorish Government must decline any responsibility for anything that might occur in that district, for although the tribesmen might at present be well-disposed towards the Spaniards, any small incident might give rise to trouble.

I understand that the Spanish Minister had also spoken on the subject to Sid Torres, who expressed surprise that no previous notice of the intention to land troops at Cabo de Agua had been given to the Moorish Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

[9677]

No. 123.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 21.)

(No. 69.)

Tangier, March 15, 1908

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of events based on news received during the past week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 123.

Events of the Week.

THERE is but little of importance to report during the past week, beyond the fight which took place on the 8th instant in Emdakra, near Emgartou. The mehalla under the Khalifa of Mulai Hafid, Kaïd Essekhtani, was attacked by a portion of the French troops operating from the north in the defile of the Wad Hasseila, and utterly crushed. The Arabs fled in great disorder, abandoning a large quantity of ammunition and several gun carriages. The French losses are described as very slight. It is hoped that this severe blow will have a salutary effect upon the tribes, and lead them to give up the struggle. Reinforcements, however, appear to be much needed by the French, in order to relieve the overworked troops.

Mr. Madden learns that a brisk commerce in contraband has recommenced in Bujad, the old centre of this trade. Large quantities of ammunition appear to be coming through to Bujad across the Southern Algerian frontier.

Conflicting reports are received in regard to the expedition to Fez, but the probability is that it has been postponed for the present, at any rate. It is understood that the Makhzen troops from Mar Chica have been ordered to Rabat, with what object it is not yet certain. There appears, however, to be an intention to send a force to Saffi, the only port of importance which has acknowledged Mulai Hafid, with a view to retaking the town for the Sultan. There is some fear that such an attempt may lead to disturbances entailing a landing by the French, as the present officials of the town are all Hafidists.

A force was dispatched, under Mulai Zin, from Rabat on the 12th instant. This force was to proceed to Tedla, where the important Shereef-ben-Dawid had guaranteed its security. The object of this expedition is to impress the tribes in that district with the fact that the authority of the Sultan is still supreme.

The situation is quiet at Fez, but great determination seems to be shown to oppose the expedition from Rabat, should it ever be dispatched.

(Initialled) F. R.

[10414]

No. 124.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 27.)

(No. 126.)

Paris, March 25, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a despatch which I have received from Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. Lowther, Military Attaché to this Embassy, relating to the cost of the Moroccan expeditions and the losses incurred.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

Inclosure in No. 124.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lowther to Sir F. Bertie.

Paris, March 25, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that to-day's Paris papers publish a résumé of a Report by M. Doumer on the cost in lives and cash of the Moroccan expeditions.

The number killed and wounded from the commencement of the operations up to the 8th March was respectively 99 and 311 (or about as many as are accounted for in a month by the Paris hooligans and cab-drivers). These figures are made up as follows :—

OPERATIONS on the Algerian Frontier.

	Killed.	Wounded.
Europeans	6	17
Algerians	19	38
Total	25	55

OPERATIONS round Casa Blanca.

Europeans	51	175
Algerians	23	81
Total	74	256
Grand total	99	311

The force at the disposal of General d'Amade, when the reinforcements now on their way have arrived, will amount to: 14,000 men, 16 field guns, 6 mountain guns, 20 machine guns, and 4,640 horses and mules.

The additional expenses incurred in the operations are estimated as having amounted to about 885,000*l.* up to the 1st March. Of this sum 472,000*l.* has been taken on the Estimates for 1907, and 413,000*l.* on that of the current year.

But in addition to this sum there is the cost of replacement of the arms and equipment belonging to reserve stores which have been used in Morocco.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. C. LOWTHER,
Military Attaché.

[10538]

No. 125.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 28.)

(No. 71.)

Sir,

Tangier, March 21, 1908.

NEWS was received at the French Legation by wireless telegraph on the night of the 18th instant that the French trawler "Baleine" had been wrecked on the coast near Cape Juby, and the crew of nineteen persons captured by the natives.

The French cruiser "Cassard" left early next morning for Cape Juby, but probably called at Casa Blanca on the way to receive orders from the Admiral. An interpreter from the French Legation, who has had experience in dealing with natives in the Algerian Sahara, left in the "Cassard."

No further news has since been received at the French Legation, but it is feared that the natives will be found somewhat difficult to deal with, as they consider that they owe the French a grudge for the manner in which the crew of M. Lebaudy's ship the "Frasquita" were released by the "Galilée" in 1904 without payment of any ransom, as reported in Sir A. Nicolson's despatch No. 219 of the 12th December, 1903.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

[10539] No. 126.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 28.)

(No. 72.)

Tangier, March 22, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of news, based on reports received during the past week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 126.

Summary of News for week ending March 21, 1908.

WHAT little news there is of Mulai Hafid tends to the opinion that he may be eliminated for the present as an active political force in the situation. He is still at Meshra-es-Shair. He recently applied to Marakesh for funds to enable him to pay the last contingent of 700 men which had reached him from that town. The Notables of Marakesh refused the request. He has again begged that the French proceedings in the Showia may be brought to an end, but apparently without result. The French, Mr. Madden says, are doing all in their power to induce him to make formal submission to the Sultan.

The punishment of the Showia tribes continues as before, with the exception that the resistance now offered hardly allows the operations to be described as fighting. The Emdakra have been completely subjugated. In their last encounter with the French they are said to have lost 1,200 men. The casualties on the other side amounted to four. The bombardment of the Emdakra villages is said on good authority to have caused great loss of life among the women and children of the tribe. On the 15th instant, operations were undertaken against the Shereef Bu Nualla, a half-witted fanatic, who had prophesied the extermination of the French, and who seems by his influence to have gathered a large concourse of Arabs around him, drawn from the villages of the district and from the town of Casa Blanca itself. The expedition entailed a march to a more southern point than any yet visited by the troops. The original intention was merely to disperse the assembly, which was not regarded as a fighting force. Some shots were fired, however, as the French approached, and the huts were at once set on fire by the troops; the whole encampment, in which, says an eye-witness, were hundreds of wounded men and women, was burnt. This circumstance is not mentioned in the French accounts published, where the affair is described as a brilliant military operation. Mr. Madden's informant was deeply shocked by what he had seen. The French casualties on this occasion amounted to five.

The French Minister and General Lyautey reached Casa Blanca on the 17th instant, and were joined there by General d'Amade, and are presumably engaged in seeking a way out of the situation referred to by Colonel Lowther in his despatch to Sir F. Bertie of the 3rd instant. The "Times" correspondent in Tangier has joined General Lyautey at Casa Blanca, on the latter's invitation. The former attributes the invitation to the General's desire to escape the tedium of the society of his staff, but it seems equally explicable by a wish for an independent opinion from a man conversant with the country, or, perhaps, a desire to insure the support of the journal above mentioned. Mr. Madden remarks that no Spanish officers were present at the General's landing. It appears that the French Consul did not notify the Spanish Commandant of the hour of arrival. The relations between the French Consulate and the Spanish garrison at Casa Blanca are not cordial. General d'Amade has done all in his power to foster good feeling between the military forces of the two countries, with much success, says Mr. Madden.

Two sutlers of French and Italian nationality were recently captured by Emdakra horsemen while following the troops. Both declared themselves to be Italians, and this seems to have secured their good treatment by the tribesmen. A ransom of 10,000 fr. was asked for them, and their liberation effected as soon as the money was forthcoming.

The press has lately announced the proclamation, as Sultan, of "the Chief Big Sus." A "big Chief in the Sus," is presumably what is intended. There has been no official confirmation of the statement.

C. R.

March 22, 1908.

[10826] No. 127.

Vice-Consul Richards to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 30.)

(No. 6.)

Dakar, March 16, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that some 3,000 native infantry are under orders to proceed to Morocco.

They will be under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Mangin, who is at present Chief of the Staff of General Audéoud, the Commander-in-chief of the forces in French West Africa.

Lieutenant-Colonel Mangin has had considerable experience in West Africa. He takes twenty-two European officers with him.

The Government transport "Gironde" leaves here to-day with the first detachment, some 1,200 strong, fully equipped and with their own transport, for Casa Blanca.

The remainder will follow in a few days.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. A. RICHARDS.

[10707] No. 128.

Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 30.)

(No. 132.)

Berlin, March 25, 1908.

Sir,

THE debate in the Reichstag on the Foreign Office estimates began on Monday last. For the reasons given in my despatch No. 128 of the 21st instant the Chancellor of the Empire did not follow his usual custom and address the House on the first day of the discussion. Yesterday, however, both His Serene Highness and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Herr von Schoen, spoke. Prince Bülow, in the first part of his speech, remarked that the disagreeable state of things in Morocco had been mentioned by all those who had participated in the debate. He was pleased to observe that all the speakers had dealt with the matter in a moderate and serious spirit, although several members had remarked more or less strongly on the object of the military measures, and had cast doubts as to whether the action of France was in agreement with the text of the Act of Algeciras. It was correct, he said, to say that this Act was equally binding on all the Signatories, and it was also right to say that Germany must exercise care that commercial equality was not contravened, and that Germany's commercial interests did not suffer. It must not be forgotten on the other side that the performance of important provisions of the Act was hindered by the disturbances which were in process in Morocco, especially the conflict for the throne, which was taking place there. The French Government could not accuse Germany of having ignored these facts, and of interpreting the Act in a petty or mean-spirited manner. Germany had not done so, nor would she do so in the future, but she expected that France on her side would interpret and regard the Act in a peaceful and friendly manner.

This utterance of Prince Bülow was greeted with applause, and His Serene Highness then said that he had nothing to add to his former utterances in the Reichstag on the general policy of Germany in Morocco and on the relations of the Empire with France. Herr von Schoen followed the Chancellor of the Empire. His Excellency said that he was glad to be able to state that Franco-German relations over the Morocco question were quite friendly and normal. Herr von Schoen stated that he did not propose to discuss the speech of M. Delcassé in the French Chamber, since the statements of the late French Minister for Foreign Affairs had already been contradicted in his own country. In his Excellency's opinion, it was enough for him to say that the policy of the present French Government in Morocco was a very different one to that of regarding Morocco as the corner stone of a hostile movement, a policy which

obtained three years ago. Then (and this was where the difference lay between the present date and three years ago, and between Germany's position then and now) Germany was forced to use a lever to redress the balance and to accentuate and guard her interests and rights which had been traversed. The result was the Algeciras Conference and the Act of Algeciras. To this international Agreement Germany would hold firm. For Germany it was and remained the basis of her position in the affairs of Morocco. If events in Morocco were measured by the Act of Algeciras, it must be said, in spite of the sceptical and ironical remarks of a certain section of the press, that up to the present time no open contravention of the Act could be proved against France, and it must furthermore be taken into account that the French Government had always declared that the Algeciras Act was binding upon them.

It was stated a short time ago in a French paper that France intended to denounce the Act. Inquiries as to the truth of this statement had been made in the proper quarter, and Germany had been informed that the rumour was entirely groundless.

The French Government had repeatedly declared to Germany that they had no intention of doing more in Morocco than to restore peace and tranquillity, and that all their actions in that country were directed solely to that end; and the German Government had no ground whatever to doubt the loyalty of good faith of France. It must also be remembered that the Act of Algeciras regulated the relations of Morocco and the Powers, and that the Powers who had signed the Act would be entitled to demand satisfaction for a flagrant contravention of their rights. According to the Act, no attempt must be made on the integrity of Morocco, and so long as that was not done, Germany had no right to raise objections.

Germany could in no way be responsible for the proceedings of the French in Morocco. It could not, of course, be denied that the continuation of the present evils increased the state of confusion, and particularly that trade must suffer. Germany's point was that French military action in Morocco must not be allowed to prejudice trade; and France had given repeated assurances that she would do her best to safeguard German trade. So long as German rights were not especially contravened, Germany had no reason to mix herself up in Moorish affairs. It was for this reason that the German Government refused to intervene when approached by the two rival Sultans, Abd-el-Aziz and Mulai-el-Hafid. Both these Princes had been informed that, should they consider they had justifiable cause for complaint, their proper course would be to address themselves to the Signatory Powers jointly, and not to one alone.

In a few weeks his Excellency trusted to lay a White Book on the table which would go into details of affairs in Morocco, and would, he felt convinced, prove to the House that German interests had been vigorously protected. This statement was received with much satisfaction by the House. It would be seen in the White Book that an inquiry had been addressed to the French Government as to whether there was any truth in the statement that France intended to occupy the harbours of Saffi and Azimur, and that a negative reply had been received. His Excellency then proceeded to explain to the House the methods by which it was intended to settle the Casa Blanca indemnity question, and he then turned to other subjects.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANK C. LASCELLES.

[10718] No. 129.

Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 30.)

(No. 143. Confidential.)

Berlin, March 27, 1908.

Sir,

I HAD yesterday some conversation with my French colleague on the subject of the speeches on the foreign policy of Germany, delivered by Prince Bülow and Herr von Schön in the Reichstag on the 24th instant, a report of which I had the honour to forward to you in my despatch No. 132 of the 25th instant.

M. Cambon said he was completely satisfied with the language held by Prince Bülow and Herr von Schön about Morocco. It was certainly intended to be conciliatory, and he trusted it would be considered so in Paris. Herr von Schön had previously informed him that a debate about Morocco was inevitable, and that it was probable that in the course of it some of the speakers would severely criticize the action of France in that country. He himself would be called upon to reply, and he

would do his utmost to do so in a conciliatory manner, although he would be bound to assert that the German Government would take care to safeguard German interests in Morocco. Herr von Schön having noticed that Count Berckheim, the Councillor of the French Embassy, was present in the Reichstag during a speech, sent a message to him to ask him to come to his room, and then prepared a résumé of his speech, which he requested him to hand to M. Cambon—a civility with which M. Cambon was much gratified.

M. Cambon said, in conclusion, that he had sent a report to his Government, to the effect that the German Government desired to deal with the Moroccan question in a conciliatory sense, and that he hoped that this would be recognized in Paris.

I told M. Cambon that the impression I had received on reading the speeches was that the German Government wished to convey their desire for friendly relations with France, and indeed for all other countries, but that I thought that His Serene Highness' remarks about Macedonia might have been couched in more fortunate language. M. Cambon agreed that Prince Bülow's observations as to the danger of introducing innovations into Macedonia might be held to apply to the question of the nomination of a Governor-General, but they were of a vague and general character, and did not constitute a reply to your proposal.

It has occurred to me that Prince Bülow, who, according to a statement in the papers, is about to pay a visit to Baron d'Aehrenthal at Vienna, may have been guided by a wish to indicate to that statesman that he might count upon the support of the German Government in his Macedonian policy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANK C. LASCELLES.

[10808] No. 130.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 30.)

(No. 49.)

Madrid, March 26, 1908.

Sir,

ON the 21st instant Señor Sanchez Roman, formerly Foreign Minister in the Liberal Government of Señor Montero Rios in 1905, interpellated the Spanish Government in the Senate on the Morocco question. His speech occupied two sittings of the Senate, but contains little matter worth noticing. He thought several points of Spanish policy required clearing up. Had the Spanish Government observed faithfully their obligations under the General Act of Algeciras? Had they maintained, in the complications which arose out of the Casa Blanca incident, a proper mean between allowing themselves to be drawn by the French into a forward policy and the danger, on the other hand, of leaving the Spanish populations in the coast towns exposed to assault and outrage at the hands of the Moors? Thirdly, had they acted on the Riff Coast with due regard to Spanish interests?

In his reply, delivered on the 24th instant, the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs traversed once more the whole ground covered by Señor Sanchez Roman's interrogations.

The General Act of Algeciras had been, he said, the foundation of Spanish policy in Morocco since the date of its signature. It had been scrupulously observed, and no objection had been raised by any Power to the interpretation which Spain, in common with France, had placed upon it, in respect of the organization of the native police force, of the establishment of the State Bank, or of any of its other provisions. The most cordial understanding had been maintained with France and England throughout, those Powers being interested in a special degree in the course of events in Morocco. But, in reviewing Spanish policy in that country, it must not be forgotten that, apart from her obligations under the more recent Conventions, that is to say, under the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish Agreements of 1904 and the Algeciras Act of 1906, Spain is connected with the history of Morocco by direct understandings between the Moorish and Spanish Governments dating back to the end of the fifteenth century, when her fortresses in the north coast of Morocco began to be established. These special understandings were consolidated and interpreted in the Treaty of Wad Ras of 1860, which followed upon the Spanish expedition to Tetuan in the preceding year. They had been further defined by the Treaty of 1894, in which will be found the special provision entailing upon the Sultan the duty of maintaining order and keeping open the communications with the interior in the districts adjoining the Spanish possessions. This obligation had been of late years entirely neglected by the Sultan, and it was no longer

possible for Spain to tolerate the position of complete isolation to which the "Presidios" had been reduced by the unwillingness or inability of the Sultan to keep his engagements. This was the simple and sufficient explanation of the recent occupation by Spanish troops of the Mar Chica and Cabo de Aguas.

Summing up the policy of Spain in Morocco, Señor Allendesalazar said that this country was determined to continue on the same course, executing faithfully and in agreement with the other interested Powers, and especially with the Makhzen, her obligations under the Algeciras Act, and, as regards her own peculiar interests, never losing sight of the fact that Spain looks across the Straits to the north coast of Morocco, where a political necessity compels her to maintain as long as possible, beyond the limits of her own possessions, the unimpaired authority of the Sultan, but to reserve her own undisputed and predominant rights in the event of that authority being at any time brought immediately to the ground.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[10764] No. 131.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 30.)

(No. 134.)
Paris, March 28, 1908.

Sir,

ANOTHER long debate took place yesterday in the Chamber of Deputies respecting Moroccan affairs, in connection with the voting of a credit for the cost of the military operations. M. Lasiès, a Nationalist Deputy, first criticized the Government on the subject of the proper payment of the troops. He was followed in the tribune by M. Jaurès, the Socialist leader, who stated that his party was opposed to the Moroccan adventure, and would not vote for the credit. He took the opportunity to make a long speech, raising the general aspect of French policy in Morocco. He also questioned the Government closely with reference to the recent bombarding and capture of a Moroccan encampment by General d'Amade's troops, at which he declared that a species of massacre of non-combatants, including women and children, took place, that the encampment was 80 kiloms. from the coast, and that its occupants had shown no sign of a desire to attack the French. The Minister of War gave explanations as to this operation. General d'Amade had succeeded in enveloping a portion of the tribe of the Medakras in a mountain gorge, where they were at his mercy, and he stopped the cannonade, showing thereby a spirit of humanity, "quand il vit cette masse humaine à sa merci sous les coups de son artillerie, et quand il vit les populations venir ramasser les blessés et les morts." A Socialist Deputy here interjected the remark that from the accounts published 1,500 persons had already been killed.

Other speakers covered ground which has already been repeatedly covered in previous debates, and the discussion was wound up by a speech of M. Pichon, which I have the honour to transmit to you herewith extracted from the "Journal Officiel."* His Excellency met the criticisms which had been brought against the Government policy, and gave explanations as to the mission intrusted to General Lyautey and M. Regnault. He insisted once again that France had been obliged to send forces to Casa Blanca, and that if she had not acted up to her responsibilities other Powers would have taken her place.

An allusion was made by one of the speakers to the fact that England had promised to evacuate Egypt, but that she was still there; a Deputy thereupon called out: "Ask M. Clemenceau who sent England there." M. Clemenceau replied: "C'est moi qui ai envoyé les Anglais en Égypte? Deux fois les Anglais ont proposé de s'en aller; deux fois, en 1885 et 1887, la diplomatie Française s'y est opposée."

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

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* Not printed.

[10815] No. 132.

Mr. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 30.)

(No. 40.)
(Extract.)
Munich, March 28, 1908.

THE press here is not satisfied with the Chancellor's declarations on the Moroccan question. I have noted for several months past that whenever the Imperial Government have officially stated that they are satisfied with the declarations made by the French Government as to their action in Morocco the whole German press bitterly attacks France for that very action. Is this done by orders from Berlin, or does it really reflect the opinions of the writers in these newspapers? It is a question difficult to answer, for people here have their own opinions as regards Morocco; but, as newspapers in Germany in dealing with foreign questions are so much under the guidance of Berlin, it is conceivable that, although in this case they almost unanimously criticize the policy of the Imperial Government, they do so by instruction for a purpose which is not quite clear.

As an example of the criticisms employed by the press in judging of the situation in Morocco, I will draw your attention to the way in which Prince Bülow's recent utterances have been received by the Munich "Neueste Nachrichten," a newspaper which, as a rule, takes its inspirations from the Prussian Legation here. That newspaper, in commenting on that portion of the Chancellor's speech which relates to Morocco, observes that it does not see why the Imperial Government should not make their views clearly felt in Paris without having the support of the other Powers. It is a mistake to believe that if Germany acted in this independent manner she would thereby complicate matters in Morocco. It thinks that if things have reached the present state of confusion in that country the fault lies to a great extent with Germany, who has encouraged France to act as she does by her undecided, wavering, and weak attitude of late. The present Moroccan problem would be greatly simplified if Germany could only muster the courage to talk to France in a clear manner. In his speech Prince Bülow described German policy with regard to Morocco as a mixture of resolution combined with reserve. The Munich newspaper declares that, if such a policy has not done German interests any positive harm so far, it certainly has not helped to further them very much in Morocco.

The Munich "Neueste Nachrichten" thinks that the moment has come for Germany to have a friendly, loyal, but firm exchange of views with the French Government, for if she continues to be silent the politicians in France will take this as a sign that Germany will not impede French action in Morocco. If that should come to pass, what was the use of this country going to Algeciras? This is a prospect which cannot be viewed with equanimity, for the solution of the Moroccan problem must not be left to the future to be solved without Germany taking any kind of precaution to protect her real interests.

In reporting the French comments on Prince Bülow's speech, mostly of a laudatory character, the Munich newspapers generally point out that such flattering references by France to German foreign policy cannot sound as entirely satisfactory to German ears.

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